The deep extent of mental autonomy by Conway, William

The Deep Extent Of Mental Autonomy 
Williarn Cassidy Stronach Conway 
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
The University of Edinburgh 
1998 
I hereby declare that I have composed ths thesis, and that the work contained herein is 
entirely my own: 




Chapter 1: Introduction, 1. 
Chapter 2: Physicalism and Autonomy, 5. 
l:Introduction, 5. 
2:Arpments .for non-reductive physicalism, 9. 
3:Supervenience, 24. 
I: Conclusion, 3 I. 
Chapter 3: Life and Mind, 34. 
I :  Introduction, 33. 
2: The autonomy ojhuman relationships, 3 7, 
3:Conclusion, 5 7. 
Chapter 4: Thinking and Relating, 59. 
I:lntroduction, 59. 
2:More on human relationships, 59. 
3: The intrinsic connection between thinhng and relating 69. 
-f:Intelpretationism, 77. 
Chapter 5: Rationalising Explanations, 85 
I:Introduction, 85. 
2: What rationalising explanations explain, 85. 
3: Why the causal account of rationalising explanations? 90. 
4: The problem of mental property epiphenomenalism, 93. 
5:Securing the autonomy o f  mental causation by rejecting the principles ofphysicalism, 101. 
6:Conclusion, 105. 
Chapter 6: Thoughts Externalised, 108. 
I:Introduction, 108. 
2: The externalistic individuation of thoughts, 109. 
3: Reconciling externalism with the identity claim, I I 7. 
3: Thinhng and knowing what one is thinhng, 124. 
5. Conclusion. I 2  7. 
Chapter 7: Thinking and the Brain, 129. 
I:Introduction, 129. 
2: Thinkmg: biological or computational? 130. 
3: The attitude of scientistic optimism, 138. 
4:Conclusion, I43 
Chapter 8: Animal Thinking, 144. 
I: Introduction, 144. 
2:Animal thinkmg: a Brther fragment of our alrea&@agmented concept, 134. 
Chapter 9: Conclusion, 153. 
Bibliography, 163. 
Acknow iedgements 
First of all, I would like to thank my main supervisor, Peter Lewis, for hs helpfbl comments 
on an earlier draft of this thesis. His quiet weighmg of linguistic facts has prevented me from 
over-stating certain points and from under-stating others. I would also like to thank my 
second supervisor, Dr. Alexander Bird, for hs excellent and very thorough comments on 
chapter 2. In writing h s  thesis, I have benefited fiom discussions with various people. In 
particular, I have benefited fkom discussions with Maura Tumulty, now at the University of 
Pittsburgh, without whom I would never have seen the distinctively human side to 
Wittgenstein 's Philosophical Investigations. Special thanks are also due to my good fhend 
and phlosophcal sparring partner. Michael Higgins, with whom, over the past five or six 
years, I have had the pleasure to discuss some of the issues now contained in this thesis. His 
sharpness of intellect has been inspiring. I would also llke to thank Pal Opdal, not only for hs 
lessons in Norwegian, but more importantly for his fhendshp and much needed 
encouragement through the final stages of ths  work. But my greatest debt is to Suzanne, 
whose constant presence has prevented my spirits fiom flagging on more than one occasion. 
Finally. I am gratefid for having had the opportunity to present earlier versions of chapters 4 
and 6 at work-in-progress meetings in the University of Edinburgh, and I would like to 
express my gratitude to the Student Awards Agency for Scotland for the award of a three year 
Major Studentship grant which made h s  study possible. 
Abstract 
The central aim of this thesis is to argue that the autonomous nature of mentalistic explanation presents 
a stronger constraint on what counts as a satisfactory statement of the relation between the mental and 
the physical than can be acknowledged within the metaphysical fiamework of non-reductive 
physicalism. Although the chief merit of non-reductive physicalism appears to be its ability to respect 
the irreducibility of mental concepts to physical concepts, whilst respecting the primacy of the physical 
ontology, I claim that its commitment to the principles of physicalism prevents that framework fiom 
being able to accommodate what I will refer to as the deeper extent of the autonomous nature of 
mentalistic explanation. The deeper extent of the autonomous nature of mentalistic explanation 
manifests itself in the fact that the work carried out by mentalistic explanations is completely separate 
kom the work carried out by physicalistic explanations. I claim that the deeper extent of the 
autonomous nature of mentalistic explanation cannot be recognised within a metaphysical framework 
which claims to recognise the primacy of the physical ontology because recopsing deep autonomy 
requires giving up the assumption that the mental must be related to the physical in the manner 
appropriate to discharging such metaphysical principles. 
I defend the claim that we can recognise the deeper extent of the autonomous nature of mentalistic 
explanation if we take our successhl explanatory practices as the starting point of our investigation, 
and only then revert to the question of how best to articulate the relation between the mental and the 
physical. My claim is that there is an intrinsic connection between the nature of the mental and the 
nature of human relationships, and I therefore suggest that the autonomous nature of mentalistic 
explanation ought to be understood in connection with the autonomous nature of human relationships. 
The basic ideas in this thesis are derived by combining features of Wittgenstein’s rule following 
considerations with features of John MacMurray’s approach to human relationships. On the basis of 
this combination, I argue for the more specific claim that there is an intrinsic connection between what 
it means to say that an individual has the capacity to think and what it means to say that he has the 
capacity to be involved in various types of human relationships. This connection is then used to develop 
a non-causal account of human action to challenge the physicalist ’s causal account, which will be used 
to support the claim that mentalistic explanations are autonomous with respect to physicalistic 
explanations in the deeper sense. 
I conclude by arguing that the considerations which put us in position to recognise the deeper extent of 
the autonomous nature of mentalistic explanation ought to constrain our statement of the relation 
between the mental and the physical, and I suggest that this statement should be consistent with the 
way in which mentalistic and physicalistic explanations carry out their work in our explanatory 
practices. I claim that individuals are subject to mentalistic explanations in so far as they have a life to 
live in the world with other people, and that individuals are subject to physicalistic explanations in so 
far as human beings are creatures whose life has a natural biological dimension. But rather than identifL 
the mental with the physical, and thereby compromise the deeper extent of the autonomous nature of 
mentalistic explanation, I suggest that this relation might be understood in terms of the fact that the 
mental is embedded in the dimension of human life which is constituted by the involvement of 
individuals in various types of relationshps with each other, and that the dimension of human life in 
which physicalistic explanations are operative is presupposed as the causal background which must be 
in place if individuals are to have such a life to live in the world. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Recent attempts to articulate the nature of the relation between the mental and the physical 
have been largely constrained by a sensitivity to the autonomous nature of mentalistic 
explanation. To those who are concerned to conduct their thinking within the parameters of 
the received scientific world-view, tlus means that a satisfactory statement of the relation 
between the mental and the physical not only has to be consistent with a recognition of the 
irreducibility of mental concepts to physical concepts? but also with a recognition of the 
primacy of the physical ontology. Consequently, the relation between the mental and the 
physical has been most commonly articulated withm the metaphysical framework of non- 
reductive physicalism. Not only does non-reductive physicalism claim to display a bias 
toward the primacy of the physical ontology; it also claims to be sensitive to the autonomous 
nature of mentalistic explanation. However, there appears to be a tension at the heart of this 
position. On the one hand, the primacy of the physical ontology seems to imply that it must 
be possible to explain everything that exists and occurs in terms of what exists and occurs in 
the physical domain; but on the other hand, the irreducibility of mental concepts to physical 
concepts seems to imply that it is not possible to give an exhaustive characterisation of every 
aspect of human behaviour in terms drawn exclusively from the physical sciences. 
It is not my aim to contribute to the arguments which purport to remove this tension, by 
explaining how the primacy of the physical ontology can be reconciled with the autonomous 
nature of mentalistic explanation. Rather is it my aim to argue that there is a deeper extent to 
the autonomous nature of mentalistic explanation than can be recognised when the mental is 
related to the physical in the manner suggested by the metaphysical framework of non- 
reductive physicalism. mist that framework claims to respect the autonomous nature of 
mentalistic explanation in respecting the irreducibility of mental concepts to physical 
concepts, it seems to me that this is not sufficient to capture the deeper extent to which 
mentalistic explanations are autonomous with respect to physicalistic explanations. I argue 
that mentalistic explanations are autonomous in the much deeper sense that they can carry out 
the work required of them without implicating the explanatory support of underlying 
physicalistic explanations. Consequently, I claim that a satisfactory statement of the relation 
between the mental and the physical is one whch is sensitive to the deeper extent of mental 
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autonomy, and hence that thls relation cannot be properly articulated within the metaphysical 
framework of non-reductive physicalism. 
I think the main reason why non-reductive physicalism cannot recognise the deeper extent of 
the autonomy of mentalistic explanations lies with one of the central motivating factors for 
that position. Non-reductive physicalism is largely motivated by the need to account for the 
causal efficacy of mental events with respect to the behaviour they purport to explain. This is 
achieved through the imposition of a metaphysical ordering onto reality which secures the 
identification of mental events with physical events, and hence at the same time secures the 
causal efficacy of mental events with respect to the individual’s behaviour. Here is where I 
thmk the problem lies: if mental events can be regarded as causally efficacious with respect to 
the individual’s behaviour only in so far as they are identical with physical events, the result 
is that the mentalistic explanations which cite these mental events can be said to carry out the 
explanatory work required of them only in so far as they derive support fiom the explanatory 
resources of the physical sciences. But if this is the case, mentalistic explanations cannot be 
granted full autonomy with respect to physicalistic explanations. That can only be granted if 
we can find a way of explaining human action whch does not require the identification of 
mental events with physical events, so that mentalistic explanations need not be said to 
implicate physicalistic explanations in order to carry out the explanatory work required of 
them. 
A useful starting point for acheving this aim is to take our various explanatory practices as 
basic, and only once the role of mentalistic explanations and physicalistic explanations have 
been worked out within their appropriate practices do we revert to the question of the relation 
between the mental and the physical. The merit of talung this approach is that it straight away 
puts us into position to appreciate the actual role of mentalistic explanations, and it puts us 
into position to understand how mentalistic explanations can be said to fulfil that role without 
deriving explanatory support fiom physicalistic explanations. The recommendation is that 
instead of starting out with a full-blown metaphysical ordering of reality, we start out with an 
investigation into the nature of our explanatory practices as they stand. Our explanatory 
practices can then be our guide to our statement of the relation between the mental and the 
physical. rather than our statement of the relation between the mental and the physical being 
our guide to the nature of our explanatory practices. This starting point is recommended by 
Baker, who suggests that: 
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instead of begnning with a full-blown metaphysical picture, we should begin with a range of good 
explanations, scientific and commonsensical.. .Start with explanatory practices and let the metaphysics 
go. (1993: 95). 
What I want to do is develop h s  starting point by arguing that the proper contexts in which 
to assess the work carried out by mentalistic explanations are the contexts created by our 
involvement in various types of human relationships. I want to argue on the strength of this 
that mentalistic explanations are autonomous with respect to physicalistic explanations in the 
deep sense that the work carried out by the former is completely separate from the work 
carried out by the latter, and I contend that this presents a strong constraint on what counts as 
a satisfactory statement of the relation between the mental and the physical. My central ideas 
are derived by combining aspects of Wittgenstein’s treatment of rule governed practices with 
aspects of John MacMurray’s treatment of human relationships. I will argue on the basis of 
this combination that there is an intrinsic connection between the nature of the mental and the 
nature of human relationships, and that the autonomous nature of mentalistic explanation is 
therefore tied to the autonomous nature of human relationships. Specifically, I will argue that 
there is an intrinsic connection between what it means to have the capacity to think and what 
it means to have the capacity to be involved in various types of relationships with other 
people; h s  will enable me to tie the success of mentalistic explanations in carrying out their 
work to their ability to satis@ the understanding we seek in our everyday relationships with 
each other. I will then proceed to develop the central features of ths intrinsic connection into 
an account of human action which does not require the identification of mental and physical 
events. and I will eventually go on to suggest a means of articulating the relation between the 
mental and the physical based on these considerations. 
Here is a brief outline of the following chapters. In the second chapter I will review various 
non-reductivist approaches to the autonomy of the mental, and I will explain why I think the 
deeper extent of the autonomy of the mental cannot be recognised within th~s framework. In 
the third chapter I will argue that the proper contexts in which to investigate the autonomous 
nature of mentalistic explanations are the contexts created by our involvement in various 
types of human relationships. The fourth chapter will be concerned with a detailed 
application of these ideas to what it means to say that an individual has the capacity to think, 
and I will draw out some connections between the physicalistic approach to the mental and its 
underlying conception of human relationshps. In the fifth chapter I will be concerned to 
develop these ideas into a non-causal account of rational action. f i s  will be used to 
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challenge the non-reductivist’s assumption that the notion of causality must be built into OUT 
conception of what it means to act for a reason, which in turn will challenge the key 
assumption that rationalistic explanations must be a species of causal explanation. where the 
relevant causal processes take place at the physical level. 
In the sixth chapter I will develop an account of the externalistic individuation of thoughts out 
of these arguments, which will support the non-casual approach to rationalistic explanations, 
and whch will put pressure on the identity claim. In the seventh chapter I will discuss the 
relevance of the brain to my account of thinking. and I will argue that physicalistic 
approaches to thinlung tend to over-inflate the importance of the brain to the extent that brain 
hnctioning is regarded as itself constituting thinking. In the eighth chapter, in order to round 
off my main argument, I will discuss the case of non-human animals to assess their claim to 
be treated as having a mind, which I seem to have ruled out by the claim that the nature of the 
mental is intrinsic to the nature of human relationships. Finally, in the ninth chapter, I will 
draw some conclusions concerning the constraints we face when attempting to articulate the 
nature of the relation between the mental and the physical. 
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Chapter 2: Physicalism and Autonomy 
1. Introduction 
It is possible to adopt two different modes of explaining human behaviour. Which mode of 
explanation is adopted depends on whether our interest lies in understanding others as 
rational agents, or as purely physical beings. Understanding others as rational agents requires 
us to explain their behaviour by drawing on the array of concepts which reveal them to be 
acting in light of reasons; understanding others as purely physical beings requires us to 
explain their behaviour by drawing on the array of concepts which reveals them to be part of 
the explanatory order of physical nature. The use of the latter concepts is restricted to 
investigations carried out within the field of the physical sciences, whereas the use of the 
former concepts is rather spontaneous and immediate within the contexts of our everyday 
lives. Since both modes of explanation must be in place if we are to have a satisfactory 
account of what it means to be a human being. it is natural to ask how we are to conceive the 
relationshp that obtains between these modes of explanation, and in turn it is natural to ask 
whether our conception of this relationshp imposes any constraints on what we ought to 
accept as a satisfactory statement of the relationshp that obtains between the mental and the 
physical. 
It is widely held that non-reductive physicalism offers the most plausible account of the 
nature of the relationship that obtains between the mental and the physical. The reason for 
h s  is simple. Non-reductive physicalism claims to recognise the fact that mental concepts 
are irreducible to physical concepts, whilst maintaining that the physical ontology is 
exhaustive of what there is. W c h  is to say that non-reductive physicalism claims to 
recognise the autonomous nature of mentalistic explanation whilst affirming the ontological 
primacy of the physical. l lus is its main attraction. Despite assurances to the contrary, 
however, it seems obvious to some that the irreducibility of mentalistic explanations to 
physicalistic explanations implies that the bias toward a monistic physical ontology ought to 
be reconsidered.’ But a number of arguments have been developed to establish that no such 
Madell (1988a: 144), for instance, writes: “it seems more and more extraordinary that the view that 1 
reality consists wholly of agglomerations of elementary particles should nevertheless be seen as 
allowing us to talk of thought and feeling, reason, agency and value, truth and falsity. Only the huge 
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implication holds. The arguments to block tlus implication, whch I shall come to presently, 
suggest that it is indeed possible to give a scientifically respectable account of the nature of 
the relationshp between the mental and the physical, which nonetheless respects the 
autonomous nature of mentalistic explanation. To be successfbl, the non-reductive physicalist 
is therefore required to find a balance between the autonomous nature of mentalistic 
explanation and the ontological primacy of the physical. 
Here is how &Is balance is achieved. Sensitivity to the autonomous nature of mentalistic 
explanation requires the physicalist to substantiate hs ontological claims with an account of 
the nature of the dependence of the mental on the physical that does not immediately involve 
him in any kind of reductionist programme. Otherwise, there will seem little reason to 
continue &Inlung of physicalism as being able to provide a complete and exhaustive account 
of everything that exists, whilst at the same time being able to respect the autonomous nature 
of mentalistic explanation. The question of whether a bias toward the primacy of the physical 
ontology implies the reducibility of the mental to the physical is therefore the question of 
whether it is possible for the physicalist to find a dependence relation whch does not also 
qualirj7 as a reductive relation. So what is required for a comprehensive statement of the non- 
reductivist’s position is not a purely ontological thesis, but this together with an account of 
the dependence of the mental on the physical. Hellman and Thompson put it thus: 
Although a purely ontologcal thesis is a necessary component of physicalism, it is insufficient in that it 
makes no appeal to the power of physical law ... we seek to develop principles of physical determination 
that spell out rather precisely the underlying physicalist intuition that the physical facts determine all the 
facts. The goal then is to show that these principles do not imply reductionism. (1975: 552). 
The question might be still more complicated than b s ,  however, since the need to find 
principles of determination or dependence that do not imply reductionism only seems to be 
part of the physicalist’s task. Arguably, the physicalist’s task is complicated by the fact that 
even if he combines a purely ontological thesis with principles of dependence and 
determination, &Is does not yet seem sufficient to capture the sense in which the physical 
facts explain all the facts, or the sense in which everything which exists does so in virtue of 
the physical. Granted, &Is might seem to impose an extremely strong demand on the 
physicalist; but it is possible that a weaker demand, one which is satisfied with an ontological 
thesis together with principles of dependence and determination, still fails to discharge the 
pressure toward some sort of monistic view could possibly explain the acceptance of a position so 
hndamentally implausible. ” 
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central commitments of the physicalist’s explanatory programme. For the mere fact that 
mental properties are held to be dependent on physical properties (even if that dependence 
relation is so strong that it becomes possible to effect the nomological correlation of mental 
properties with physical properties) does nothing to explain how the physical ontology is 
primary, or to explain how mental properties are thereby embedded in the physical structure 
of the world. 
Poland (1994: 16-17) insists that in addition to providing an ontological statement and 
principles of dependence, the physicalist must set out very definite principles which explain 
how mental properties are instantiated zn virtue qfthe instantiation of physical properhes, and 
this must involve a precise specification of those physical properties which are nomologically 
sufficient for, and relevant to, the instantiation of certain mental properties. As Poland sees it, 
the physicalist is obliged to explain how the instantiation of certain physical properties 
realises the instantiation of certain mental properties, and this means that he has to explain 
how the nature or essence of mental properties can be constituted by the instantiation of a 
specific configuration of physical properties. But this seems rather strong, since it is difficult 
to understand how the intrinsic name of mental properties could be realised by a 
configuration of physical properbes. How, for instance, can an individual’s tlnnking about the 
hardships endured throughout last winter be constituted by a configuration of physical 
properties, when such configurations simply do not display the intentionality intrinsic to the 
individual ’s t h i h g ?  It does not help matters to refer to the fact that there are many different 
physical configurations capable of constituting the instantiation of the property transparency, 
as Poland claims, since transparency is a physical property, and as such it already fails to 
&splay the intentionality that cannot be constituted by instantiations of configurations of 
physical properties anyway. As Madell puts it, the problem is that: 
no series of physical events is intrinsically about anythmg; it is only as interpreted by human beings that 
such series can be seen as possible representations of processes of thought. That is to say, the intrinsic 
dzrecfedness of thought isn’t something which one can meaningfidly ascribe to a set of physical items 
or events. (1988b: 113-1 14).2 
But are there not cases in which it is correct to say that the property of intentionality is constituted by 2 
configurations of physical properties: plants growing toward sunlight and thermometers recording 
room temperatures seem to display intentionality, yet all we have here are particular configurations of 
biological and physico-chemical properties? Not so- it seems to me that the intentionality in such cases 
is, as Madell puts it, only as interpreted. The point might be made in terms of the fact that whereas we 
can read intentionality into the activity of plants and thermometeres from an external stand-point, their 
activity is not itself intentional because it is not carried out for reasons had by the plants and the 
thermometers. 
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Yet Poland insists that the physicalist has to be able to explain how mental properties are 
embedded in the physical structure of the world, otherwise the primacy of the physical 
ontology cannot be properly acknowledged. That is, a purely ontological statement, together 
with principles of determination and dependence, are simply not sufficient to discharge the 
physicalist’s commitment to the primacy of the physical ontology. What forces these very 
strong demands on the physicalist is the need for physicalism to discharge its function as a 
programme for explanatory unification; it is the need for physicalism to provide a precise 
explanation of how mental properties are embedded in the physical structure of the world. 
However, it seems to me that we should acknowledge the limits to the explanatory resources 
of the physical sciences, rather than attempt to apply and reapply them beyond their own 
proper field of interest. For unless these limits are acknowledged, unless we respect the 
resistance of the mental to be incorporated into the physicalistic explanatory programme, it 
seems to me that the upshot will be time and effort misspent trying to force the mental into a 
system in which it is not going to fit. 
In the remainder of h s  chapter my central concern will be whether the commitment to the 
primacy of the physicalistic ontology is in fact consistent with the recognition of the 
autonomous nature of mentalistic explanation. It will be suggested that this commitment 
forces the physicalist to articulate the relationship that obtains between the mental and the 
physical in such a way that threatens to undermine mental autonomy. What I hope to achieve 
out of this discussion is a motivated rejection of the metaphysical framework of non- 
reductive physicalism. My rejection of that framework will be not be based on the strong 
claim that it has been shown to be internally inconsistent, although I will certainly be testing 
that consistency at various points; rather will it be based on the weaker claim, that non- 
reductive physicalism cannot fully discharge its physicalist commitments without 
compromising the deeper extent of the autonomous nature of mentalistic explanation. I will 
begin with a discussion of some of the classic arguments for non-reductive physicalism, and 
then I will move on to consider some more recent developments in this field. 
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2.Arguments for non-reductive physicalism 
2.1 a. The Variable Realisability Of The Mental 
It might seem natural to suppose that if individuals are purely physical beings, then there 
must be an explanation of every aspect of human behaviour in terms drawn fiom the physical 
sciences. I f  this is the case, then it does not seem possible to acknowledge mentality as a real 
and autonomous feature of our world. The wony seems to be that if we start out fiom the 
assumption that individuals are just complex physical systems, then we have to give up the 
hope of securing a degree of autonomy for the mental. But thrs does not seem to mesh very 
well with the fact that explanations of an individual’s behaviour in mental terms are such that 
they cannot be replaced by, or even derived from, explanations of his behaviour in purely 
physical terms. What seems to be required, if we are to retain the basic commitment to 
physicalism, is a way of blocking the implication fiom the basicness of the physicalistic 
ontology to the exhaustiveness of its explanatory programme. It has been thought that this can 
be achieved if we can leave room for irreducible modes of explanation within the basic 
physicalistic framework. 
htnam (1 975a) suggests that we might understand what it means to say that a mode of 
explanation is autonomous if we think of the following example: an explanation of the failure 
of the square peg to fit into the round hole is that the board and the peg are rigid and that the 
round hole is smaller than the square peg. This seems obvious, and let us face it, rather 
boring. But the point of the example is that the explanation at the level of everyday 
geometrical relations, as opposed to the level of particle physics, brings out the relevant 
structural features of the situation whtch enable us to understand why the peg does not fit into 
the hole on t h s  and other occasions, when the same higher level structural features are 
present. In fact, the same explanation would hold again whether the peg was made of wood, 
rubber or steel, and whether this particular atom was positioned here, and whether that 
particular atom was positioned there. In thrs respect, the hgher level functional explanation is 
autonomous with respect to the explanation at the lower level of particle physics. 
Putnam’s suggestion is that the key to understanding how the mode of explanation 
appropriate to the mental can retain its autonomy with respect to the mode of explanation 
appropriate to the physical is the notion of functional isomorphism. The basic idea is that 
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mental states are functional states whch are individuated by their causal functional role. To 
conceive mental states as such is to rule out the possibility of explaining them in terms of 
lower level physical explanations, even if the latter apply unquestionably to the physical 
states whch, as a matter of fact, happen to realise them on any given occasion. Two states 
can be functionally isomorphc, and in thrs sense be the same states, yet be realised by 
completely difierent physical states. So if mental states are individuated according to their 
hctional role. their identity as the states they are must remain distinct fiom the identity of 
their physical realisation bases. They can retain their identity as the mental states they are, 
regardless of whether they are realised by cheese, cogs or copper wire. Of course, this is not 
to suggest that we really ought to entertain the possibility that human beings might be 
composed out of these things. It is only to drive home the point that it is impossible to derive 
an explanation of an individual’s behaviour in mental terms fiom an explanation of his 
behaviour in physical terms. As far as mental states are concerned, it is quite irrelevant that 
they have the physical realisation they do. So the possibility of mental states being realised in 
a variety of different physical states makes the connection between mental and physical 
explanations accidental. such that explanations in mental terms cannot be deductively derived 
from explanations in physical terms. The result ofthis seems to be that: 
we do have the kind of autonomy that we are looking for in the mental realm. Whatever our mental 
hnctioning may be, there seems to be no serious reason to believe that it is explainable by our physics 
and chemistry. (1975a: 297). 
Putnam’s deeper point in all of th~s is that physicalism can be made out to be perfectly 
consistent with the recognition of the mental as a real and autonomous feature of our world, 
because the reduction of the mental to the physical depends on the possibility of identifLing 
mental state types with physical state types. The underlying point here is that whereas 
reductionism is c e r t d y  an implication of type-identity physicalism, it is not an implication 
of token-identity physicalism. Token-identity physicalism can hold that every gven mental 
state is realised in some physical state, whlst it is not necessary that every mental state type is 
identical with a physical state type. Th is  is just as well, since it is a hghly unrealistic and 
implausible requirement that whenever individuals, creatures or organisms have the very 
same mental state type in common, for example, being in pain, they must also have the very 
same physical state type in common. It is only if h s  claim is made good that it can be said 
that physicalism implies reductionism, and that the explanatory scope of the physical 
programme is wide enough to exhaustively incorporate the mental. But as Putnam points out, 
t h s  would presuppose that it was possible to: 
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specifL a physical chemical state such that any organism (not just a mammal) is in pain i f  an only if (a) it 
possesses a brain of a suitable physical-chemical structure; and (b) its brain is in that physical chemical 
state. This means that the physical chemical state in question must be a possible state of a mammalian 
brain, a reptilian brain, a mollusc’s br ain... etc. At the same time, it must not be a possible (physically 
possible) state of the brain o f  any physically possible creature that cannot feel pain. Even if such a state 
can be found, it must be nomologically certain that it will also be a state of the brain of any extra- 
terrestrial life that may be found that will be capable of  feeling pain before we can even entertain the 
supposition that it may be pain. (1975b: 436). 
The variable realisability of the mental comes to this: it is possible for any given mental state 
to be realised in physically diverse ways, as illustrated with reference to the variety of 
different species which may be said to be in pain, without necessarily having to be in the 
same physical-chemical states. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that mental state types can be 
nomologically llnked to physical state types in the manner required if physicalism is to imply 
that mental explanations can be derived from physical explanations. But this cannot give us 
an adequate conception of the mental since mental states and events are individuated 
according to rationalistic and justificatory relations which cannot be reproduced by fixing the 
location of physical states and events within any type of causal network. Regardless of how 
complex or how tightly interlockmg these physical states and events happen to be, they wiIl 
remain in brute contingent connections, and as such their network will fail to capture the 
notions of ‘must’ and ‘ought’ which figure constitutively in the network of rationalistic and 
justificatory relations definitive of intentional mental states and events. 
Thus, it is rather questionable to offer an account of the autonomy of the mental in terms of 
the failure of explanations at the level of physics to imply hctional explanations, since this 
does not seem to touch on the question of the autonomy of mental explanations with respect 
to physical explanations. Although Putnam’s example of the square peg and the round hole 
helps us to understand the autonomy of macrophysical explanations with respect to 
microphysical explanations, for example, it does not seem to help us understand the 
autonomy of mental explanations with respect to physical explanations. But what motivates 
this argument is the much deeper point that mental states are variably realised, and this in 
itself does seem to present a strong case for denying that physicalism implies reductionism or 
explanatory exhaustiveness. 
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2. I b. The Irreducibility Of The Special Sciences 
Fodor (1981) exploits this idea to argue that physicalism is only inconsistent with mental 
autonomy if we suppose that commitment to the primacy of the physical requires 
commitment to sets of reducing laws that llnk mentalistic explanation to physical 
explanation. The antecedent of these laws would contain a physical predicate and the 
consequent would contain a mental predicate. But if mentalistic explanations were reducible 
to physicalistic explanations, these laws would have to contain predicates which figure 
independently in the laws of the theory to be reduced and predicates which figure 
independently in the laws of the reducing theory; and being laws, they would have to state 
that the predicate of the reduced theory is nomologically coextensive with the predicate of the 
reducing theory. So if physicalism implies the reduction of the mental to the physical, then 
for every mental predicate there must be a coextensive physical predicate, and the 
generalisation whch expresses this coextension would have to be a law. This would make it 
possible to deductively derive any given mental explanation from a physical explanation 
when it is combined with the relevant reducing laws. 
Fodor’s point is that the variable realisability of the mental implies that mental predicates 
may be coextensive with a disjunction of heterogeneous physical predicates, and this in turn 
implies that the mental cannot be explained in terms of the physical. It is extremely unlikely 
that the disjunction of physical predicates, with which any given mental predicate may be 
coextensive, can figure in an independent physical law to begin with, never mind as the 
antecedent of a reducing law, since the disjunction of physical predicates i s  unlikely to form a 
natural physical kind. Fodor illustrates the basic idea with the example of economics, a 
special science whose laws are irreducible to the laws of physics. Although it is clearly the 
case that every event which is a monetary exchange has a physical description, the physical 
description under whch every one of these events falls must be wildly disjunctive, such that 
the likelihood of that description’s figuring as the antecedent or consequent of a law of 
physics is pretty slim. The reason for t h s  is that the set of events whch count as a monetary 
exchange is classified as such for specific social and economic purposes, but this 
classification groups together events whose physical descriptions fail to display the unity of a 
natural physical kind. The upshot of all of this is that although every monetary exchange is 
identical with some physical event, it does not follow that economics thereby loses its 
autonomy, and by the same token, although every mental event is identical with some 
physical event, it does not follow that the mental thereby loses its autonomy. 
2.2a. The Problem With Realisation 
Does the htnam-Fodor line successfblly secure the autonomy of the mental within the 
physicalistic framework? The fact that mental states can be realised in a wide variety of 
physical states and structures which, when taken together, fail to display the unity of a natural 
physical lund, does seem to decrease our chances of finding the type of bridge laws thought 
to be required to reduce the mental to the physical. But perhaps we ought to probe somewhat 
deeper at t h s  point into the idea that mental states can be realised in physical states. For it is 
not so clear that we can say, as does Putnm, that the mental state of thinking about next 
summer’s vacation can have a physical and chemical realisation in the brain. Again, the 
problem is that it is not obvious how a physical and chemical state of an individual’s brain, 
whatever it happens to be, can be a realisation of his thinlung about next summer’s vacation, 
when it is intrinsic to his t h i h g  that it is about a particular situation, whereas the physical 
and chemical state of the brain cannot be about anything. It might help if we have a more 
precise definition of realisation to work with. Here is Poland’s: 
all  attributes must be realised by physical attributes in the sense that configurations of physical objects 
and attributes constitute the instantiations of all attributes that are, or can be, instantiated in nature. 
(1994: 18). 
Poland builds into h s  definition of realisation the requirement that the physical attributes 
that constitute the instantiation of mental attributes are nomologically sufficient for them. So 
what we are being asked to suppose here is that a particular configuration of physical 
properties is nomologically sufficient for it to be the case that the individual is thinking about 
next summer’s vacation, just as a particular configuration of physical properties is 
nomologically sufficient for glass to be transparent or for water to be liquid. To be fair to 
Putnam and Fodor, h s  definition of realisation is perhaps too strong to capture their 
understanding of realisation, since they are committed to the gross unllkelihood of there 
being nomologically coextensive mental and physical properbes. But it is not very clear that 
we can make sense of realisation without being able to say that certain configurations of 
physical properties are nomologically sufficient for the instantiation of certain mental 
properties, since nomologcal sufficiency does seem to be required to articulate the idea that 
mental properties are instantiated in virtue of the instantiation of physical properties. We 
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could, of course, simply assert that a particular configuration of physical properties is 
materially sufficient on a particular occasion, without thereby implying the satisfaction of 
laws. But regardless of whether we incorporate nornologicality into the definition of 
realisation, it does seem that if a configuration of physical properties realises a mental 
property, then that particular configuration must at least be materially sufficient on that 
occasion for the instantiation of the mental property. 
Once again, however, the problem is that the intentionality intnnsic to the individual's 
thnking does not seem to be realisable in any sort of physical system, as liquidity and 
transparency clearly are. It is not too difficult to understand what it means to say that liquidity 
is realised in the molecular structure of water, or that transparency is realised in the molecular 
structure of glass, in the sense that they are nothmg over and above these structures. But as I 
have already noted, such comparisons must fail to shed light on what it means to say that an 
individual 's thinking can be realised in the physical or chemical states of his brain. It seems to 
me that realisation is a relation peculiar to the physical sciences, which applies straight- 
forwardly to physical phenomena. There seems to be no problem at all with saying that a 
given physical configuration is sufficient on a particular occasion for the instantiation of a 
given physical property, but I think it is problematic to extend this notion to cover mental 
properties, since it does not seem possible for any given physical Configuration to constitute 
an individual's thnkmg about next summer's vacation. So it seems to me that the use of the 
notion of realisation to arbculate the nature of the relation between the mental and the 
physical is questionable, even if it does appear to serve the purpose of blocking the 
implication fiom physicalism to the explanatory exhaustiveness of the physical sciences. 
2.2b. The Possibilig Of Local Reductions 
Even if we grant the use of the notion of realisation for the sake of assessing the strength of 
the argument, in so far as it is construed as an argument to block h s  implication, there are 
still further problems which come to light. One central problem is that far from providing the 
physicalist with a means of avoiding the reductionist implications inherent in the assumption 
that everything which exists is physical, the variable realisability of the mental can be made 
out to be consistent with the reduction of the mental to the physical, if the reductions are 
restricted to specific species. That physicalism does not entail the explanatory exhaustiveness 
of the physical sciences appears to be blocked by the point that mental states can be variably 
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realised across different species (mammals, reptiles, extra-terrestrials, etc.), but it is arguably 
the case that this is consistent with there being a number of different species-specific 
reductions, weakening the overall anti-reductionist implications of the claim that mental states 
can be variably realised. 
Kim ( I  993a: 273) points out that if the notion of realisation is to be cashed out in terms of 
conditionals of the form p 3 m, which are species-specific, then it must be possible to 
generate bridge laws whxh can be used to effect the local reduction of mental states to 
physical states. What t h s  amounts to is that if we assume that the realisation of the mental by 
the physical entails that conditionals of the form p 3 m hold (whch means that (i) if x is in 
physical state p, then x is in mental state m, and (ii) the physical state p which realises the 
mental state m is nomologically sufficient for it), and we restrict these conditionals to specific 
species, then it looks as if we can say that, withm any given species, s, p is both necessary 
and sufficient for m. T€us will then provide us with the restricted bridge law, s 3 (p m). If 
we follow th~s tactic. it seems that local reducibility can be made out to be consistent with the 
variable realisability of the mental, dmmshmg the strength of its over-all anti-reductionist 
implications. 
If we take it for granted, for the sake of the argument, that the notion of realisation is 
unproblematic, and if it is plausible to make the move that Kim suggests, then we seem to 
have secured the possibility of generating species-specific bridge laws which may be used to 
cany out local reductions of the mental to the physical. It seems that the attempt to secure the 
autonomy of the mental by appealing to the possibility of variable realisation simply serves to 
hghlight the difficulty with using the notion of realisation as a way of arhculating the nature 
of the relation between the mental and the physical. However, it might be replied that h s  
move is not necessarily going to work, since it might be the case that mental states are 
variably realised within specific species. Given the phenomena of maturation and 
development, injuries to the brain, and so on, it is not so clear that species-specific reductions 
are going to be available. hlviduals suffering damage to certain parts of the brain may 
thereby suffer loss of memory, for instance, whch may be regained when other parts of the 
brain begin to compensate for thrs damage by fulfilling a role previously fulfilled by the 
damaged parts. Given cases of this type, and perhaps many others, there seems to be no 
reason to insist that individuals withm a specific species who happen to be in the same 
neurophysiological state, p, will necessarily be in the same mental state, m. But as Kim 
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correctly points out, even once these differences are taken into account, and even if they are 
more wide-spread than it is realistic to assume, in order to make use of the notion of 
realisation as a way of articulating the relation between the mental and the physical, it must 
be assumed that the psychology of each of us is at least locally reducible to his own 
individual neurobiology. Kim writes that: 
the conclusion we must draw is that the multiple realisability of the mental has no antireductionist 
implications of great significance; on the contrary, it entails, or at least is consistent with, the local 
reducibility of psychology, local relative to species or physical structure-types. If psychological states 
are multiply realised, that only means that we shall have multiple local reductions of psychology. The 
multiple realisation argument, if it works, shows that a global reduction is not in the offing; however, 
local reductions are reduction enough, by any reasonable standards and in their philosophical 
implications (1 993a: 275). 
The problem lies with the metaphysical implications of using the notion of realisation to 
articulate the nature of the relation between the mental and the physical. For although the 
notion of realisation does seem to have anti-reductionist implications, in the sense that it is 
consistent with the variable realisability of the mental, this cannot be sufficient to secure the 
autonomy of the mental, since the realisation of the mental by the physical is also consistent 
with the possibility of makmg local reductions of the type envisaged above. There does not 
seem to be anything to rule this out. Admittedly, however, the argument as a m  presents it 
cannot be conclusive, since it does not yet show that the variable realisability of the mental 
entails local reducibility, which would be required to refute the anti-reductionist stand. Yet, 
even if it is adrmtted that local reductions are not entailed by the variable realisability of the 
mental, they do seem to be consistent with it; once this is acknowledged, the argument to 
block the implication fiom physicalism to reductionism, if not refuted, must certarnly be 
weakened somewhat. And the problem, I suspect, lies with using the notion of realisation to 
articulate the nature of the relationshp between the mental and the physical. 
2.3. Psychophysical Anomalism 
Perhaps a more plausible argument to block the implication fiom physicalism to 
reductionism is suggested by Davidson (1980a). Davidson's central claim is that mental 
properties cannot be reduced to physical properties because there cannot be a strict law-like 
statement that correlates these properties. "his is worth considering, starting with the 
following question: what is it about mental properties that prohibits their figuring in 
nomological relations with physical properties, in such a manner that would permit the 
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generation of bridge laws between the mental and the physical? The central idea is that 
mental properties of events are identified as the mental properties they are by the patterns of 
rationalistic and justificatory relations that give structure to the logical and epistemic space in 
which they are instantiated. Physical properties, on the other hand, are identified as the 
physical properties they are by the patterns of causal relations that give structure to the 
domain which is subsumed by the closed and deterministic theories of physical science. So 
the reason why statements that link mental and physical properties cannot be strict laws is that 
it would thereby be possible to infer the instantiation of mental properties on the basis of the 
instantiation of physical properties, which would effectively mean that it would be possible to 
identifL mental properties without attention to the rationalistic and justificatory relations 
which in fact identifL them. As Davidson puts it: 
There are no strict psychophysical laws because of the disparate commitments of the mental and the 
physical schemes. It is a feature of physical reality that physical change can be explained by laws that 
connect it with other changes and conditions physically described. It is a feature of the mental that the 
attribution of mental phenomena must be responsible to the background of reasons, beliefs and 
intentions of the individual. There cannot be tight connections between the realms if each is to retain 
allegiance to its proper source of evidence. ( 1980a: 222). 
What lies in the background here is a very plausible assumption concerning the attribution of 
intentional states and events to individuals: their attribution is necessarily governed by the 
constraints of rationality and normativity, such that an individual cannot be said to have the 
thought ‘that the candle has blown out’, for example, unless he is also capable of having 
various other logically related thoughts and beliefs. whch identifL this particular thought by 
locating it in a logical and epistemic space. The logical space whch identifies this thought as 
having the content it has is structured by the interlockmg patterns of rational and justificatory 
relations that hold between the contents of the rest of the individual’s thoughts and beliefs. 
Therefore, we cannot attribute th~s  particular thought to the individual without taiung into 
account the possibility of hs having the appropriately structured background. Furthermore, 
we cannot hope to reconstruct t h ~ s  pattern of relations at the level of physical description, and 
this point certainly seems to suggest a way of supporting the claim that the mental is 
autonomous with respect to the physical. 
Davidson combines his arguments for the autonomy of the mental with a rather interesting, 
but questionable, argument for the token identity claim. Indeed, what is interesting about this 
argument is that it starts out with the assumption that the mental is autonomous, and it 
concludes that mental events must be identical with physical events. But why should the 
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autonomy of the mental be thought to imply the truth of the token-identity thesis? Why 
should the autonomy of the mental, when made out in terms of the impossibility of 
subsuming mental and physical properties under laws, have physicalistic implications? 
The argument is simply that mental events enter into causal relations with physical events, as 
when the desire for a dnnk causes an individual to walk to the water fountain; but if events 
enter into causal relations, according to Davidson, there must be a description of these events 
under which they instantiate a law. l k s  is required by his commitment to the nomological 
conception of causality, which states that causal relations between events must instantiate law 
governed regularities. The problem is that since the autonomy of the mental has been secured 
by the principle of psychophysical anomalism, which depends on the assumption that mental 
properties of events cannot figure in laws, it follows that causal relations in which mental 
events are involved must instantiate a physical law. The final step in the argument is to point 
out that if mental events are subsumable by physical laws, then they must have a physical 
description, in virtue of which the physical laws apply, and for that reason it follows that 
mental events must be physical events. 
This conclusion appears to be necessary, given that the autonomy of the mental implies the 
failure of mental properties to figure in laws. But although the conclusion is that every mental 
event must be a physical event. this does not yet tell us how mental and physical properties 
are related. Davidson 's suggestion is not that mental properties are realised in physical events, 
which I welcome, but simply that mental properties of events are supervenient on the physical 
properties of events: 
mental characteristics are in some sense dependent, or supervenient, on physical characteristics. Such 
supervenience might be taken to mean that there cannot be two events alike in all physical respects but 
differing in some mental respect.. .supervenience of this kind does not entail reducibility through law or 
definition. ( 198Ua: 2 14 j. 
2. l a .  The Problem With Fusions 
Davidson 's argument is rather complex, but as I suggested, it is questionable at certain points. 
I want to begin with hs argument for the identity claim, and I want to suggest that the identity 
claim can be dispensed with. The claim that mental events are identical with physical events 
can be seen to analyse into at least two components: first, some events have both mental and 
physical descriptions; second, physical descriptions of events are more basic than their mental 
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descriptions. The first general point I want to raise here is that it is not immecfiately clear 
what it means to say that physical events can have mental descriptions; or at least, it is not 
obvious how we are to understand the claim that the mental event of ‘thinking that it is going 
to snow’, for example, is identical with an event which has a more basic description in 
physical terms. The problem is that it is not clear how h s  description could be correctly or 
incorrectly applied to a physical event, unless there were some way of picking out the 
relevant physical event, and then applying h s  description on the basis of its physical 
properties. But ihs cannot be what Davidson has in mind, since he builds hs argument on the 
assumption that there can be no such move. The description of the event in mental terms can 
only be justified in terns of its location in the larger network of mental events. However, this 
surely takes us to a deeper point, whch is that there does not seem to be any justification for 
making the identity claim in the first place, other than adherence to the nomological 
conception of causality. %s gives us a possible line of criticism, since the identity claim will 
have to be made out in such a way as to cohere with the nomological conception of causality. 
Hornsby ( 1980- 1) suggests that the only way to make sense of the identity claim, given that it 
is motivated by the nomological conception of causality, is to think of mental events as being 
mereologically composed out of physical events. The point is that the types of events which 
are subsumed under strict laws cannot be everyday macroscopic events, like thunderstorms 
and boating trips on the lake, but must rather be the microscopic events out of whch these 
events are mereologically composed. If macroscopic events are to be related as cause to 
effect, then the nomological conception of causality demands that there be a description of 
these events under which they are subsumed by a strict law. So if the thunderstorm caused the 
boating trip to be cancelled, there must be a description of these events under which they are 
law instantiating. But the problem is that since macroscopic events of this type are too 
coarsely individuated to be subsumed by strict laws, the nomological conception of causality 
can only be supported if macroscopic events can be said to be composed out of ‘fusions’ of 
microscopic events, whch are individuated finely enough to be subsumed by strict laws. 
The same reasoning applies to mental events. If the mental event of thmking that it is going to 
snow caused the intentional act of putting on a warm coat, then there must be a description of 
these events under whch they are subsumed by a strict law. But given that macroscopic 
events of h s  type are too coarsely individuated to be subsumed by strict law, they too must 
be said to be composed out of ‘fusions’ of microscopic events, which are individuated finely 
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enough to be subsumed by strict law. So if the autonomy of the mental implies token 
physicalism, on the strength of the nomological conception of causality, then it seems to 
follow that mental events are identical with physical events in the sense that they must be 
composed out of fusions of neural events. 
Hornsby 's (1980-1 : 82-85) central point is that the mereological conception of events is 
incoherent, and that it therefore cannot be appealed to in order to support the nomological 
conception of causality. The problem with the mereological conception of events is that fails 
to set out any principles of construction, on the basis of which neural events can be combined 
to form the fusions with whch mental events are to be identified. This has the unhappy 
consequence that a variety of ad hoc fusions could be formed simply by combining neural 
events in an arbitrary manner, possibly resulting in a combination of neural events, some of 
which having no obvious relevance to the mental event with which it is to be identified. More 
than ths, the mereological conception of events does not seem to provide us with any 
principles on the basis of which we could distinguish those fusions which are genuine events 
fiom those fusions whch are merely ad hoc constructions, and t h s  is connected to the fact 
that the mereological conception of events fails to impose principled restrictions on the 
relations that the individual neural events must bear to each other, if they are to be combined 
to form the fusions with which mental events are to be identified. But presumably, such 
principled restrictions could not be provided without adrmttmg at least the possibility of 
generating reducing laws of the type the anti-reductionist needs to avoid. So if adopting the 
mereological conception of events is the only way of supporting the nomological conception 
of causality, then we have good reason for giving up that conception of causality; and once 
that is given up, we have immediately lost one central means of demonstrating the 
consistency of mental autonomy with physicalism. That is, once the nomological conception 
of causality is deemed insupportable, we have to abandon this particular route fiom the 
autonomy of the mental to the token identity thesis. 
2. Ib. D&?nding Non-Reductivism: Property Coinstantiation 
I s  th~s argument too quick? Macdonald (1989) thinks it is. She points out that even if the 
mereological conception of events cannot be made plausible, t h s  need not force us to 
abandon the principle of the nomological conception of causality, and if we are not forced to 
abandon that, then it is simply not the case that we have undermined this argument for non- 
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reductive physicalism. Macdonald’s objection is that it is a mistake to say that the 
nomological conception of causality requires that the relation between mental and physical 
events be one of mereologcal composition; there is an alternative way of conceiving the 
relation between these events whch explains how mental events can be covered by strict 
laws: 
laws relate events in terms of their properties. In particular, they relate events of certain types in virtue 
of those events instancing properties of certain types. We may have good reasons for thinking that 
event types like the type ‘being an avalanche’ have associated with them certain properties distinct 
fiom any of the properties associated with event types whch their so-called ‘parts’ instance, i.e., that 
the properties associated with macrophysical and microphysical event types are distinct. But this only 
leads to the conclusion that tokens of macrophysical event types are not covered by laws if one 
assumes that the instancings by events of those very properties which make for the distinctness of 
avalanches from their ‘parts’ (e.g., the property of being an avalanche) are themselves distinct from 
instancings of the properties associated with such events’ parts which do figure in laws. (1989: 173). 
Thls is a very dense passage, but let me try to paraphrase it somewhat. Macdonald seems to 
be arguing that events are covered by laws in vlrtue of instantiatmg microscopic property 
types. Macroscopic property types are distinct from microscopic property types, and h s  
makes it look as if macroscopic events are not subsumable under law unless they are 
mereologically composed out of fusions of microscopic events. But by Macdonald ’s lights, 
there is no need to assume that ths is the case, since it can be argued that the instantiation of 
microscopic properties, by virtue of which events are subsumed under law, is at the same 
time the instantiation of macroscopic properties. It is only if the instantiation of tokens of 
microscopic properties is distinct fiom the instantiation of tokens of macroscopic properties 
that the application of the nomologcal conception of causality to macroscopic events will be 
problematic. If these properties are coinstantiated, then tokens of macroscopic events will not 
be distmct from tokens of microscopic events; and hence it will follow that laws can apply to 
tokens of macroscopic events in vlrtue of the fact that they stand to tokens of microscopic 
events in the relation of property coinstantiation. 
So Macdonald’s suggestion is that the relation between mental and physical events, in virtue 
of whch mental events can be covered by laws, is one of property coinstantiation. The 
crucial point is that since the question of whether the relation of property coinstantiation 
holds is silent on the issue of how many microscopic events may constitute a gven 
macroscopic event, the nomologcal conception of causality can be supported independently 
of assuming the mereological conception of events. Before I question the intelligibility of 
defending the mental-physical identity claim with the claim that macrophysical and 
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microphysical properties can be coinstantiated, let me consider one of Macdonald’s more 
recent attempts to articulate this analogy more precisely. 
2. Jc. The Defince Deepened: An Analogy From Biology 
Macdonald ( 1995) deepens her defence of non-reductive physicalism by developing a general 
anti-reductionist strategy whch bears some resemblance to the strategy adopted by Fodor. It 
involves showing how the irreducibility of properties whch figure in the laws of special 
sciences to properbes whch figure in the laws of physics can serve as an analogy for the 
irreducibility of mental properties to physical properties. Specifically, Macdonald ’s tactic is 
to explain the irreducibility of mental properties to the physical properties that instance them 
by analogy - with the irreducibility of biological properties to the physicochemical properties 
that instance them. The important point is that biological properties are identified by a pattern 
of relations that is distinctively different fiom the pattern of relations that identifi 
physicochemical properties, even though an instance of a biological property is in fact 
claimed to be an instance of some physicochemical property. Biological properties are 
identified by their hctional role. whereas physicochemical properties are identified by their 
causal-nomological role. Biological properties are therefore dependent on physicochemical 
properties in the sense of being coinstantiated by them, yet are irreducible to them in the 
sense of having a nature which cannot be exhaustively replicated at the level of 
physicochemical description. 
But if this is to serve as a way of understanding the mental-physical relation, a more precise 
specification of the relation between biological and physicochemical properties is required, 
one whch clarifies what it means to say that macrophysical properties can be instanced by 
microphysical properties. This will also be relevant to Macdonald’s argument to avoid 
fhions. She offers the following example. Suppose that three organisms all have bottle-green 
colouring, a chameleon, a butterfly, and a bird. All three can be described fiom a 
physicochemical point of view in the very same terms, but they cannot be described fiom a 
biological point of view in the very same terms. The chameleon’s bottle-green colouring 
serves as camouflage. The butterfly’s serves as a warning to predators that it is more or less 
inedible. The bird has no biological description in virtue of its bottle-green colouring at all. 
So the pattern of causal relations between the physicochemical properties that underwrite the 
bottle-green - colouring possessed by these organisms, in Macdonald’s view, is undisturbed by 
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the different hctional patterns produced at the biological level; in this respect, biological 
properties have a specific nature whch cannot be exhaustively characterised by an exhaustive 
characterisation of the physicochemical properties which instance them. But what is the 
relationship that obtains between biological and physicochemical properties and their 
instances, which helps us understand the relation between mental and physical properties and 
their instances? Macdonald writes: 
Gwen that biological properties arise as the result of natural selection operating on these instances of 
physicochemical properties, and given that physicochemical properties acquire biological functions as a 
result of the process of such selection, the most plausible account of the relationship is that to instance 
a biological property, say the property of having aposematic colouring, just is to instance the property 
of being bottle-green in colour, given that the latter instance has the causal history it does. It seems, in 
short, that instances of biological properties just are instances of certain physicochemical properties. 
(1995: 149). 
It seems to me that th ls does not really further our understanding of what it means to say that 
mental properties can be coinstantiated by physical properhes, since the argument appeals to 
a relation whch is restricted to the macrophysical domain, as opposed to a relation between 
the macrophysical and the microphysical. It cannot explain the relation between 
microphysical properties and macrophysical properties to say that the biological property of 
having aposemahc colouring is instanced by the property of being bottle-green. Does th ls not 
remain within the macrophysical domain? To clarifL the relation between the macrophysical 
and the microphysical, or between the mental and the physical in part~cular, the property of 
having aposematic colouring would have to be shown to be instanced by some of the 
physicochemical properties at the microphysical level. Otherwise, the irreducibility of 
biological properties to the physicochemical properties that instance them has not explained 
the irreducibility of mental properties to the physical properties that instance them. 
The analogy also breaks down in other ways. Although it is fairly clear what it means to say 
that physicochemical properties acquire biological functions as the result of the process of 
natural selection, it is not so clear which processes are supposed to be responsible for the fact 
that physical properties acquire their mental descriptions. Nor is it very clear that mental 
properties can be said to arise as the result of the operation of these processes, whatever they 
are, on instances of physical properties, in the Same way that biological properties can be said 
to arise as the result of natural selection operating on instances of physicochemical properties. 
But unless these questions can be answered, it seems to me that the claim that macrophysical 
and microphysical properties can be coinstantiated does not M e r  our understanding of 
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what it means to say that mental and physical properties can be coinstantiated. For these 
reasons, I think that Macdonald fails to articulate the relation between the mental and the 
physical in such a way that avoids Hornsby’s central objection to the identity claim. 
3.Supervenience 
3.1. Weak And Strong Definitions 
The notion of supervenience has more recently been appealed to in order to give expression 
to the relation between the mental and the physical in a manner deemed satisfactory to the 
non-reductivist. The reason for this is that supervenience is thought to embody the general 
idea that the mental is dependent on the physical without being reducible to it. The fact that 
one set of properties supervenes on another set, in this case mental properties on physical 
propemes, is thus expressed in the following way: no two events can differ with respect to 
their mental properties without differing with respect to their physical properties, such that 
any difference with respect to mental properties will be accompanied by some difference 
with respect to physical properties. Expressed in this way, the notion of supervenience seems 
to be a rather weak statement of the relation between the mental and the physical, since what 
it amounts to is that mental properties and physical properties stand in a relation of 
covariance. Its weakness is what makes it attractive to the non-reductivist. The mere fact that 
mental properties covary with physical propernes is not sufficient to warrant the introduction 
of psycho-physical laws to lrnk them, and t h s  is precisely what the non-reductivist is looking 
for. However, its weakness is also a problem: it does not seem to offer an adequate statement 
of physicalism. A mere statement of psycho-physical property covariance is too weak to 
capture the idea that the mental is dependent on the physical, since it does nothmg more than 
report occurrent patterns of change between different sets of properties. 
Kim (1 993b: 148) points out that the notion of dependence is in fact an additional component 
of supervenience, which takes us beyond the mere statement of property covariance. The 
statement of property covariance reports patterns of change between sets or families of 
properties; but t h s  does not yet answer the deeper question, which is why these families of 
properties covary as they do. The problem is that covariance itself does not entail 
dependence, since the mere report that two families of properties stand in the relation of 
covariance does not entail that the variation in one set is dependent on variations in the other, 
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let alone that one family is more basic with respect to the other. As it stands, the primacy of 
the physical, and the dependence of the mental on the physical, cannot be adequately 
expressed by the statement of mere covariance, unless that statement is boosted by an 
explanation of why such covariance holds. But boosting the statement in this manner must 
make it difficult to appreciate _ -  the sense in whch physicalism is consistent with the autonomy 
of the mental. Arguably, a statement of dependence involves a modal claim, which gives rise 
to the possibility of generating laws of the type required to reduce the mental to the physical. 
Kim’s distinction between weak and strong covariance might help to illustrate the problem. 
Weak covariance states that, necessarily, if anytlmg has property F in A, there exists a 
property G in B such that the thmg has G, and everything that has G has F. Strong covariance 
states that. necessarily. if anything has property F in A, there exists a property G in B such 
that the thing has G, and necessarily, everything with G has F. Thus, in order to count as a 
dependence relation. weak covariance has to at least be strengthened into strong covariance 
by the incorporation of the modal operator ‘necessarily’ into the final clause of its definition. 
In terms of mental and physical properties, weak covariance states that, necessarily, if an 
event has a mental property m, there exists a physical property p such that the event has p. 
and every event that has p has m. Strong covmiance states that, necessarily, if an event has a 
mental property m, there exists a physical property p such that the event has p. and 
necessarily, every event with p has m. 
The result of this is that strong covariance guarantees that the correlation of mental and 
physical properties holds stable across possible worlds, whereas weak covariance restricts its 
guarantees to the given world under consideration. So the central problem with weak 
covariance is that it restncts its constraints on the distribution of mental properties only 
within any given world, and as such it fails to capture the idea that the physical facts 
determine all the facts, since that would seem to require that the constraints on the 
distribution of mental properties held across every possible world. Furthermore, since weak 
covariance requires only accidental connections between mental and physical propemes, it 
does not seem sufficient to express the idea that an individual has his mental properties in 
virtue of his physical properties. Poland complains that such relations: 
underwrite no counter-factual truths regarding what non-physical properties an individual would have if 
he were to have certain physical properties ... There is no required isolation of all relevant physical 
attributes that are nomologxally sufficient for the realisation of given non-physical attributes.. .Thus a 
weak supervenience approach to the formulation of physicalism fails to be adequate. ( 1994: 8 1-2). 
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Weak supervenience thus appears to be an inadequate expression of physicalism. The 
implication is that in order to count as the expression of a dependence relation, we have to 
strengthen the definition of supervenience by strengthening the relation of weak covariance 
to yield the relation of strong covariance. This would at least provide a guarantee that the 
psycho-physical property correlations held across worlds. such that the instantiation of a 
given set of physical properties ensured the instantiation of a given set of mental properties. 
The problem with this, however, is that the required strengthening of the covariance relation 
Seems to yield psycho-physical laws of the type the non-reductionist must be concerned 
about. That is, it seems that the only way of giving adequate expression to the physicalist's 
dependence principles at the same time gives expression to the reductionist implications of 
these principles. This will clearly be welcomed by reductionists, since it seems to threaten the 
case for saying that physicalism is consistent with the autonomy of the mental. A key point in 
the case for anti-reductionism is the impossibility of stating strict psycho-physical laws that 
would allow the mental to be nomologically reduced to the physical. But once it is claimed 
that physicalism cannot be adequately stated unless the instantiation of specific physical 
properties guarantees the instantiation of specific mental properties across worlds, it begins to 
look as if physicalism is in fact inconsistent with mental autonomy? 
3.2.A Global Definition 
One way of responding to this threat is to define supervenience in more global terms, so that 
a statement of the dependence of the mental on the physical is to be assessed for adequacy by 
comparing whole worlds as opposed to individuals w i t h  worlds. The suggestion is that the 
Admittedly, however, reductionism might not immediately follow from the use of strong 3 
supervenience as an expression of the relation between the mental and the physical. McLaughlin (1995: 
47) points out that there are some cases involving nomologically coextensive properties that would not 
be counted as cases of reduction. Electrical conductivity properties of metals are nomologically 
necessary and sufficient for their thermal conductivity properties, since the same free electrons carry 
charge and heat, yet the thermal conductivity properties of metals do not reduce to their electrical 
conductivity properties. The reductionist implications are indeed there to be drawn out, but whether 
they present a rehtation of the combination of mental autonomy with physicalism has not been 
conclusively established. However, compare th s  with Grimes (1995: 1 12-3), who insists that the set of 
one-way conditionals, G 3 F, for instance, which arise out of the definition of strong supervenience, 
are enough for reduction, since they allow us to derive every instantiation of every supervenient 
property on the basis of the instantiation of some subvenient property. On this view, which trades on 
the fact that there is no one form of reduction, and that one form may be stronger or weaker than 
others, necessary coextension is not even required. Grimes adds that, even if this stronger definition 
fails to imply a relation of necessary coextension between mental and physical properties, it still seems 
too reductive to serve as a general vehicle for advancing the nonreductivist agenda. 
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mental supervenes globally on the physical in the sense that my two worlds whch are 
indiscernible with respect to the distribution of physical properties are indiscernible with 
respect to the distribution of mental properties. The advantage of deftning the dependence of 
the mental on the physical globally is that it is silent on the strength of specific mental- 
physical property correlations, the important consequence of which is that global 
supervenience does not seem to threaten reductionism in the way that strong supervenience 
seems to. As a means of avoiding the reductionist implications inherent in strong 
supervenience. therefore. this defrnition must be more effective. Whereas strong 
supervenience requires that any two individuals who are indiscernible with respect to their 
physical properties must be indiscernible with respect to their mental properties. global 
supervenience is perfectly consistent with the fai ure of such indiscernibility, and hence with 
the failure of generating appropriate sets of reducing laws, since its central intuition is that 
mental properties are determined in a holistic. rather than an individualistic. manner. 
However. as an expression of physicalism global supervenience seems rather inadequate. 
The problem is simply that it does not seem strong enough to express a satisfactory 
dependence relation between the mental and the physical. Whilst its broadness is certainly to 
its advantage- in so far as it precludes the possibility of generating sets of reducing laws 
covering specific mental and physical properties. it is also to its disadvantage. in so far as this 
unspecificity makes it too permissive to qual@ as a useful relation of dependence. The 
problem, similar to that encountered by weak Supervenience, is that it fails to be specific 
concerning which physical properties are relevant to the determination of whch mental 
properties. Global supervenience thus seems to be perfectly consistent with there being two 
physically indiscernible individuals withm any given world who have radically divergent 
mental properties; or even one with and one without my mental properties, since what 
matters is only that these individuals could not be mhabitants of two physically indiscernible 
worlds. Furthermore- it is often claimed that the global supervenience of the mental on the 
physical is perfectly consistent with there being two worlds which differ in the minutest 
physical respect, but where two physically indiscernible individuals, one from each world, are 
drastically different in mental respects. Smith, for example, puts the complaint thus: 
since it fails to put any restrictions on the psychological properties that are instantiated in worlds that 
are not physically identical, it is compatible with there being a situation differing physically from the 
actual one only in the existence of an extra penguin, but where the psychological facts are as different 
as you like from the actual ones. We need, somehow, to narrow down to the relevant base properties 
that determine the supervenient ones. ( 1  993 : 238-9). 
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The force of t h ~ ~  objection seems to be that since global supervenience fails to exclude those 
physical facts which are irrelevant to the determination of psychological facts, it is too 
permissive to qualify as a dependence relation of the mental on the physical. The onus is 
therefore placed on the physicalist to find a means of excluding those physical facts which 
are completely irrelevant to the determination of an individual’s psychological facts, such as 
the existence of an extra penguin in the antarctic, or the existence of one extra hydrogen atom 
somewhere in deep space, without which global supervenience would seem to lose its 
credibility as a statement of the dependence of the mental on the physical. 
According to Post (1 995), t h s  objection is not as strong as it seems. What the physicalist 
needs to exclude as irrelevant to the physical determination of psychological facts are only 
those physical facts whch do no causal work in th s  respect. l b s  means that he needs to 
restrict the physical determination base, whilst remaining committed to the global 
determination of the mental by the physical. so as to exclude such trivial differences from 
being relevant to the determination of an individual’s psychology. Here is how Post thinks 
this can be achieved. Suppose that T is the set of physical conditions that determines whether 
certain psychological facts are true of a given individual, x. Then the physical fact, that there 
exists one extra hydrogen atom in x’s world, let us call it a, can be regarded as irrelevant to 
the determination of x’s psychology if this fact could have been excluded fi-om T without 
dwupting the determination at work in th~s case. Post points out that if there is a proper 
subset A of T, whch does not contain condition @, but which nevertheless determines 
whether certain psychological facts are true of x. then we can say that condition is 
irrelevant to the fact that x has the psychology he has. Condition is therefore relevant to the 
determination of x’s psychology only if it is a member of the least set A of T, whch is 
uniquely sufficient on this occasion to determine whether certain psychological facts are true 
of x or not. 
The upshot of this is that when x’s world is compared against a physically indiscernible 
world, but for the fact that it differs only in the existence of one extra hydrogen atom 
somewhere in deep space, we should not be forced to admit the possibility of rahcal 
psychological differences for x according as he is considered in one possible world or the 
other, because condition @ can be excluded from the least set A, as doing no real work in this 
respect. Given the existence of a possible world, therefore, which differs minutely from this 
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one, if the conditions which belong to the least set A obtain in both, then the psycho1ogica.I 
facts which are true of x in this world are true of him in that world. And furthermore, despite 
the fact that the physical conltions have been narrowed to exclude irrelevant factors, this 
need not be thought to affect the global nature of the dependence relation. For as Post puts it: 
Provided there being an extra hydrogen atom somewhere in deep space is not a member of the least set 
to determine whether I have fruit fly mentality, it is irrelevant to the determination. And, of course, @ 
can be a member of such a least set, hence relevant, whether or not @ is a property or relation of the 
individual x, and whether or not @ is minute, synchronous with x, in spatiotemporal proximity to x, or 
we require that whofe worlds never be compared for in-/discernibihy in regard to sets of properties. 
(1 995: 93-94). 
It might raise some concern that although this move does seem to be effective in excluding 
irrelevant factors from figuring in the physical determination of the mental, it does not yet 
provide us with a means of isolating the least sets of relevant conditions which are claimed to 
be important. The reason for this is that it still does not provide us with a means of isolating 
the specific physical conditions which are relevant to the determination of specific mental 
conditions. The unspecificity of the global definition of supervenience leaves us without a 
useful method of isolating the physical conditions which are irrelevant, since it leaves us 
without an understanding of which mental conditions obtain in virtue of which physical 
conditions. But is it too quick to think that this omission is necessarily a weakness? Post 
believes that it is. By Post’s lights, the central point of the global definition of the physical 
determination of the mental is only to provide us with a general or sweeping statement of the 
relation between the mental and the physical. It is not one of its jobs to provide us with a 
statement of how the physical determines the mental in every case, or of how specific 
physical conditions determine specific mental conditions. In other words, to complain that 
global supervenience is too permissive because it is unspecific and unfocused, in the sense 
that it does not provide us with a means of isolating the specific physical conditions which 
are relevant to the determination of specific mental conditions in any given case. would be to 
miss the point.‘ 
It is not obvious that this objection does miss the point. If physicalism is to offer a way of 4 
understanding how the mental is itself part of the physical world, rather than simply being connected to 
it by way of natural relations, then it is not unreasonable to insist that a stronger claim has to be made. 
With respect to this point, Witmer (1998: 85) states that: “However exactly we are to understand 
physicalism, it is clear that physicalism is meant to be a claim about the metaphysical character of such 
phenomena as mind and society; that is, it is meant to be a claim about what such things are.. . What 
makes physicalism the tough-minded claim that it purports to be is that it goes beyond the banal and 
obvious claim that mind and society and so forth are linked to the physical by natural relations of some 
sort.. .Physicalism is, further, a claim about the nature of the items so linked to the physical.” 
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Whether t h s  objection misses the point or not, and I am inclined to thmk it does not, there is 
still a W h e r  difficulty whch global supervenience faces. The difficulty is that even if we had 
this method of exclusion available to us, and even if we were in the position to implement it 
successfully, global supervenience is open to the objection that it does not seem to capture the 
physicalist's central intuition that the physical facts determine all the facts. TINS can be 
illustrated if we imagine a case in which there is a possible world whose physical 
indiscernibility from this one is complete in every respect, but where there is nonetheless a 
significant divergence at the level of the psychological. Such divergence should not be 
permitted at all under global supervenience if it is to count as a plausible statement of the 
physicalist 's claim that the physical facts determine all the facts. 
Moser and Trout (1995) imagine a case in which there is psychological divergence across 
physically indiscernible worlds, which is effected by the fact that in one of these worlds there 
are atypical psychological laws. Suppose that there is a world which is distinctive in that its 
laws of psychological causation, for example, give rise to a level of psychological fact which 
is at odds with the level of psychological fact characteristic of every other physically 
indiscernible world. The physical facts in each world are indiscernible, and as such each 
determines that the same first-level psychological facts obtain. But given that there are 
different laws of psychological causation operative in this world, the first level psychological 
facts then determine a second level of psychological facts which are divergent with respect to 
the second level psychological facts determined by the first level facts in those worlds whose 
laws of psychological causation are not atypical. In h s  world, psychological events of 
assenting, for example, do not generate dispostional or habit-like belief-states and intention- 
states, and for this reason the imagined situation seems to display psychological uniformity at 
the first level, but psychological divergence at the second, despite the fact that the worlds 
under consideration, and hence the individuals w i t h  these worlds, are physically 
indiscernible in every respect. Moser and Trout claim that: 
We have no compelling reason to hold that in all physically possible worlds with the same physical 
conditions and physical laws, the same laws of psychological causation always obtain. It seems quite 
plausible to suppose, after all, that the aforementioned case of psychological divergence at a secondary 
level involves physically possible worlds. ( 1995 : 199). 
The possibility of psychological divergence in physically indiscernible worlds does seem to 
drastically undermine the chances of giving a statement of the relation between the mental 
and the physical which respects the principle that the physical facts determine all the facts, 
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whdst at the same time respecting the autonomous nature of the mental. It does not seem 
plausible at all to insist that the physical facts determine all the facts when it is possible that 
hstinct sets of psychological laws could be operative in two physically indiscernible worlds, 
determining a secondary level of psychological fact in one world which is not replicated in 
the other. So whereas global supervenience seems to escape the charge that it is too 
permissive because it allows radical psychological divergence in virtue of some minute 
physical divergence, it does not seem equipped to deal with the objection that there could be 
radical psychological divergence even though there is no physical divergence whatsoever. 
Indeed, to make matters worse, such a case suggests that it does not seem possible to retain 
the central physicalist principle at all, since it is conceivable that there are psychological facts 
which are not in any sense determined by underlying physical facts. It would perhaps require 
some effort to fill in the details of th~s cenario, but in so far as we have no contrary evidence 
to suggest that such a world is not physically possible, I think we have reasonable grounds for 
doubting the truth of the claim that the physical facts determine all the facts. It seems to me, 
therefore, that there are some genuine difficulties with achieving the required balance 
between physicalism and autonomy, which the physicalist must be able to deal with in a 
convincing manner, in order to explain how hs claim that the physical facts determine all the 
facts does not undermine the claim that the mental is autonomous with respect to the 
physical. 
4.Conciusion 
In its attempt to secure the autonomous nature of mentalistic explanation, non-reductive 
physicalism places a great deal of weight on the issue of the irreducibility of mental 
properties to physical properties. Its statement of the relation between the mental and the 
physical draws on the metaphysical principles which seem to guarantee the autonomous 
nature of mentalistic explanation by guaranteeing the irreducible status of mental properties 
to physical properties. Or in other words, the irreducibility of the mental to the physical is 
secured by the imposition of an order onto the world that purports to be consistent with the 
instantiation of irreducible mental properties in physical events. I have been arguing that this 
position is problematic. I have tried to demonstrate certain weaknesses in non-reductive 
physicalism by testing out some of the key arguments designed to show that the existence of 
an autonomous mental domain can be consistent with the embeddedness of the mental in the 
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physical structure of the world. To my mind the problem lies with the non-reductivist's 
statement of the relation between the mental and the physical, which is dictated by his 
commitment to the metaphysical principles of physicalism. In attempting to articulate this 
relation, the non-reductivist faces the threat of reductionism. It is perhaps for this reason that 
the latter is keen to emphasise that he is not required to give a precise statement of how the 
mental is embedded in the physical structure of the world, but it seems to me that this is 
tantamount to admitting that the mental cannot be embedded in the physical structure of the 
world. 
Yet even if we allow the non-reductivist the security he claims, there is a fiuther problem 
whch I believe he ought to take more seriously. Non-reductive physicalism is certainly 
sensitive to the fact that a satisfactory statement of the relation between the mental and the 
physical will be one which recognises the constraint presented by the autonomous nature of 
mentalistic explanation. However, I want to argue that there is a deeper sense in which 
mentalistic explanations are autonomous than he is in the position to acknowledge. 
Mentalistic explanations are autonomous in the deeper sense that they can be said to carry out 
the work required of them without implicating the explanatory resources of the physical 
sciences. To appreciate the deeper sense of the autonomous nature of mentalistic explanation 
it is therefore necessary to find a way of maintaining the complete separateness of the work 
carried out by mentalistic explanation from the work carried out by physicalistic explanation. 
But that cannot be achieved, nor even considered a possibility, in so far as there is a 
commitment to the metaphysical ordering of reality inherent in the non-reductivist 's 
framework. 
The metaphysical ordering of reality is integral to the physicalist 's commitment to the claims 
that the physical facts determine all the facts, and that everything that occurs does so in virtue 
of what is occurring in the physical domain. To the physicalist, this must place a more basic 
constraint on what should count as a satisfactory statement of the relation between the mental 
and the physical. He can recognise the autonomous nature of mentalistic explanation only to 
the extent that it is consistent with his metaphysical ordering of reality. But this means that, in 
articulating the relation between the mental and the physical, he must give priority to hs 
physicalistic commitments first and foremost, and the constraint presented by the 
autonomous nature of mentalistic explanations, to which he is certainly sensitive, then has to 
be worked around this starting point. The problem with this, however, is that it does not do 
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justice to the full extent of the autonomous nature of mentalistic explanation, since the work 
carried out by mentalistic explanations will always have to be underwritten by the work 
carried out by physicalistic explanations. 
Suppose we want to explain why an individual is felling a tree. We might do so by saying 
that he thrnks the tree would provide sufficient fire wood for his camping holiday. But to the 
physicalist, the explanation of his action at this level cannot be a complete explanation. since 
that would mean that the truth of this mentalistic explanation were fully independent of the 
truth of some physicalistic explanations, and it would also mean that the mentalistic 
explanation did not stand in need of support from such underlying physicalistic explanations. 
But this cannot be tolerable to the physicalist. since it would interfere with his principles that 
the physical facts determine all the facts. and that there is a complete and deterministic 
explanation of every occurrence in terms of occurrences at the level of micro-physical 
processes. 
The crux of the matter for the physicalist is that the mentalistic explanation picks out only 
certain aspects of the individual 's behaviour. which it does without being able to explain how 
that behaviour occurred. So given that the mentalistic explanation only seems to offer an 
alternative means of describing what the more basic physicalistic explanations already 
completely account for, it follows that the mentalistic explanation is not yet suficient to fully 
explain the individual's action of felling the tree. regardless of the fact that it serves to 
illuminate an ineliminable feature of it. In order to complete the explanation in the right way. 
it would be necessary to show that the mentalistic explanation converges on the same subject 
matter as the physicalistic explanation of the occurrence of the individual 's behaviour. So the 
immediate consequence of retaining the commitment to physicalism, whilst trying to 
recognise mental autonomy, is that the work carried out by mentalistic explanations turns out 
to be parasitic on the work carried out by physicalistic explanations. But even if this succeeds 
in recognising a limited degree of mental autonomy, we will have failed to recoguse the 
deeper extent of the autonomous nature of mentalistic explanations. And if I am correct, non- 
reductive physicalism must therefore fail to yield a satisfactory statement of the relation 
between the mental and the physical. What is required to recognise the deeper extent of 
mental autonomy, how t h ~  might be achieved, and what it implies about the nature of the 
relation between the mental and the physical, will be topics for the remainder of this thesis. 
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Chapter 3: Life and Mind 
1.Introduction 
1.1. What Is Required To Recopise The Deeper Extent QfMental Autonomy 
My task in the remainder of this thesis is to argue that the autonomous nature of mentalistic 
explanation presents a stronger constraint on what counts as a satisfactory statement of the 
relation between the mental and the physical than can be acknowledged within the 
metaphysical framework of non-reductive physicalism. Th~s means not only that the 
statement of thss relation has to be consistent with the fact that mental concepts are 
irreducible to physical concepts, but also with the fact that the work carried out by mentalistic 
explanations is completely separate from the work carried out by physicalistic explanations. 
To recogmse the latter is to recogmse the deeper extent of the autonomous nature of 
mentalistic explanations: mentalistic explanations can carry out the work required of them 
without implicatmg the explanatory resources of the physical sciences in their support. In 
order to recognise the deeper extent of the autonomous nature of mentalistic explanations, 
therefore, it is not sufficient to find a means of securing the irreducibility of mental concepts 
to physical concepts as the non-reductivist implies. I suggest that it is also required that we 
find a means of securing the complete separation of the work carried out by mentalistic 
explanations from the work carried out by physicalistic explanations. 
Here is how h s  will be achieved. I will begin with a detailed defence of the claim that there 
is an intrinsic connection between the nature of human relationships and the nature of the 
mental, and I will suggest that an investigation into thts connection, as it manifests itself 
w i h  our everyday explanatory practices, ought to put me in position to successfully 
accommodate the first requirement. I will suggest, in other words, that the autonomous nature 
of mentalistic explanation is to be understood in terms of the autonomous nature of human 
relationshps. In malung thts claim, it will be argued that individuals acquire their repertoire 
of conceptual skills and mental capacities through learning how to be involved in various 
types of relationshps with other people. Part of thss learning process is the process of 
acquiring the wide range of mental concepts that individuals put to use in their day to day 
lives, in telling each other what they thmk about thts and how they feel about that, in listening 
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to each other's stories and news, in discussing new projects with work colleagues, in 
comforting fhends in their troubled times and in expressing sympathy and concern for them, 
and so on and SO forth. The point here is that mental concepts have countless different uses 
across the different relationshps in which individuals are involved, and that using mental 
concepts is part of the way in which individuals express and direct their interests and 
concerns in relating to each other. It seems to me that whether mentalistic explanations 
successfully cany out the work required of them is determined by whether they satis6 the 
understanding sought by the individuals concerned; once that has been ascertained, there is no 
further question for these individuals of whether their mentalistic explanations stand in need 
of support from the explanatory resources of the physical sciences. 
But this is only part of my task. What is also required, in addition to t h ~ s ,  is a direct attack on 
the claim that mentalistic and physicalistic explanations converge on the common subject 
matter of internal behaviour-causing states and events. Th~s  will enable me to meet the second 
requirement. The central strategy in this part of my argument will be to develop a non-causal 
account of the work carried out by explanations employed in rationalising human action, 
whch will build on the intrinsic connection between the nature of the mental and the nature 
of human relationshps, and whch will contrast directly with the causal approach to such 
explanations integral to the metaphysical framework of non-reductive physicalism. The point 
of contrast between these different approaches will be crucial for the defence of my thesis: 
the non-reductivist 's account of rationalising explanations maintains, whereas I want to deny, 
that the notion of causality must be built into the concept of what it means for an individual 
to act for a reason, where the relevant causal relations are implemented at the level of 
physical processes. It seems to me that if we can maintain that what an individual thmks can 
completely explain hs behaviour, without presupposing that his thinking has to be physically 
constituted, we will then be in a position to appreciate the deeper extent of the autonomous 
nature of mentalistic explanations; and hence, we will finally be able to make some 
suggestions and recommendations as to how the relation between the mental and the physical 
might be articulated. 
One final point before moving on. In the introduction I stated that my intention was to 
develop the methodological starting point recommended by Baker. Her recommendation is to 
take our everyday explanatory practices as self-standing and successful in their own right. She 
claims that mentalistic explanations can meet our explanatory requirements without our 
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having to presuppose that the mental is related to the physical by way of identity or 
constitution. mist t h s  claim will certady figure centrally in my overall argument, I will be 
developing the recommended starting point in a somewhat different du-ection in order to 
make a stronger claim. Let me be quite specific about the development I have in mind. To 
begin with, here is Baker’s claim, with whch I am in broad agreement: 
The legitimacy of psychology no more depends on particular physical realizations of explanatory states 
like belief than does the legitimacy of economics depend on particular physical realizations of 
explanatory states like the national debt. It should be obvious that it does not follow fiom any of this 
that beliefs (or the national debt) are realized in, or constituted by, some nonphysical stuff The point 
that I am urging is that physical realization or constitution is simply irrelevant to the justificatory, 
explanatory, and predictive uses to which we put beliefs (or the national debt). (1995: 148). 
I will be arguing that not only does the success of mentalistic explanation fail to commit us to 
accepting that the mental must be related to the physical by way of identity or constitution, 
but that the success of mentalistic explanation depends on the fact that the mental and the 
physical are not so related. My central contribution will be made by basing this stronger 
claim on the point that the identification of the mental with the physical commits us to 
accepting an account of how mentalistic explanations work which fails to cohere with the 
way in which they are actually used within the contexts of our relationships. It will be argued 
that the physicalist’s conception of the mental is implicitly tied to an implausible 
interpretationist account of human relationshps, and that a more satisfactory conception of 
the mental, because it acknowledges the deeper extent of the autonomous nature of 
mentalistic explanation, can be arrived at through a more accurate account of the way in 
which we actually relate to each other on an everyday basis. In making this stronger claim, I 
will be departing from Baker in another respect: whereas she wants to say that mentalistic 
explanations are adequate if they qualifL as causal explanations whch do not depend on the 
truth of physicalistic explanations, I want to say that mentalistic explanations are adequate if 
they satis6 the (mostly) non-causal understanding sought by each individual within the 
contexts of his or her own particular relationship. 
1.2.Brief Outline Of The Remainder Of This Chapter 
In the remainder of h s  chapter I want to motivate an interpretation of the autonomy of the 
mental in terms of the autonomy of human relationships, which should provide me with a 
starting point for completely separatrng the work carried out by mentalistic explanations from 
the work carried out by physicalistic explanations. Central to the connection between the 
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nature of human relationshps and the nature of the mental, I will argue, is Wittgenstein’s 
notion of rule governed practices. I will therefore begin in the next section with an outline of 
some of the salient points concerning the autonomy of human relationships. I will then move 
on to draw out what I consider to be the important connections between our involvement in 
various types of human relationshps and our involvement in rule governed practices, and 
then I will deepen &Is connection by considering the extent to which individuals are 
dependent on their involvement in relationshps with others for their possession of conceptual 
skills and mental capacities. Finally, I will consider how &Is connection manifests itself 
within the contexts of our everyday explanatory practices, and what h s  implies about the 
autonomous nature of mentalistic explanations. 
2.The autonomy of human relationships 
2. I. Introductory Remarks 
The fnst point that needs to be made is that what it means to have the capacity to be involved 
in human relationships is not something that can be given a straight-forward and exact 
definition. It is very unclear whether it would be possible to give a finalised and definite list 
of criteria that individuals must satis@ if they are to be said to have precisely &Is capacity. 
Actually, I thlnk that such a list of criteria would not be possible. The reason for t h s  is that 
our relationships take so many different forms, and are of so many different types, that it 
would not make sense to suppose that there were a d e f ~ t e  list of criteria that individuals had 
to satis@, if they were to be said to have the capacity to be involved in human relationshps. 
The possibility of being able to give such a list would presuppose that there were no 
indeterminacies with regard to the meaning of ‘involvement’. But different types of 
relationshps demand different levels and types of involvement, and there are many different 
reasons and motivations for an individual to become involved in certam relationshps, or for 
him to remain involved, to the same or to a lesser extent, in the relationshps in whch he is 
already involved. To be involved in various types of intimate and loving relationships, for 
example, demands a deep level of emotional commitment and moral responsibility, which is 
not required of individuals who are involved in various types of business or professional 
relationshps. Different relationshps have different types of demands and requirements, 
whch makes the task of regimenting human relationshps into one single form impossible, 
37 
and it also makes impossible the task of producing a strict definition of what it means to be 
involved in human relationshps that can be generally applied throughout. 
It seems to me that thls is indicative of the fact that the network of human relationships is 
irreducible to anythmg more basic. It is not realistic to expect to be able to define what it 
means to be involved in human relationshps in terms of factors external to this complex 
network itself. It is the demands and constraints of our relationshps themselves that 
determine what is required of individuals who can be said to have the capacity to be involved 
in them. Intimate human relationships, for example, demand not only a great deal of 
emotional and affective commitment from the individuals involved in them; they also 
demand that each take on a great deal of moral and practical responsibilities toward the other. 
Workmg relationshps, on the other hand, might not demand ths  type of emotional and 
affective commitment, but they do sometimes make certain moral and practical demands on 
the individuals involved, as a background to the demands whch are more specifically work- 
oriented. It seems to me that not only are different types of relationshps constituted by 
dfferent types of demands, but that withn any one type of relationshp there are certain 
demands whch might also be common to many other relationships. It is therefore difficult to 
isolate any one type of human relationshp in order to exactly specify whch demands are 
uniquely constitutive of it. It is more llkely that the various types of human relationshps in 
whch individuals are involved are interdependent in varying degrees, and that the demands 
whch are partly constitutive of one type of relationshp are at the same time demands which 
are partly constitutive of other types. 
The autonomy of human relationshps manifests itself most clearly in the fact that the 
demands whch are partly constitutive of our relationshps are demands whwh can only come 
into view for us through our involvement in the relationshps themselves. There are two 
important points whch can be taken from this: first, it is not possible to make sense of the 
demands of our relationshps on us except fiom within the contexts of our involvement in 
these relationshps themselves; second, the interdependence of the demands of some types of 
relationshps on the demands of others undermines the possibility of reconstructing the 
demands of our relationshps at a more basic level of explanation. The problem is that in 
order to get these demands into view a great deal of intentionalistic and moralistic language 
has to be in place, but ths does not seem possible except within the contexts of the 
relationshps themselves. 
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In developing these points, I want to focus on the idea that although the demands presented to 
an individual in the various relationshps in whch he is involved are not specifiable in any 
strict form, ttzls does not detract from the individual’s understanding of what is required fi-om 
hrm if he is to be able to respond appropriately to those with whom he is involved. I want to 
stress that the individual’s understanding of how he ought to respond in any gven situation 
could not have been the product of some form of training that successfidly drilled into him a 
definite list of demands and a defrnite list of responses. Rather, what the indwidual knows 
that enables him to cope with the situations in which he finds himself, to respond to the 
demands whch are presented to h m  in hs involvement with others, could only have been 
acquired through experience of living out hs life with other people on a day to day basis. In 
effect, I will be claiming that although the various practices in whch individuals participate 
throughout the normal course of their lives are autonomous, they must also be characterised 
by a degree of indeterminacy, whch stems from the lack of strictness and rigidity in many of 
our shared routines and activities. 
This indeterminacy should not be considered in a negative light, however, as a failing that 
ought to be completely eradicated, or minimally improved upon. It is necessary to sustaining 
our involvement in many of our relationshps that h s  indeterminacy is retained as it is. One 
reason for ttzls is that any attempt to forcibly inject a greater amount of regimentation and 
rigidity into the routines and rituals of our everyday lives would result in the loss of the depth 
and diversity in our relationships, which is considered to be important to our own sense of 
who we are. The variety in our relationshps, or what comes to the same thmg, in our shared 
routines and activities, is fundamentally important to our own sense of personal identity. It is 
precisely because there are such differences in our relationshps that certain individuals 
become more important than others to sustaining our sense of who we are, and to sustaining 
our sense of personal worth. Dilman puts the general idea quite neatly: 
A person is who he is in those relationships which mean most to him, relationships which engage his 
deepest loyalties, obligations, love and gratitude. The first relationships of this kind are the network of 
family relationships into which he is born and in which he finds growth. Later come friendshps, his 
work and colleagues, the demands these make on his moral resources, the interests and loyalties they 
engage, what he gives to them, his sexual loves, mamage, children, and other commitments. But what 
he learns in and fiom his earliest relationshps, who he becomes in them and what he comes to be like, 
largely set the pattern for what he makes of these later relationships. ( 1  990: 208). 
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My suggestion, therefore, is that since human relationshps are autonomous, in the sense that 
their demands cannot be redescribed at any level other than that of our involvement with 
others in everyday activities, they must also be characterised by a certain amount of 
indeterminacy, in the sense that there are no strict definitions of how an individual ought to 
respond to those with whom he is involved. If autonomy is to be understood as a feature of 
the complex web of human relationshps, and hence of the various activities in whch we 
engage, then it must be balanced with the degree of indeterminacy that is also a feature of 
many of our everyday activities. I suggest that we ought to thmk of &IS balance in terms of 
the balance that Wittgenstein sets out to acheve, between the autonomy and indeterminacy 
that characterise the rule governed practices in which individuals participate in living out their 
everyday routines. My deeper reason for appealing to Wittgenstein 's rule following 
considerations, other than the fact that they suggest a way of balancing this autonomy and 
indeterminacy, is that I believe there to be an intrinsic connection between what it means to 
have the capacity to be involved in human relationshps, and what it means to have the 
capacity to be engaged in rule governed practices: to have the capacity to be involved in 
human relationshps requires having the wide array of conceptual skills and abilities that 
individuals develop through learning how to partxipate in rule governed practices. 
2.2a.An Interpretation Of Wittgenstein On Rules And Relationships 
Wittgenstein's rule following considerations are typically thought to be an attack on the 
platonistic conception of rules which, when worked out to its logical conclusion, turns out to 
be self-refutmg. No doubt there is some truth in h s .  But it seems to me that the target is 
rather any conception of rules, not just of the platonistic variety, which holds that the identity 
of the rule is logrcally prior to the identity of the various routines and activities constitutive of 
our everyday practices. What motivates this conception of rules is that it seems to offer the 
only means of retaining the assumption that the rule itself determines its own applications, 
autonomously and independently of those applications whch strike the individual who is 
following the rule as correct. According to the target conception, this assumption frnds 
expression in the idea that the rule ought to be conceived as somethmg like a universal 
formula, whose applications have already been settled in advance of any application which 
might be made of it. Th~s indeed seems to guarantee autonomy, since the rule is already 
supposed to have determined its own applications. But the difficulty with ths  is that it 
presupposes that the identity of the rule can be fixed from the outset without taking into 
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consideration the indeterminacy lnherent in many of our practices: in certain situations, where 
it is not possible to discern the required degree of rigidity in our activities, the mechanical 
application of such a pre-set universal formula is simply not going to work. The 
indetenninate nature of our practices presents the individual with a conflict between the 
absolute rigidity of the rule and the unformalisable activities in whch he is engaged, and it 
looks as if he wiIl in fact have nothing to appeal to, in deciding how to go on in any particular 
case, other than hs own possibly conflicting interpretations of the rule. This is the difficulty 
whch Wittgenstein dramatises, where he has his interlocutor ask: “But how can a rule show 
me what I have to do at this point? Whatever I do is, on some interpretation. in accord with 
the rule’’ (1967: 4 198). 
Wittgentsein’s point seems to be that the autonomy of rules cannot be retained if it is 
conceived in the manner of the target conception, since that conception can be seen to give 
rise to the possibility that the rule fails to determine what is required if it is to be applied 
correctly. Confronted with a situation in whch the mechanical application of the logically 
pre-set rule seems to be out of place, the individual is then left to hs own devices in deciding 
how the rule ought to be applied in this case. The problem is that the activities surrounding 
many of our rules cannot be formalised in the manner required to support the idea that the 
identity of the rule is logically prior to the identity of our practices. Indeed, this conflict is 
heightened in cases where the activities surrounding our rules leave certain of their 
applications open to question. Suppose, for instance, that there is a rule stating that items 
which might be used as offensive weapons cannot be sold in hardware stores to anyone under 
a certain age. It is perfectly conceivable that, regardless of how precisely h s  rule is stated, 
situations will arise in whch it is not very clear whether the trader has correctly applied this 
rule or not. W l s t  it is clear enough that selling a h f e  to a youth would be an instance in 
whch the trader has gone against the rule, it is not so clear that selling a strip of wood, which 
might be sharpened into a spear or used as a baton, would be such an instance. In this case 
there is no clear answer to whether the trader would be going against the offensive weapon 
rule by selling the strip of wood to the youth. And as Wittgenstein is happy to acknowledge, 
“rules leave loop-holes open, and the practice has to speak for itself.” ( 1979: 4 139). 
Thus, Wittgenstein’s problem is with the approach to autonomy which forces rules to be 
conceived in such a manner that their applications require complete determinacy throughout 
our practices, when this simply cannot be granted, given the lack of rigidity that surrounds 
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many of our everyday activities. The problem can be brought into focus by considering the 
fact that there are certain types of rules whose applications cannot be sealed in advance as the 
target conception assumes, since there are always going to be situations in whch the 
mechanical application of the rule is upset by the lack of rigidity in these activities. The idea 
seems to be that unless the identity of the rule is fixed w i b  the practice itself, thereby 
leaving room to accommodate the indeterminacy inherent in the activities surrounding the 
rule, it looks as if it will not be possible to retain the general assumption that the rule 
determines its own applications autonomously and independently of the applications which 
d e  the individual as correct. 
I thmk Wittgenstein’s suggestion is that ths  balance can be retained if it is held in place by 
the attitudes that individuals take toward the various activities in which they are disposed to 
engage. The idea is that the relevant attitudes are cultivated in the course of bringing the 
individual to see that certain types of action must be performed if he is to follow certain rules 
correctly; the resulting generality in these attitudes is responsible for carrying the individual 
confidently into situations which had not been explicitly mentioned in the statement of the 
rule itself. The balance between autonomy and indeterminacy is acheved through the 
realisation that it is only through living out the routines and activities constitutive of our 
practices that the individual develops the skulls and abilities to cope with the demands of the 
situations in whch he finds hrmself. It is these very same slulls and abilities that enable the 
individual to understand what is required of htm if he is to continue to follow certain rules 
correctly in each new situation, even if the new situation seems to present the individual with 
demands withn a set of circumstances which he had previously not encountered. The 
autonomy of rules is preserved in that the generality in the individual’s attitudes, which are 
expressed through exercising the relevant conceptual slulls, commits the individual to 
accepting only a certain type of response as correct. 
The type of response judged to be correct may or may not already form part of the everyday 
routines and activities in whch the individual is engaged. The individual draws on his 
repertoire of conceptual slulls and abilities already built up through hs day to day experience, 
on hs basic practical know-how, to determine the correct response in this new situation. But 
given the lack of rigdity in many of our activities, there need be no strict definition of the 
correct response in thls new situation. If the correct response in this new situation is not one 
with whch the indsvidual is already familiar fiom a different context, it could be that, when 
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confronted with such an atypical case, the individual might have to come to his own informed 
decision based on what he has already learned through previous experience; in other 
situations, he might have to rely on the explicit judgement of others, who may have had the 
benefit of a greater and more varied experience. But the important point is that once the 
identity of the rule is fixed w i h  the practice itself, thrs amount of indeterminacy can be 
tolerated, in so far as it is indicative of the lack of rigidity in certain aspects of the activities in 
whch individuals are engaged. It would be a mistake, however, to think that toleration of a 
degree of indeterminacy in certain situations could licence toleration of complete 
indeterminacy throughout our practices, as would have to be the case to warrant an appeal to 
the agreement in judgements of others in the individual’s linguistic community as the only 
means of settling the correctness of the individual’s claim to have mastered any rules 
whatsoever. 
It seems to me that part of what explains the indeterminacy in certain types of rules is the fact 
that an individual’s engagement in the relevant practices is not sharply separable fiom his 
involvement in various loosely structured activities and routines with other people. Our rule 
governed practices are shaped and structured through the different ways in whch individuals 
relate to each other, which means that certain types of rules and demands are going to be less 
rigid and exact than others. For neither the complex web of human relationshps, nor the 
array of rule governed practices in whch we engage, can be treated independently, as 
separate going-concerns. 
The autonomy and indeterminacy in our practices cannot be grasped independently of 
grasping the autonomy and indeterminacy in our human relationships, and the balance 
between the autonomy and indeterminacy is held in place in both cases by the attitudes that 
individuals learn to take toward the routines and actvities in whch they engage with each 
other. We refuse to accept certain applications of rules as correct, just as we refuse to accept 
certain reponses to others as appropriate. But in many cases there is no strictness in our 
definition of what counts as a correct or appropriate response, and there is no formalisation of 
these responses which could be given in advance to cover each and every case. What this 
suggests is that the indeterminacy in certain of our rules, or in the demands of some of our 
relationshps, is to be understood in terms of the lack of rigidity in these activities and 
routines, whence it might happen that a specific doubt as to how a particular rule ought to be 
applied in a certain situation, or as to how a particular person ought to be treated on a specific 
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occasion, has to be settled by makmg an informed decision, or by appealing to how other 
more experienced people would be inclined to respond in that same situation. 
2.2b. Some Comments On Kripke, Baker And Hacker, Malcolm and Williams 
Although the appeal to others certainly has its place in settling the application of certain rules 
in specific contexts, it seems to me that Krrpke’s (1 982) appeal to how others would be 
inclined to respond, as the only means of settling the correctness of the application of every 
rule, betokens a failure to appreciate the need to retain the rigidity in certain of our activities, 
such as counting, measuring, telling the time, building bridges, drawing maps, and so on, 
without whch our lives could not continue to function in the regular manner that they do. 
Whereas it is perfectly acceptable to tolerate a degree of indeterminacy in some of our rules, 
where the identity of those rules is fixed within the context of activities which demand less 
exactness and strictness from the individuals involved, it would be a mistake to thmk that this 
indeterminacy could characterise every aspect of our practices, putting individuals into the 
position where every application of every rule had to be checked for correctness against the 
inclinations of others in their linguistic community. But h s  is precisely how Knpke 
interprets Wittgenstein on ths  matter. Here is what he has to say: 
Any individual who claims to have mastered the concept of addition will be judged by the community 
to have done so if his particular responses agree with those of the community in enough cases (1982: 
91 -92). 
Knpke’s community view of rule following is developed in response to the sceptical point 
that there is no fact of the matter whch determines whether an individual is currently 
applying a rule in accord with hs previous linguistic intentions; it is proposed as a direct 
return to the sceptic ’s challenge that there is no determinate answer to the question of whether 
an individual is now justified in applying a rule in one particular way rather than another. For 
if we suppose that the current application of the rule takes place withm an entirely new and 
htherto unencountered situation, and if we ask whether the individual is now applying the 
rule as he had previously intended it to be applied in ths  situation, then we seem compelled 
to agree that the question has no definite answer. The problem is that since the individual 
applied the rule a finite number of times on previous occasions without giving h s e l f  
explicit instructions as to how the rule should be applied in ths new situation, it seems to 
follow that any application of the rule in h s  situation could be made out to be compatible 
with hs previous applications of the rule. a s  is Krrpke’s famous example: 
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Let me suppose ... that ‘68+57’ is a computation that I have never performed before ... I perform the 
computation, obtaining, of course, the answer ‘125’ ... Now suppose I encounter a bizarre 
sceptic ... Perhaps, he suggests, as I used the term ‘plus’ in the past, the answer I intended for ‘68+57’ 
should have been ‘5’! ... Mer all, he says, if I am so confident that, as I used the symbol ‘+’, my 
intention was that ‘68+57’ should turn out to denote 125, this cannot be because I explicitly gave 
myself instructions that 125 is the result of performing the addition in this particular instance. (1982: 
8). 
Kripke deals with h s  problem on Wittgenstein’s behalf by appealing to the agreement in the 
judgements of the linguistic community to provide the criterion for what counts as a correct 
application of the rule. Faced with the possibility of radical indeterminacy, which threatens 
once the sceptic’s point is accepted, it seems that the individual must resort to how others 
would be inclined to apply the rule to determine whether his own application of the rule is 
correct. But as Baker and Hacker ( 1992 : 17 1-2) complain, the problem with the community 
interpretation is that since it is committed to the idea that the criterion of correctness is not 
provided by the rule itself, but by an external agency, it is guilty of abrogating the internal 
relation between a rule and acts in accord with it. Their central point, with which I am in 
agreement, is that the individual’s training into our linguistic practices instils in h m  the 
capacity to discern a correct application of the rule from an incorrect one, and what he thus 
dscerns is not that hs judgements agree with the judgements of others, but that the rule itself 
demands that a particular action must be perj4ormed f i t  is to he applied correctly, and that 
in applying the rule he is thus acting in accord with the already existing practice of following 
the rule. 
Baker and Hacker use this point to argue that there is no need to think of rule governed 
practices as requiring more than one individual. Which amounts to the claim that if other 
people are not required to settle the correctness of an application of a rule, then they are not 
required at all. On the strength of the fact that there is an internal relation between a rule and 
acts in accord with it, Baker and Hacker argue that Wittgenstein’s reference to a practice is 
not necessarily reference to a practice which involves a multiplicity of agents. And given this, 
they argue that there is no logical incoherence in supposing that a Robinson Crusoe could 
establish a novel rule governed practice and then engage in it successfully. But whilst I think 
they are correct to insist that an isolated individual could establish his own practice and 
engage in it without losing sight of what counts as correct applications of his rule, I am not 
convinced by their much stronger suggestion, that it is possible for a radically isolated 
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individual, one who has been isolated throughout h is  entire life, one who has had no contact 
whatsoever with others, to create and sustain hs own rule governed practices.’ 
Against the idea that there can be such solitary rule followers, Malcolm (1995) argues that 
there is an important sense in which other people are in fact indispensable to our rule 
governed practices. Malcolm defends t h s  claim in the course of criticising Baker and Hacker 
for not being able to answer what he refers to as the hard question. The hard question is thls: 
what decides whether a particular step taken, a particular application made, is or is not in 
accordance with the rule? It is important to note that Malcolm’s complaint is not with the idea 
that the rule and its applications are internally related, but with what Baker and Hacker take to 
be the implication of this idea, namely, that the rule itself, and nothing but the rule itself, 
determines whch steps are in accord with it. The point is that if the rule and nothmg but the 
rule determines what is correct, then it would follow that when a rule is given, so must its 
extension be given. But the central problem, by Malcolrn’s lights, is precisely that when a 
rule is gven, its extension is not given. So what is required to answer the hard question, if 
Baker and Hacker have not been able to do so? Malcolm thinks that since it is a mistake to 
say that when a rule is given, its extension is given, the hard question can only be answered 
by recognising the importance of a framework of quiet agreement to provide the rule with its 
extension : 
In asserting that ‘the rule and nothing but the rule determines what is correct’, Baker and Hacker do 
not seem to gwe sufficient weight to Wittgenstein’s insight that a rule does not determine anything 
except within a setting of quiet agreement. If you imagine that no longer existing, you become aware of 
the nakedness of the rule. The words that express the rule would be without weight, without life. A 
signpost would not be a signpost. A rule by itself determines nothmg. (1995: 149-50). 
According to Malcolrn, the nakedness of the rule is evident in the fact that different people, 
with similar training and equal intelligence, could form different extensions in accordance 
with the same general expression of the rule. So, without a framework of quiet agreement, 
our understandmg of what rules are would disappear. Consider one of hs examples. Suppose 
that you arrive at the junction of a busy London intersection. If there were no agreement 
among dnvers as to whch direction to turn in following a sign, signs would no longer 
Baker and Hacker claim that Wittgenstein conceived the possibility that an individual could be 
“acquainted only with language games he played with himself’ (1 992: 175). Th~s implies that an 
individual could invent his own language games despite not having been involved in shared language 
games at any other time. I am doubtfbl that this can be the case. It seems to me that an individual could 
certainly invent language games, which only he played, but I am not sure that he could be acquainted 
only with language games he played with himself, for this implies that he need never have been 
acquainted with shared language games before he could invent his own. 
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fimction as signs and chaos would ensue. Malcolm is careful to point out that h v e r s  do not 
consult each other’s opinions to decide whether the sign indicates this direction or thaf, but he 
does hold that unless there is a framework of consensus of action and reaction, there would 
be no such thing as rules, signposts, and so on. The agreement whch is required is not an 
agreement in the opinions of all the dnvers as to which way to go, but it is an agreement in 
the way we are all trained to react to signposts. Malcolm h n k s  that Baker and Hacker’s 
insistence that “it is the rule and nothmg but the rule which determines what is in accord with 
it” blinds them to the possibility of widespread disagreement in the application of rules, and 
as such leads them to underestimate the significance of agreement in action for the concept of 
a rule. 
It seems to me that Malcolm makes an important point against Baker and Hacker, but he puts 
it rather misleadingly in saying that “a rule by itself determines nothng”. For, when 
Wittgenstein claims that a rule is not an extension, he might only be objecting to the 
platonistic conception of rules outlined earlier, and not to the idea that there is a perfectly 
ordinary, non-platonistic, sense in whxh the normative aspects of rules are autonomous. 
Malcolm seems to have recoiled too far from the platonistic conception of rules, leading him 
to say that when a rule is given, its extension is not gven. He appears to be thinlung of a rule 
as being in itself normatively inert, unable to determine what is to count as a correct 
application of it until it is dressed up within a framework of quiet agreement. Malcolm could 
have put his point by saying, not that without general agreement the rule determines nothing, 
but that without general agreement there would no rules at all. He does seem to suggest t h s  
himself, however, when he says that without agreement a signpost would not be a signpost, 
but this specific way of putting the point does not seem to have the same consequences. It 
seems to me that if Malcolm had settled with th s  formulation, he would have been able to 
avoid the problem that gave rise to the hard question. For if we put the point t h s  way, we do 
not have to assume that there can be such a thing as a rule whose applications are completely 
undetermined, until it has been brought into a framework of agreement in action. The most 
we have to assume is that without such agreement, there would be no rules at all. This way of 
putting the point is perfectly consistent with saying that an individual might create hs own 
rules that only he follows, as in the case of Defoe’s Crusoe, but it is inconsistent with saying 
that this can happen in the case of an individual who has been isolated throughout hs life, 
whch is what Malcolm seems to have been getting at anyway. 
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But regardless of how unusual the case seems, it might be objected that there is no logical 
contradiction in the supposition that the radically isolated individual could possess conceptual 
dulls. It might be argued that the radically isolated individual could have acquired the latter 
through some magical or super-natural process, perhaps through swallowing pills whose 
effect is to make hun a competent rule-follower, or through being struck by mysterious 
language-inducing bolts of lightning. Given these possibilities, the objection might continue, 
we have no reason a priori to deny that the radically isolated individual could be in 
possession of a language, and this presents an apparent problem for my claim that an 
individual acquires hs repertoire of conceptual slulls and mental capacities through learning 
how to be involved in relationshps with other people. 
However. as Meredith Williams (1991 : 1 19) points out, the force of this objection is 
weakened by the fact that an individual’s conceptual skills could not have been acquired 
spontaneously in these ways, because to attribute such slulls to an individual at any point in 
tune presupposes their prior duration through time. Or in other words, since the individual’s 
conceptual competence in following sign-posts or continuing arithmetical series is manifest 
over time, it follows that in attributing such skills to this individual we are committed to 
assuming that he has the know-how to act in an appropriate manner in the future, and that he 
has either already acted in an appropriate manner on previous occasions, or that he has a 
hstory whch would lend some warrant to our judgement that he is at last beginning to grasp 
the rules. To specifL a particular point of time at which the individual suddenly acquired hs 
conceptual slulls, and at which he suddenly displayed behaviour whch we would call 
hguistic, without filling in details about the history of the individual’s current conceptual 
performance (whch would arguably involve details about hs initiation into a shared way of 
living), is therefore unintelligible. 
I thmk that h s  is certamly a damaging point against the idea that the radically isolated 
individual could possess conceptual skills. But it might be replied that &IS point only 
threatens the latter idea on the assumption that the magic pills and mysterious bolts of 
lightning bring about the acquisition of language spontaneously. For if we were to assume, on 
the other hand, that the effect materialised only after a longer period of time, during which 
the radically isolated individual began to act in a manner apposite to acquiring the relevant 
hstory, then the point would lose much of its force. All that would be required would be that 
the individual got into the habit of scratching - -- --- ---- in the sand, for instance, and that he 
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eventually began to use such patterns, along with variations on them, to represent and keep a 
tally of the fish he had speared that day. But once we have conceived this possibility, we 
seem to be only a short step from dispensing with magic, and granting that the radically 
isolated individual could have brought about tlus state of affairs by himself. On this 
assumption, the case against the radically isolated language user becomes unclear, and it 
becomes equally unclear whether the issue can be definitively settled one way or the other. 
So instead, it will be worthwhile considering whether other people are in fact indispensable to 
our having the conceptual skills and mental capacities we do, which is the point I really need 
for my overall argument anyway. The point is that language is a lived phenomenon, and the 
indispensability of others to our linguistic practices is connected with the fact that our 
language is bound up with our emotional and affective natures, with the basic needs, interests 
and concerns we express in a variety of different ways in the course of our lives together. 
C e r t d y .  this does not logically exclude the radically isolated individual from possessing a 
language; but it means that fhe  can be said to posses a language at all, the type of history we 
would be obliged to attribute to h m  would be such that hs language would fail to have many 
of the features characteristic of our language. The upshot of t h s  is that the type of practice 
that would be accessible to the radically isolated individual would not be the type of practice 
that is accessible to individuals who are involved in a shared way of living such as ours. The 
type of situation in whch the radically isolated individual could find himself would be 
significantly different from the type of situations in whch individuals in relation could find 
themselves, given that the situation would be entirely of the individual’s own making. It 
would not be shaped in any sense by the needs and demands that shape the situations in 
whch individuals in relation find themselves where, for instance, there is some concern for 
the interests and the welfare of others, where there is a degree of respect for persons and their 
perspective, where there are fears that some people will harm them, and so on, since it would 
not be possible for any other individual to exert the influence of their presence in shaping his 
conception of the situations in whch he finds htmself. 
This manifests itself most clearly in the fact that the radically isolated individual could not 
have the same mental concepts as we do, if indeed he can have any, since the uses of our 
mental concepts are shaped by the various ways in which we relate to each other. The type of 
practice accessible to tlus individual would thus lack many of the features necessary to 
support the claim that he had the same array of emotional and mental capacities as the 
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individual who had the benefit of being involved in relationshps with others. The radically 
isolated individual’s conception of pain and fear, for instance, would not be the same as our 
conception of pain and fear. The simple reason for this is that the hfferent ways in which 
other people are involved in our lives contributes to our understanding of what it means to be 
in pain or to be afiaid, which means that the radically isolated individual would necessarily 
lack our understanding of these concepts. An individual in pain is an individual towards 
whom sympathy is an appropriate amtude to have, and an individual who is afraid is an 
individual towards whom comfort is an appropriate attitude to have. The radically isolated 
individual ’s conception of pain and fear would necessarily lack these normative implications, 
since their meanings would be tied exclusively to the contexts of his own individualistic 
world. So the radically isolated individual would not be in command of important aspects of 
our mental concepts since he would never be in the position to respond to the type of 
demands that are presented to individuals through their involvement in human relationships. 
Nor, for that matter, would he ever be in the position to use mental concepts as part of the 
ways in whch individuals relate to each other, to make promises or to confess sins, to 
express gratitude or to declare love, to frighten, humiliate or to humble? 
2.3. The Inner And The Others 
By appealing to certain features of Wittgenstein’s rule following considerations, I have been 
trying to suggest that individuals can only be said to have the conceptual skills and mental 
capacities they have through their involvement in a partm.dar way of living their life with 
each other. On the strength of this, I claim that since the process of learning to relate to others 
must involve acquiring the conceptual skills whch alert individuals to the demands of these 
relationships, it is thls very same process that is responsible for giving content and structure 
to each individual’s own personal psychology. In thls section I will try to show that t h~s  claim 
is not as implausible as it might appear, that it does not threaten the deeply complex and 
often intensely private nature of the inner. I will do this indirectly: first, by touching on an 
aspect of Wittgenstein’s (1992: 62-3) idea that the inner and the outer are related logically, 
and that the relation between the inner and the outer is itself part of the concepts; and second, 
by dealing with an objection to this way of approachmg the inner in general. 
* These ideas will be hrther developed in the next chapter 
Part of what Wittgenstein is trymg to get at here is that that there is a logcal relation between 
the inner and the outer which is fixed by the concepts which are constitutive, not only of the 
inner experiences that the indwidual can be said to have, but also of the outer circumstances 
of whch certain of his inner experiences can be said to be experiences? An example might 
help to illustrate h s  point: an individual's experience of being struck by the thought that his 
door has been left unlocked is an experience which is intrinsically concept involving, such 
that the individual could not be said to have this type of inner experience if he could not be 
said to have the conceptual skills which are drawn on in having it. The concepts whch are 
constitutive of hs inner experience are the very concepts which are constitutive of the fact 
that hs door has been left unlocked, and as such the concepts involved serve to fix a logical 
relation between the inner experience and the outer circumstance of which the inner 
experience is an experience. The important point for my purposes is the former: since the 
inner experience is intrinsically concept involving, it must be a logical precondition of having 
this experience that the individual has the conceptual skills which are drawn on in having it. 
In other words, or so I claim, it must be a log~cal precondition of having this experience that 
the individual has the capacity to be involved in the various types of relationships, in terms of 
which the fact that his door is unlocked strikes h m  as part~cularly salient. 
But on the surface of thugs, this idea might look fairly implausible. Or at least, it might look 
as if it is not able to provide convincing support for the claim that an individual can be said to 
have his own personal psychology only through hs involvement with others. For the obvious 
objection to make against ths idea is that it forces such a strong dependence relation between 
the inner and the outer, that it not only fails to do justice to the density and complexity of 
inner experience itself, but that it is also in danger of refusing to fully acknowledge that the 
individual has hs own personal psychology. Murdoch (1992), for instance, argues in this 
vein, that any attempt to explain the nature of the inner in terms of logically structured 
practices leads to the denial of inner experience, and ultimately to the loss of the individual. 
Her concern seems to be that if the logical precondition of having inner experiences is that 
the individual is involved in a variety of shared practices, then the individual must lose his 
own identity to take on the larger identity of the people with whom he is involved. Murdoch 's 
For fbrther discussion of the internal connections between the inner and the outer, see McDowell 
(I 99 1 : 159- 160), and for a discussion of how these ideas tie up with the private language argument, 
see McDowell(l989). The common thread between these discussions is the idea that it makes no sense 
to think of inner experience as resulting from the application of concepts to previously 
unconceptualised occurrences; rather are inner experiences already conceptually constituted as the 
inner experiences they are. 
51 
problem is that inner experience is simply too complex, too intensely personal, and too fluid, 
to be analysed away in terms of the individual’s involvement in such practices, which are 
devoid of the personal values, moral and aesthetic concerns, and so on, that must be in place 
if the individual is to be credited with his own personal psychology. Murdoch writes: 
Experience has layers. Here the intense lively privacy of the individual’s ‘inner life’ presents itself as 
something not to be analysed away ...[ subjecting] an unconquered field to a particular neater clearer 
account ... Must a particular technical mastery be a ‘logical’ condition of someone’s having a particular 
experience? (What indeed is logic doing here!).” (1992: 278). 
Th~s is an important point, for it is most llkely that the individual’s experience of being struck 
by the thought that hs door is unlocked will not be as simple as I seem to have suggested. It 
is most llkely that th~s experience will also be tainted with various fears and worries, that it 
will cause the individual to panic about his house being burgled, that it will make him critical 
of his negligence, and so on. As Murdoch points out, this type of inner experience will 
involve innumerable considerations, in the sense that it will leave too much out to say that it 
is simply about ‘the door’s being left unlocked’, and it will also involve certain value 
judgements, in the sense that the individual having this experience will take up some sort of 
attitude to the fact that hs door has been left unlocked. But it seems to me that this can be 
explained by saying that it is precisely because the individual is involved in the types of 
relationshps whch alert h m  to t h s  fact in the first place that hs inner experience takes on 
the complex character it does. It is precisely because the individual lives in a society in which 
the activities of criminals and heves  force us to be security conscious that hs unlocked door 
strikes him as particularly salient, and it is this very same set of considerations that explains 
why the individual’s sudden realisation that hs door is unlocked will arouse all sorts of 
worries and fears about hs house being burgled. I think th s  provides us with a way of 
dealing with Murdoch’s point that inner experience involves moral judgements and personal 
concerns. But whereas Murdoch thrnks this means that logic ought to be expelled from the 
inner, I think it means that the identity of the inner experiences that an individual has cannot 
be sharply separated from the identity of the relationships in whch he happens to be 
involved. 
Before moving on, I want to suggest that the type of worry raised by Murdoch is better aimed 
at positions where emphasis on social structure gives rise to a rather negative construal of the 
inner. Hampsfure (1976) proposes an account of the dependence of inner feeling on the 
individual’s awareness of social constraints, whch might help to illustrate the worry. 
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Hampshire’s idea is that an individual’s ability to have inner feelings is logically dependent 
on his ability to exercise restraint on his natural dispositions toward certain patterns of 
behaviour, and his ability to exercise restraint on these dispositions is logically dependent on 
h ~ s  ability to identifL the patterns of behaviour as being appropriate or inappropriate within 
certain situations. Through becoming aware of the contrast between how he is naturally 
inclined to respond in certain situations, and how he is socially required to respond in these 
situations, the individual learns to exercise restraint on his behaviour. And the felt inclination, 
which remains when the individual restrains himself in these situations, is thus identifiable 
only in terms of the patterns of behaviour toward which it is a restrained inclination. 
Hampshire expresses ths dependence in the following way: 
in the particular case of feeling, the inner life of the mind is to be understood as a development of 
somethmg more primitive in every man’s behaviour, of which it is the residue and the shadow (1976: 
73). 
The point might be explained by saying that if an inner feeling is that which remains as a 
‘residue’ or ‘shadow’, through the exercise of restraint, then the inner feeling must be 
constituted by the very concepts whch pick out the patterns of behaviour that have been 
restrained. So it follows fiom ths that the identity of the inner feeling is not logically 
separable from the identity of the patterns of behaviour toward which it is a restrained 
inclination. At first glance this might seem plausible enough, especially if we restrict our 
attention to anger and fear, and if we think of the latter in terms of lashing out or running 
away: the inner feelings w l c h  remain when restraint is exercised are logically secondary to 
such natural patterns of behaviour. But now Murdoch ’s concerns must come to the fore, since 
this approach does seem to throw a negative, and somewhat restrictive, mantle over the inner 
in general. To begm with, it is too narrow as it stands. There are specific types of inner 
feeling, like the feeling of being safe, or the feeling of having been somewhere before, which 
are not restrained inclinations to act, but whch rather emerge in their own right as the 
individual learns to use language spontaneously in new and interesting ways. There are no 
natural behavioural dispositions w l c h  are logcally prior to these types of inner feeling, and 
whch serve as their developmental basis in the way that hitting or cowering do in the case of 
anger or fear4 And furthermore, as Dilman points out: 
Another such example- the feeling that everything is unreal. Wittgenstein (1 980a: t#j 125-6) gives the 
following account: “The feeling of the unreality of one’s surroundings.. .Everything seems somehow not 
real ... But why do I choose precisely the word “unreality” to express it?.. .I choose it because of its 
meaning ... The fact is sirrrpky that 1 use a word, the bearer of another technique, as the expression of a 
new feeling. I use it in a new way.” 
4 
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there are other emotions, such as grief, guilt, shame and remorse, where the natural inclination is to 
hide, to turn into oneself, to seek solitude. To check these inclinations in oneself, if one wishes to hide 
one’s feelings, one has to affect indifference, brazen it out, put on attitudes, pretend. Here what one 
goes on feeling is not a ‘residue’ or ‘shadow’, For though there is a guilt of which defiance is a 
common secondary reaction, defensive and seIf-protective in character, the feeIings I have mentioned 
mostly thrive in an inner life- ‘inner’ in contrast with a life of action. They have their home in such a 
life; on the whole they incline the person to reflect, reminisce, criticize himself, rather than act. ( 1987: 
53). 
To this it can be added that even the apparently paradigmatic cases of anger and fear do not 
neatly fit into the mould of ‘residue ’ or ‘shadow ’. Rather than being inclined toward natural 
patterns of retaliatory behaviour, it is quite likely that an angry individual who has had good 
moral guidance in his early life will be inclined to seek a means of defusing the situation, or 
hstancing himself fiom the the source of hs anger if possible. Also, a fnghtened individual 
may be naturally inclined to talk to someone. or in extreme cases to withdraw into himself 
rather than act. Here we can begin to appreciate the fluidity and the intense lively privacy of 
the individual’s inner life, whch Murdoch is quite correct to emphasise, and whch is in 
danger of being lost in Hampshre’s approach to the inner. 
That said, I thmk that Hampshire is certainly correct to stress the importance of social 
constraints imposed on individuals as that which gives shape and structure to the inner life. 
So perhaps his good point could be put simply by saying that since the individual learns to 
exercise restraint. and indeed to express himself in new and interesting ways as he becomes 
involved in various types of relationships with others, it is in terms of the demands of these 
relationshps that the individual’s inner life comes to take on the shape and structure it has. 
However, that there are such logical preconditions of having inner feelings and experiences 
does not have to be understood as being in any way restricting or crippling. It is certainly a 
logical precondition of having the array of inner feelings just mentioned that the individual 
has mastered the relevant conceptual skills, but th~s is precisely what enables him to go on to 
have intensely private, and often deeply moving, experiences which simply cannot be 
analysed away in terms of a ‘particular neater clearer account’. So despite Murdoch’s 
worries, which would certainly hold with respect to certain ‘negative’ accounts of the inner, it 
is not implausible to say that the individual’s own personal space is inextricably llnked with 
his capacity to be involved in various types of relationships with others. 
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2. -/.Indeterminacy 
The connection between the nature of the mental and the nature of human relationships 
manifests itself most clearly in the indeterminacy that characterises our everyday explanatory 
practices. Part of what it means to say that the mental is indeterminate is that mental concepts 
are used within the contexts of our relationships in expressing the interests and concerns that 
we have toward each other. To the extent that our involvement in our relationships is not 
rigidly structured., the use of mental concepts in these relationships must capable of adapting 
to cope with &IS lack of rigidity. So it seems that the use of mental concepts cannot be fully 
determinate, in the sense that their use in every possible case can be settled in advance, 
without losing the flexibility and adaptiveness constitutive of their use within the contexts of 
human relationships. The important point here is that the indeterminacy in the use of mental 
concepts is indicative of the fact that there are significant differences in the ways in which we 
relate to each other. There is a variety in our relationships, and the continued existence of this 
variety, which would be lost if mental concepts were to lose their flexibility, is important in 
our lives. 
If an individual related to his loved ones as he related to the ticket inspector on the train, for 
instance, there would be no deep relationships in hs life which he considered to be special in 
themselves, and worth working hard at when thngs became difficult or strained. There would 
be little difference between relating his terrible news to his family or relating it to the 
postman who greets him each morning with his mail. It is important to individuals that 
different people are involved in their lives in different ways; it is the fact that an individual's 
loved ones are who they are in his life that he seeks their company, that he wants them to be 
there, at such significant times. So I think that what it means to say that our mental concepts 
are indeterminate is that their use is shaped in such a way as to cope with the differences in 
the depths and qualities of OUT various relationships. If it is part of the use of mental concepts 
to express our interests and concerns in our relationshps, then the ways in which they 
perform these tasks will display a lack of uniformity across the variety of ways in which 
individuals relate to each other. 
The glance of a loved one, for instance, might be loaded with feeling, and the affective 
responses it evokes in the individual it is directed at will be intrinsically concept involving. It 
is through these concepts that the glance is understood to have the sipficance it has; but that 
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it has ths sigmficance, and that it evokes the intended response, is inseparable from the depth 
and quality of this particular relationship. The significance of the glance might. however, be 
unclear to a stranger to h s  relationship, whose non-involvement in it may leave him 
unmoved. There might be no straightforward way in whch to bring the stranger to see the 
significance of t h s  glance. other than by filling in some of the background and the context of 
the particular relationship in which it occurred. But exactly which details would have to be 
given to remove the stranger’s uncertainty over its significance cannot be detenninately 
settled in advance for every possible case, without assuming an artificial simplification of our 
intensely complex relationships.’ It rather depends on the individual one is trying to convince, 
on how well he relates to others, on hs social and interpersonal skills, on how quick he is on 
the uptake, and so on. Wittgenstein captures th s  point in his remarks that: 
It is important, for instance, that one must ‘know’ someone in order to be able to judge what meaning 
is to be attributed to hs expressions of feeling, and yet that one cannot describe what it is that one 
knows about him. (1992: 89-90). 
What one acquires is not a techque; one learns correct judgements. There are also rules, but they do 
not form a system, and only experienced people can apply them right. ( 1967: 227). 
In learning to relate to others the individual does not receive a well defined instruction 
manual, whch he can either memorise in full, or consult from time to time, in order to bring 
the strict rules to bear on particular cases; rather are the individual’s slulls and abilities, hs 
capacities to be moved and touched by the feelings and experiences of others, gradually built 
up throughout the course of hs life. The individual can be said to acquire a knowledge of 
human nature through hs experience of living his life with others, through the help and 
guidance he receives from those who may be more sensitive than he is, through hs own tnal 
and error, and so on. But what the individual comes to know is not susceptible of codification 
in a form that would allow the transmission of this knowledge to an individual who altogether 
lacked the experience of living out h s  life in the company of others. For that to be possible, 
we would have to envisage a higher degree of regimentation throughout our relationships than 
we can readily grant without losing sight of the individual ’s own private and personal space. 
But individuals could never be in the position to be credited with their own personal 
psychology, if it were not possible to see in them the different traits and qualities which 
5 
- As Marie McGinn (1998: 55) points out, the indeterminacy in our psychological concepts is part of 
the way in which they are bound up with our complicated lives together, and “the uncertainty that 
enters into our everyday human relationships.. . [is] an indication of how intricate our life together has 
become.” 
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gradually emerge out of their involvement in their own complicated webs of human 
relationships. 
3.Conclusion 
The autonomous nature of mentalistic explanation comes to h s .  Mental concepts are 
variously used in expressing the specific interests and concerns that individuals have within 
the contexts of their relationshps with each other. Since these interests and concerns vary 
according to the type of relationship in question, what counts as an adequate or successfhl 
mentalistic explanation is assessed relative to its ability to satis@ the understanding sought by 
each individual within hs or her own particular relationship. An interest in the underlying 
causal processes responsible for bringing about another person 's bodily movements on a 
certain occasion is external to the interests individuals have within the context of their 
everyday relationships, and as such mentalistic explanations can successfully meet the 
demands we make of them without having to implicate the explanatory resources of the 
physical sciences. What has to be appreciated here is that the nature and the structure of our 
explanatory practices are inseparable from the way we live our lives together, and that since 
the standards by whch we assess the adequacy and success of mentalistic explanations are 
therefore generated from w i t h  the contexts of our everyday relationshps with each other, 
mentalistic explanations do not stand in need of support from the more specialised 
explanatory practices of the physical sciences. 
To sum up: my claim is that in order to recognise the deeper extent of the autonomous nature 
of mentalistic explanation it is necessary to completely separate the work carried out by 
mentalistic explanation from the work carried out by physicalistic explanation. The aim of 
h s  chapter has been to provide a framework for effecting h s  separation by arguing that 
mentalistic explanations are intrinsic to the various interests we have in our relationships with 
each other. In the introduction I noted that it would not be sufficient for the defence of my 
thesis simply to point to the fact that these interests are different from the interests served by 
physicalistic explanations, and then conclude on that basis that the work carried out by 
mentalistic and physicalistic explanations must therefore be completely separate. 
Unfortunately, the fact that different forms of explanation answer to different types of 
interest does not yet guarantee that the work carried out by the one is completely separate 
f'i-om the work carried out by the other. For that reason, I said that it would be necessary to 
dn-ectly attack the idea that mentalistic and physicalistic explanation must converge on a 
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common subject matter. But in light of my argument concerning the intrinsic connection 
between the nature of the mental and the nature of human relationships, I now want to close 
th s  chapter by suggesting a reason for thdung that these two stages are logically connected, 
whch has so far remained implicit in the background. 
What I want to suggest is ths: if the nature of the interests served by mentalistic explanations 
are tied to the nature of our everyday relationships with each other, then the question of 
whether the work carried out by mentalistic explanations is completely separate from the 
work carried out by physicalistic explanations can be settled by determining whether the 
nature of our mentalistic interests merges in some sense with the nature of our physicalistic 
interests, whch in turn can be settled by determining whether our everyday relationships are 
motivated out of a concern with the prediction and causal explanation of each other’s 
behaviour. What I am effectively claiming here is that if the nature of mentalistic interests is 
tied to the way in which individuals actually relate to each other on an everyday basis, and if 
we actually relate to each other with a view to predicting and causally explaining the other 
person’s behaviour, then it must seem natural to hold the view that mentalistic explanation is 
a form of causal explanation; and hence, it must seem natural for the non-reductive 
physicalist in particular to hold that mentalistic explanation is a form of causal explanation 
which derives its explanatory efficacy from that of physicalistic explanation. But on the other 
hand. if our everyday relationships are not motivated or driven by such concerns, and if we 
do not commit ourselves to the same metaphysical principles, then recognition of the 
autonomous nature of mentalistic explanation in the deeper sense is arguably the next logical 
step to take. 
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Chapter 4: Thinking and Relating 
1.Introduction 
In tlus chapter a more precise account will now be gwen of the nature of human relationships, 
and its implications for the autonomous nature of mentalistic explanation will be brought to 
light. Thls will be achieved by developing features of MacMurray ’s account of the nature of 
human relationshps in the direction suggested by my interpretation of Wittgenstein’s rule 
following considerations in the previous chapter. The result of this combination will be an 
account of the nature of human relationships and the nature of the mental wluch will contrast 
dtrectly with the account of human relationships to whch the physicalist’s conception of the 
mental is implicitly committed. More specifically, on the basis of k s  combination it will be 
argued that there is an intrinsic connection between what it means to say that an individual 
has the capacity to thrnk and what it means to say that he has the capacity to be involved in 
various types of human relationshps. a s  will provide a concrete example to show how the 
nature of the mental is tied to the nature of our relationslups with each other, and it will also 
show that the extent to which the autonomous nature of mentalistic explanation can be 
acknowledged is tied to our account of the way in which we actually relate to each other on 
an everyday basis. 
2.More on human relationships 
2. I .A Four-Fold Division 
It is by no means obvious that there is an intrinsic connection between what it means to say 
that an individual has the capacity to think and what it means to say that he has the capacity to 
be involved in human relationshps. It does not seem necessary to having the capacity to thmk 
that an individual has the capacity to be involved in relationshps with others, nor does it even 
seem necessary that other people are there in the first place. So there is bound to be a strong 
tendency to deny that thmlung and relating are intrinsically connected, but it seems to me that 
there are nonetheless some strong arguments in favour of tlus claim. The intnnsicness of h s  
connection can be brought into sharper focus by concentrating on a particular way of dividing 
up the general category of human relationshps, whch will indicate some definite points at 
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whch having the capacity to thmk can be seen to presuppose having the capacity to be 
involved in relationshps with others. The general category of human relationships is too wide 
and unspecific as it stands, so I will make use of the four-fold &vision of human relationslups 
into personal and impersonal human relationshps, and direct and indirect human 
relationshps, which is suggested by MacMurray: 
our relation to another person may either be personal or impersonal. Like all our relations to the Other, 
these are primarily practical, but they have, of course, their theoretical aspect. Each, therefore, gives 
rise to a knowledge of people. The first gives rise to that personal understanding of others which is the 
result of reflection upon our personal dealings with men and women of varying sorts under varied 
conditions, and which we sometimes call ‘a knowledge of the world ’; the second, if it is systematically 
pursued, leads to the scientific knowledge of man and his behaviour (1970: 30) 
We must distinguish between the direct and indirect relations of persons.. .Direct relations are those 
whch involve a personal acquaintance with one another on the part of the persons related. Indirect 
relations exclude this condition: they are relations between persons who are not personally known to 
one another. All indirect relations are therefore necessarily impersonal. Direct relations are those which 
may or may not be personal, at the will of the persons related. If they are maintained at an impersonal 
level, this requires a justification. (1 970: 43). 
Personal human relationshps are relationshps in whch the individual’s involvement is 
spontaneous and immediate in everyday life; they are relationshps between persons in their 
capacity as fhends, lovers, work colleagues, and so on, and as such these relationshps are 
characterised by various types of demands, whch can only be described using the moralistic 
and intentionalistic language particular to th~s domain of human life. Impersonal human 
relationshps, on the other hand, are relationshps in which the individual’s involvement is 
rather limited to certain contexts, such as relationshps between scientists and their subjects in 
the context of the laboratory, where the purpose of entering into these relationshps might be 
to discover the effects of certain types of drugs on the brain and the nervous system, for 
example. These particular impersonal relationships are characterised by demands whch can 
only be described using the explanatory resources particular to that field of scientific 
investigation. 
Human relationshps are further divided into direct and indirect relationships. Direct 
relationships are relationshps in whch the individual ’s involvement is of immediate concern 
to him, with someone with whom he is personally acquainted, such as h s  involvement with 
hs loved ones and fiends. Indirect relationshps are those in whch the individual’s 
involvement is of less immediate concern to h, unless they are disrupted for some reason, 
and in which hs  involvement is with people with whom he is not personally acquainted, such 
as h s  relationshps with the supplier of hs b t u r e  and the baker of h s  bread. Although the 
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latter are also impersonal, they differ fiom the type of impersonal relationshp mentioned a 
moment ago. We do not personally know the baker or the fimiture supplier, but we do not 
thereby relate to them with a view to acquiring ‘scientific knowledge of their behaviour ’. 
The division of human relationshps into personal and impersonal relationshps does not 
correspond exactly to the &vision into direct and indirect relationshps, although it is closely 
connected to it. Direct relationshps might be either personal or impersonal. Direct 
relationshps are personal when they are carried out on an ord inq  everyday basis in a variety 
of situations with people with whom we are personally acquainted. Yet there might be 
specific occasions on whch direct relationshps are carried out on an impersonal level- when 
an individual studies the behaviour of h s  fiend in a controlled situation in order to predict 
how he will be afl‘ected when hs body is deprived of nicotine. Induect relationshps, on the 
other hand, are necessarily impersonal, in the sense that they involve people who are not 
personally acquainted, even though they are not necessarily carried out with a view to gaining 
scientific knowledge of the other. So a relationshp is direct if it is between persons who 
know each other, otherwise it is indirect and between persons who do not know each other. A 
drrect relationshp is personal if it is carried out on an everyday level between persons who 
know each other, and it is impersonal if it is carried out on a level whch is more appropriate 
to gaining scientific knowledge of the other. An indirect relationshp is necessarily 
impersonal, but it may be impersonal in a straight-forward everyday sense that it is carried 
out between persons who are not personally acquainted, as in the case of the baker and the 
h t u r e  supplier, or it may be impersonal in a non-everyday sense that it is carried out 
between persons who are not personally acquainted, but where the aim is to gain scientific 
knowledge of the other. Macmurray writes: 
The personal relation with the other is possible only between persons who know one another. But our 
own personal activities depend upon the personal activities of large numbers of people whom we do 
not and cannot know. All my activities have an economic aspect, for example. I need food; 
consequently I depend upon a host of people who produce, transport and deliver food to me. When I 
pay for food; I contribute my quota of assistance to the personal lives of all these people. One aspect of 
my dependence is my belief that their personal activities will continue in the fbture as they have done in 
MacMurray uses the term ‘impersonal ’ to characterise direct relationships entered into for the 1 
purpose of gaining scientific knowledge of the other, and to characterise all types of indirect 
relationships. For the purposes of clarity, I will find it necessary at certain points in my argument to 
mark this distinction by using the higher-level categories of ‘everyday relationships ’ and ‘non-everyday 
relationships ’. I will therefore stipulate that ‘everyday relationships ’ include both direct personal 
relationships, and indirect impersonal relationships carried out on an ordinary basis (baker and fbrniture 
supplier); and I will stipulate that ‘non-everyday relationships ’ include both direct impersonal 
relationships, and indirect impersonal relationships carried out with a view to gaining scientific 
knowledge of the other. 
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the past. I must trust in the continuance of patterns of activity carried on by persons whom I do not and 
cannot know. The relation so established between myself and them is a relation of persons. But the 
relation is necessarily impersonal; and consequently the knowledge on which it rests must be merely 
objective. I must conceive the activities of those others upon whom I depend as automatic and 
continuant, although I know well enough that they are personal doings. (1 970: 43). 
What this suggests is that people with whom an individual is involved in indxect 
relationshps are interchangeable in a way in which people with whom an individual is 
involved in direct relationshps are not. It is of much less concern who is there to supply the 
b t u r e  and bake the bread than who is there to listen to our good news and take pleasure in 
our happiness. It is of much less concern who is there to process our bank cheques and drrve 
our trains than who is there to offer support and encouragement in difficult times, or to share 
a walk, a meal or a film. The most basic and immediate of human relationships in whch an 
individual is involved are therefore direct personal relationships, whch emanate outward to 
encompass the various indirect and impersonal relationships that make up the vast web of 
human relationships in whch the individual is involved, to greater or lesser degrees. Indirect 
relationships are thus more distant from the individual's concerns and interests than are his 
&rect relationshps, and h s  means that hs attitudes to those people with whom he is 
involved in direct relationshps will differ significantly fiom his attitudes to those people with 
whom he is involved in indirect relationships.' 
This point has to be treated with caution, due to its importance: corresponding to the wider 
category of human relationshps is the wider category of attitude to persons, whilst 
corresponding to the division of human relationshps into direct and indirect relationshps is 
the division of attitude to persons into direct and indirect attrtudes to persons. An individual 's 
attitudes to the supplier of his furniture or the baker of his bread is indirect in that his 
relationships with these people do not involve any form of emotional or affective attachment, 
whereas hs attitudes to hs family and friends are direct in that these forms of attachment are 
partly constitutive of hs involvement in such direct relationshps. An individual's attitudes 
towards other people not only manifests themselves in his treatment of them as rational 
agents in their own right, but also in hs being able to respond to the demands which are 
constitutive of the relationshps in whch he is involved. Th~s applies to the individual's direct 
and indirect attitudes allke, differing only in the types of demands to whch his attitudes alert 
him. Without having the capacity to be emotionally and affectively attached to others, the 
indwidual would be unresponsive to the demands whch are constitutive of relationshps 
~~ 
In what follows I will go beyond what MacMurray explicitly says. 2 
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between loved ones, ftlends and family members; without having the capacity to be 
economically and legally committed to others, the individual would be unresponsive to the 
demands whch are constitutive of relationshrps between traders and suppliers of various 
types of goods and services. 
2.2a.Attitude To Persons As A Basic Orientation 
Direct and indirect attitudes to persons are specific manifestations of our attitude to persons 
in general. Whereas direct and indirect attitudes to persons are open to moral appraisal and 
assessment, it does not seem correct to raise the question of the moral praiseworthmess or 
blameworthmess of our amtude to persons in its broadest form. Our attitude to persons in its 
broadest form cannot be regarded as being based on judgement or deliberation, or as being 
demanded of those individuals who are committed to the types of responses consititutive of a 
particular moral outlook. To say that our attitude to persons in its broadest form is not open 
to moral appraisal, in the way that its more specific manifestations are, is simply to say that 
there is no genuine question of its being appropriate or inappropriate with respect to that 
toward whch it is an amtude. I thmk that part of the reason for h s  is that our attitude to 
persons in its broadest form is spontaneously solicited from the individual in such a way that 
it is already presupposed as being in place, before any question can arise with respect to the 
appropriateness of its more specific manifestations w i t h  direct and indirect human 
relationshps. It might be helpful, as a way of expressing thts spontaneity, to say that our 
attitude to persons in its broadest form is a basic orientation that we have toward other living 
things, whch differs in sigmficant ways from the basic orientation that we have toward non- 
living thmgs. What is distinctive of living things is that they have the possibilities of 
movement and expression whrch command a certain type of attention and respect not 
commanded by non-living things, and it might be said that what is distinctive of persons in 
particular is that they command the type of attention and respect that immediately draws us 
into acknowledgeing their presence in a situation with us. 
Particularly relevant in drawing us into acknowledging the presence of other people is the fact 
that their possibilities of movement and expression are limited withm the human bodily form. 
The limitation here is not to be understood negatively; the limits of the human bodily form do 
not seem to be circumscribable with any degree of precision or mathematical accuracy. If the 
limits of the human bodily form were circumscribable at all, I suspect that the specification of 
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these limits would have very little to do with our acknowledgement of a person’s presence in 
a situation with us. What I thmk is important is that since the movement and expression of 
other people is what is responsible for drawing us into an acknowledgement of their presence, 
the human bodily form must figure quite centrally in an explanation of what it means to have 
the capacity to be involved in various types of human relationshps. Thls point can also be put 
by saying that having the human bodily form is a logical precondition of being able to have, 
and express, the array of feelings and emotions whch are partly constitutive of many of our 
relationships. This way of putting the point is suggested by McClintock, who illustrates the 
importance of the human bodily form in our relationshps with reference to certain types of 
feelings and emotions which are only expressible through touch, and other more subtle forms 
of bodily contact: 
The kinds of feelings and emotions ... which can find expression through touch are conceptually 
connected to, amongst other things, the following physiological details: Having arms and legs, having 
hands which can bend in such a fashion as to be able to follow the contours of a body, having a body 
that varies in sensitivity with mood ... having a bodily sense that can be aware of limb position or muscle 
state without observation, having a body such that tension can lead to pains in the neck or a racing 
heart, having a body that is capable of shaking with fear and of sweating with anxiety and so on. 
(1995: 90). 
The point that McClintock is making here is that there is a logical connection between certain 
types of feelings and emotions that an individual is capable of having and the bodily 
capacities and attributes that give expression to these feelings and emotions. It might be said 
that attributing emotions or feelings to individuals is in most cases a matter of being involved 
in a direct relationshp with them, and it might also be said that a logical precondition of this 
is that the individuals involved have the human bodily form. What explains h s  point is that 
the human bodily form commands OUT attention in such a way as to spontaneously solicit the 
attitude toward persons that sustains the different types of relationshps in which we can be 
involved. If this is correct, then the possibility of being involved in relationshps with others 
depends on at least these two basic factors: frrst, it depends on our having the basic 
orientation toward others whch is an acknowledgement of their presence in situations with 
us; second, it depends on our both having the human bodily form, which gives expression to 
the basic orientation in one of us, and to which that basic orientation is logically tied in the 
other, and vice-versa. Having this basic orientation is therefore a logical precondition of 
having the more specific direct and indirect attitudes, whch are necessary if we are to have an 
awareness of the demands which other people impose on us. With regard to the more specific 
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manifestations of our basic attitude to persons, the question of their appropriateness can be 
raised. 
2.2b. The Appropriateness Of Direct And Indirect Attitudes 
The various direct and indirect attitudes that an individual has toward others sustain his 
relationships with them. Direct and indirect relationshps are constituted by demands which 
must be acknowledged if the individual is to be said to have the capacity to be involved in 
them. But it seems to me that an individual can only be said to have an awareness of the 
demands of hs relationshps if he has the appropriate attitudes towards those people with 
whom he is involved. Direct and indirect relationshps are constituted by different types of 
demands, so individuals who are involved in such relationshps must have different types of 
attitudes to different people, depending on the nature of the relationshp in question. Direct 
and indirect attitudes to other persons can therefore be judged to be appropriate relative to the 
relationshp in whch they are involved, since it is only in terms of these relationshps that the 
individual’s attitudes can be considered to be open to moral appraisal. The individual can be 
said to have the capacity to be involved in various types of relationshps in so far as he can be 
said to have an awareness of the demands that these relationshps present to hm, and he can 
be said to have an awareness of these demands in so far as he can be said to have the 
appropriate direct or indirect attitudes to other persons. 
Cockburn (1990) suggests that we come to tlmk of others as beings toward whch certain 
attitudes and responses are appropriate as a result of our training, whch instils in us the 
propensity to give, and accept, reasons for feeling certain h g s ,  and acting in certain ways. 
Cockburn’s idea seems to be that the child in his pre-linguistic state is naturally disposed to 
respond in various ways to other individuals with whom it comes into contact, but that it 
hardly makes sense to say that the child’s responses at this stage of its development are 
manifestations of the fact that it thnks of other individuals as beings toward whch certain 
responses are appropriate or inappropriate. The chld might naturally respond caringly to hs 
sister when she falls over, but he does not yet thnk of hs sister as an individual toward 
whom a caring attitude is appropriate. Thu can be seen in the fact that the chld might rather 
h t  or luck his sister whenever she happens to frustrate hs current pursuits, and her falling 
over on h s  occasion might have done just that. Until the chld has acquired the linguistic 
dulls and abilities which are integral to the way of living into which he is being brought up, it 
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makes no sense to say that he h n k s  of other individuals as malung any kind of demands on 
h. It is only through being brought up into a particular way of living h is  life with others 
that he acquires the linguistic skills necessary for him to think of them as beings toward 
whtch certain responses and attitudes are appropriate. Cockbum notes that: 
the possibility of saying, in any rich sense, that it thinks of others as beings who are to be treated in 
certain ways only emerges gradually as the child develops. It cannot be said that the very young thinks 
of the situation as presenting him with reasons for feeling and doing certain things. A clear foothold for 
that way of spealung only emerges when he begins to give and accept reasons for feeling and acting 
(1990: 7). 
I thmk that h s  goes some way toward helping us understand what it means to talk about the 
appropriateness of our attitudes in our relationshps with others. It brings out the importance 
of linguistic training in the development of our attitudes to others which, as a result, issue in 
responses to individuals whom we thlnk of as persons who ought to be treated in certain 
ways. Without having the relevant concepts, the individual would not have the capacity to 
tlmk of others as persons who ought to be pitied, persons who ought to be respected, persons 
who ought to be feared, and so on. It is only once the relevant conceptual skills are acquired 
that it begins to make sense to talk of our attitudes to persons as developing in more specific 
ways withm the contexts of different types of relationships, for it is only once the relevant 
slulls are acquired that it makes sense to talk of the individual as being aware of the demands 
that other people in hs relationshtps present to him. But th~s takes us to a deeper point 
concerning the appropriateness of our attitudes, which expands on the idea that our attitudes 
to others are developed in more specific directions through the acquisition of conceptual 
skills. 
Winch (1 987) argues that part of what it means to say that our attitudes and responses to 
other individuals are appropriate is that on the particular occasion on whtch they are 
expressed, they can be said to be instances of more general attitudes and responses, whch 
would be expressed on other occasions toward other people in similar circumstances. Winch 
refers to h s  condition for the appropriateness of our attitudes as the generality condition, 
which effectively requires that an individual’s reaction to a particular person on a particular 
occasion be typical of that individual’s reaction to any other person on any other occasion. Of 
course, tlus must be complicated by the fact that an individual might not always react as he 
really ought to react, even if there had been no question that he had reacted appropriately to 
another person on another occasion. An individual who reacts sympathetically to his fhend 
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when she is distressed at the death of her mother might not react in this way to another fhend 
in s d a r  circumstances, and his failure to react in the Same way would require some sort of 
explanation. Perhaps the indvidual was particularly fond of hs fhend’s mother himself, so 
much so that he found it hard to cope with her death or offer comfort to his fhend in the way 
that he would normally have been expected to. At any rate, allowing for such complications, 
an individual’s attitudes to others are typical of the attitudes that any individual who is 
involved in such direct relationshps would be expected to have in these circumstances. And 
since it is perhaps too much to expect the Same attitude from an individual who is not directly 
involved in thrs relationship, the generality condition can be read as being sensitive to the 
variations in individuals ’ amtudes across different types of direct and induect relationshps. 
Winch’s deeper point is that the generality in our responses cannot be understood 
independently of the fact that they are regular and constantly repeated features of human life, 
which means that it is only through learning how to successfully partxipate in on-going 
relationshps that an individual acquires the concepts necessity to appreciate the generality in 
the particular response. It is important to stress that the individual comes to appreciate the 
generality in the particular response through acquiring the conceptual skills which are 
exercised in the expression of his attitudes to those persons with whom he is involved. It 
would be wrong to thmk that the process of acquiring the relevant conceptual skdls could 
proceed independently of the process of learning how to relate to others, so it would be 
equally wrong to thrnk that an individual’s capacity to exercise hs conceptual skills in the 
expression of hs attitudes could be explained independently of explaining h s  capacity to be 
involved in relationshps with other people. 
It seems to me that ths deeper point helps us to understand the foIIowing connection: in 
learning to use the concepts ‘suffering ’ and ‘distress ’ in relating to his bend, the individual is 
at the same time learning to use the concepts ‘comfort’ and ‘pity’ to express hs own attitudes 
to his fhend. Learning to use these concepts together is a matter of learning how to be 
involved in relationshps with other people: it is a matter of learning how to say the right 
word in the right tone of voice; it is a matter learning how to offer emotional and practical 
support; it is a matter of learning how to look into her eyes and calmly talkmg to her to put 
her at ease, and so on. Through being involved in situations ldce this one, the individual 
experiences different aspects of different types of relationships, and he learns how to see and 
cope with the demands of the situation as they arise w i h  the context of these relationshps. 
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The upshot of h s  is that the individual learns to conceptualise ‘suffering’ together with 
‘pity’, ‘distress’ together with ‘comfort’, and he comes to hnk of an individual who is 
suffering, or an individual who is in distress, as a person toward whom pity and comfort are 
appropriate attitudes to have. The appropriateness of the individual’s attitudes to his fi-iend in 
this particular direct relationship is therefore decided relative to the demands presented to 
him in it. The friend’s distress and suffering at her mother’s death presents the individual with 
a reason for comforting her and offering her pity, and part of what makes the individual’s 
responses appropriate on &Is occasion is that the conceptual slulls whch are exercised in the 
expression of hs attitudes forge an internal connection between hs attitudes and their object, 
and &Is means that the attitudes expressed on h s  occasion can be expected to be in place 
with respect to other people on other occasions. 
Winch’s point is that the conceptual slulls exercised in the expression of the individual’s 
attitudes of pity and comfort tie the suffering and the distress intrinsically to the attitudes 
themselves, such that the indwidual’s attitudes of pity and comfort take the other person’s 
suffering and distress as their proper objects on h s  and on other occasions. But again hs 
point has to be put quite carefully, since there are difficult cases whch do not seem to 
conform neatly to these conditions. It might be that an individual responds caringly to one 
person ’s suffering, yet indiff‘erently to another person’s suffering, more so when that person 
is not personally known to the individual; or in an extreme case, it might be that the 
indvidual is incapable of displaying any emotional response whatsoever to the other person’s 
suffering, perhaps through having had an atrocious upbringing, or perhaps through being 
psychologically dyshctional, preventing the individual from living a normal life in the 
company of others. 
But what these extreme cases indicate is not that suffering cannot be deemed the proper 
object of the attitude of care, or that distress cannot be deemed the proper object of the 
attitude of comfort, but that these individuals are, for some reason or other, incapable of 
having what we would be inclined to call the appropriate responses on these and perhaps on 
other occasions. What constitutes an appropriate response in such cases is certady not 
susceptible of strict definition, but there are various factors whch we would normally expect 
to be in place as the norm. We are brought up to see that other people make demands on us, 
and that we ought to have certain attitudes and responses in certain situations. There will 
inevitably be cases in whch certain individuals stand out as exceptions to the norm, but I 
thmk it would be erroneous to take these individuals as the norm rather than as exceptions. To 
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suppose that such indwiduals were not exceptional cases would be to countenance the 
possibility of a complete break down in the stability and continuity in our human 
relationshps, in our explanatory practices, and in our everyday lives in general, threatening 
the very existence of what we call the norm in these situations. 
3. The intrinsic connection between thinking and relating 
3.la.Responding To The Demands Of Relationships 
I now want to explain what it means to say that there is an intrinsic connection between what 
it means to have the capacity to tfirnk and what it means to have the capacity to be involved in 
various types of human relationshps. What this amounts to is that there are certain situations 
in whch an individual can be said to be thmlung if he can be said to be responding to the 
demands of the situation in whch he finds lumself, and that hs awareness of these demands 
is inseparable from hs awareness of the demands of the various human relationshps in which 
he has the capacity to be involved. Or in other words, what it amounts to is that there is an 
intrinsic connection between the individual’s awareness of the demands that the situation 
presents to h, and hs awareness of the demands of the direct and induect relationshps in 
which he happens to be involved. My point is not that every case of thmlung is a case of 
responding to the demands of the situation in which the individual finds hrmself; nor is it that 
every case of thrnlung is a case of being involved in a particular direct or indirect 
relationshp. That would be an extremely difficult position to maintain, and I am sure that it 
would not be correct. Individuals can be lost in private thoughts, just as they can be 
responding to the demands of their situations; and solitary individuals can still be said to have 
the capacity to thmk, despite having withdrawn themselves as far as possible from all contact 
with other people. My point is rather that an individual can be said to have the capacity to 
thlnk in so far as he can be said to have the capacity to be involved in human relationshps, 
and solitary individuals who have withdrawn themselves from contact with other people can 
still be said to have this capacity. 
The idea can be illustrated if we reconsider the case of the individual who is moved to 
comforting hs &end on the death of her mother. Withrn the context of this particular direct 
personal relationshp, the individual ’s involvement is such that he is responsive to the distress 
and suffering that her mother’s death has caused her. Her suffering presents itself to the 
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inhvidual as a reason for consoling her, and in responding to hs friend in this way he can be 
said to be responding to the demands of this relationship. At the Same time, it can be said that 
it is hs involvement in this relationshp that alerts h m  to the demands of the situation in 
whch he frnds himself, in whch hs fhend is not eating or sleeping properly, in which she is 
finding it hard to get on with her normal routine, in whch she is spending most of her time in 
solitude, and so on. The individual responds to the demands of this situation by comforting 
his fhend and encouragmg her to return to her normal routine, and in so doing it can be said 
that he is responding appropriately to the demands which are presented to him in this 
relationship. The individual’s awareness of the demands of the situation is shaped by the 
conceptual slulls whch he has acquired in the process of learning how to be involved in 
dtrect personal relationshps with others, and hs awareness of these demands is therefore 
intrinsically connected to his awareness of the demands of this direct personal relationship in 
which he is involved with hs fhend. So it can be said that the individual thmks that his fhend 
is distressed, that she is suffering, and that she ought to be comforted, in so far as it can be 
said that he is responding as he does to the demands of the situation to which his involvement 
in this relationship have alerted him. 
The same point can be illustrated with the case of an individual’s involvement in an indirect 
relationship, but this time I will mention the types of demands whch are often overlooked. 
Suppose that the indwidual is a carpenter who is busy at work on a dining set that he has been 
commissioned to make. He knows that the dining set must be made according to the 
customer’s specifications, otherwise he will fail to meet the demands of the contract. That 
much is obvious. But he also knows that the chairs must be built in proportion to the table, 
that the chairs must not be so light as to collapse the minute they are sat on; he knows that the 
chairs must not be so heavy that the guests cannot adjust their position relative to the table, 
and he knows that the chairs must be wide enough that the guests can sit down comfortably 
without falling off, he knows that the table must not be so low that the guests would have to 
sit on the floor to eat from it, and he knows that there must be sufficient space around the 
table for the guests to sit without rubbing shoulders and bumping elbows. That much is also 
obvious. So obvious, in fact, that there is nothing in the contract to cover these demands. 
They are simply taken for granted as constitutive of the practice of sitting down at a table to 
share a meal. 
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Suppose that in buildmg one of the chairs the individual stops what he is doing for a moment, 
runs hs hand over the seat of the chair, and then reaches for the sandpaper that is lylng next 
to him on the workbench; or suppose that he stops what he is doing, carefblly studies the 
lengths of the legs, and then gets the plane that is hanging on the wall beside his bench. Can 
we say that the individual is thdung in these cases, and that in so doing he is responding to 
the demands of some relationshp? It seems to me that we can, for we can say that in hs work 
he is responding to the demands of the situation as they arise for him, and we can say that his 
reaching for the sandpaper is expressive of hs awareness of the fact that the seat of the chair 
is still too rough for anyone to sit on it comfortably without getting a splinter, and we can say 
that hs getting the plane is expressive of his awareness of the fact that the chair will be too 
wobbly for anyone to sit on it if one of the legs is longer than the other three. So it can be 
said that the indwidual is &dung in so far as it can be said that in hs work he is &splaying 
an awareness of the demands of the situation as they arise for hm, and that hs awareness of 
these demands is at the same time inseparable from I s  awareness of the demands of the 
indirect relationshp in whch he is involved in building this particular dining set for hs 
customer. 
There is one final illustration of this point that I want to consider, whch places greater 
emphasis on the individual’s involvement in both direct and indirect relationships at the same 
time.’ An individual is at confession, relating a partrcular venial sin to the priest, when he 
pauses and stares off into space for a moment; an aspect of the sin suddenly strikes the 
individual whch he had not considered before, and he comes to realise that because of the 
negative way in which his sin touched the lives of other people, hs sin was in fact a mortal 
sin. The individual’s thdung in this situation is embedded in the traditions and the doctrines 
of the church, and in the deeply religous way of life into whch he has been brought up. His 
awareness of that aspect of hs sin which renders it a mortal sin, as opposed to a venial sin, is 
inseparable from his involvement in various direct and indirect relationshps, including hs 
h e c t  personal relationshp with the priest, hs direct personal and indirect impersonal (in the 
everyday sense) relationships with the larger body of people who share th s  religious way of 
life, and who uphold the traditions and doctrines whch qualie the individual’s sin in this 
way, and his direct (and possibly indirect) relationshps with the people whose lives were 
negatively affected by hs sin. The individual’s awareness of the sin as a mortal sin is 
therefore inseparable from his awareness of the demands of the various direct and indirect 
~ ~~ ~ 
This particular example is based on an example from Canfield ( 1  994). 3 
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relationships in whch he is involved, in carrying on and upholding the trahtions of the 
religious way of living into which he has been brought up. 
In the different cases that I have considered, the individual’s thinking has been said to be 
intrinsically connected to hs responding to the demands of the various direct and indrrect 
relationships in whch he is involved. The individual’s responses to these demands are open 
to moral appraisal and rational assessment in terms of the demands themselves, an important 
consideration in whch is that the individual has the appropriate direct or indirect attitude to 
whomever he is involved with in hs relationshps. The final point I want to make in ths  
connection is one which presents an expansion of Wittgenstein’s idea, that the concept 
thmlung comprises w i h  itself many manifestations of life (1990, 4 1 10). It is not 
immediately obvious what Wittgenstein is gettmg at here, but it seems to me that it is not 
unreasonable to interpret it w i h  the context of this discussion, as stating that the 
individual’s responding to the demands of hs relationshps can be said to take a variety of 
different forms, and whch form is taken can depend on many factors. It can sometimes 
depend on the individual’s level of slull and competence, other times it can depend on the 
individual’s personal mood and state of mind, yet other times it can depend on the type of 
relationship in question. The individual who thmks that hs fhend ought to be comforted 
responds caringly toward her, and hs loving attention can be said to be the most appropriate 
form that hs awareness of the demands of this situation ought to take. His involvement in 
ths direct personal relationshp is such that his awareness of the demands is immediate, in 
that there was no need for a process of deliberation over whether or not hs fhend actually 
was distressed. 
The individual who is confessing hs sins to the priest suddenly realises that hs sin was a 
mortal sin, and lus feelings of deep sadness and regret over hs actions is the form that his 
awareness of the demands happen to take. His awareness of tlus aspect of his sin might have 
m e r  manifestations, perhaps in his denying hmself some of his normal pleasures, or in hs 
subsequent efforts to make amends for the hurt that he has caused others. In ths case the 
individual’s awareness of these demands struck hrm only after discussing the problem over 
with the priest, but it might have been that the individual had privately come to this 
realisation h s e l f  through considering the motive behmd hs action, and then coming to the 
decision that he could not reconcile hs motivation with the fact that hs action had caused so 
much hurt, and then on the basis of this he might have finally arrived at the conclusion that 
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hs action would have to be seen by the church in a certain light. The important point to note 
here is that the individual can be said to be thdung in certain situations where he can be said 
to be responding to the demands of these situations as they present themselves, and that hs 
awareness of these demands, whch is intrinsically connected to hs awareness of the demands 
of the direct and indirect relationslups in whch he happens to be involved, can take many 
&fferent forms. 
3.1 b. What About The Solitay Individual? 
The obvious objection to make against this approach to thmlung is that it places too much 
emphasis on the individual’s involvement in relationslups with others. An individual can 
surely cut himself off from others and commit hmself to a life of solitude and isolation, in 
whch h s  activities and routines can no longer be said to be part of hs involvement in any 
relationshp with other people. Within that state of withdrawal the individual can be said to 
act for the reasons that hs situation presents h m  with, reasons whch might only be 
intelligible from within the context of hs life in isolation from others. Or at least, it can be 
said that he can act for reasons which are not intrinsically connected to the demands of any 
type of direct or indirect relationslup. He might thrnk it prudent to reinforce his shelter when 
he notices the darkening clouds, for instance, or he might thrnk it fortuitous that the wood is 
still dry enough to light h s  fire. But far from presentmg counter-examples to the position I 
have been developing, it seems to me that they can be dealt with in a satisfactory manner. 
There has been some amount of debate recently on whether Wittgenstein held that thinking can 4 
sometimes be said to be a mental process or activity. The debate has largely been a reaction to Hacker 
(1993), who argued that thinking cannot properly be said to be a process or an activity because it lacks 
the grammatical features of a ‘typical ’ process or activity, the most central of which seem to be that 
thinking does not have genuine duration. and it does not have the right kind of structure. The same 
points are echoed by Schroeder (1995)’ who argues that thinking is characterised by a temporal 
indeterminacy which does not characterise typical processes and activities, and that thinking lacks the 
exact micro-structure which typical process and activities possess. On the other side of the debate, 
Hanfling (1993) argues that there are activities and processes which thinking can sometimes be said to 
consist in: thinking can be said to take the form of an activity when a musician is working out a piece of 
music at the piano. His composing at the piano can be said to be what hs thinking consists in. Thinking 
can also be said to take the form of a process, when an individual is mulling over a particular problem 
by weighmg up alternatives and deciding to accept or reject certain ideas. His speaking can be said to 
be what his thinking consists in. It seems to me that Hanfling is on the right lines. Hacker and 
Schroeder have concluded that thinking cannot be a process or an activity because it lacks certain 
features of ‘typical’ processes and activities; but it is not clear that there is a ‘typical’ process or 
activity to which thinking must conform if it is to count as a mental process or activity. That thinking 
sometimes takes the form of a process or activity cannot be rejected on the grounds that it lacks the 
grammatical features of typical non-mental processes and activities. See also n.5. 
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Part of what it means to say that an indwidual has the capacity to be involved in human 
relationshps is that he has the capacity to withdraw from his involvement with others and to 
be alone. a s  is essentially Heidegger’s idea, only expressed in different terms, that being- 
alone is a necessary determination of being-with others (1967: 156-7). It is also part of what 
it means to say that an individual has the capacity to be involved in human relationships that 
he has hs own individuality and personal space, which enables him to act for reasons that are 
presented to hun withn a situation that can be hs own malung. Having the capacity to be 
involved in human relationshps empowers the individual to withdraw from his involvement 
and take up a way of life in whch hs contact with others is perhaps non-existent, and it 
empowers the individual to exercise his conceptual slulls on some occasions with such a 
degree of freedom and privacy, that it seems to allow us to dispense with hs involvement 
with others as a necessary precondition for saymg that he has the capacity to hnk in the first 
place. But it seems to me that the capacity for freedom and privacy, for individuality and 
separateness, are simply aspects of what it means to have the capacity to be involved in 
human relationshps. So it is only to be expected that an individual who has the capacity to be 
involved in human relationshps, and hence to hnk, is an individual who has the capacity to 
lose hmself in his own private world, or to live out a solitary existence if he so desires. 
3.2. Uses Of The Concept Thinhng As Acts Within Human Relationships 
At tlus point I want to develop certain aspects of Wittgenstein’s recommendation that we 
look at the word “to thtnk” as a tool whch is used withm the contexts of our life with others 
(1967: 8 360). I am not so much interested in developing the tool metaphor, rather than the 
suggestion that the word “to hnk” can be used for various purposes wittun the context of 
various types of human relationships. Wittgenstein ’s recommendation to consider the 
dfferent uses that we actually make of our psycho1ogm.l concepts seems to be in danger of 
being dismissed out of hand, as an unsuccesshl attempt to avoid metaphysical problems by 
an irrelevant appeal to what we say in everyday life. But h s  is a negative way of talung 
Wittgenstein’s recommendation, which might be better understood as a recommendation to 
look at the different ways in whch the concept t h h g  is used as part of the way in whch 
we relate to each other. Tlus is positive, and more effort is required in its execution than it 
seems. But this positive understanding of Wittgenstein lets us say that certain uses of the 
concept t h i h g  are acts whch are partly constitutive of some of our relationshps, acts of 
the type whrch create commitments and obligations for the individuals who are involved in 
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them. More than ths ,  it lets us say that there are certain uses of the concept thdung whch 
are logically connected to the uses of a host of moral and inter-personal concepts, such as 
‘commitment ’, ‘obligation ’, ‘duty ’, ‘agency ’, ‘personhood ’, and so on. 
Hunter (1990: 59ff) brings out the connection between certain uses of the concept hnking 
and uses of the concepts of obligation and commitment, by considering cases in which an 
individual uses the concept hnlung (in a direct relationship) to indicate non-committal to a 
suggested course of action.’ The connection is brought out most clearly when the individual 
avoids committing himself to acting in a certain way by saying that he will have to think 
about it first. It is characteristic of this use that although the individual is indicating that he is 
not prepared to commit himself to the course of action at that moment, he is nonetheless 
seriously inclined to adopt h s  course of action at some stage or another. I f  it later came out 
that he had no such inclination, we might be entitled to conclude that he had intended to 
deceive us or that he did not want to disappoint us by declining the offer out-right. Suppose, 
for example, that an employee is offered the opportunity to manage the office for a week 
whilst the boss is on a business trip, and he says that he will thnk about it. The boss is then 
entitled to expect that the employee is seriously inclined to take up this opportunity, 
otherwise he would not have indicated his willingness to consider the offer by saymg that he 
would thmk about it. 
But suppose that the employee is actually quite hghtened by the prospect of being in charge 
for a week, and he really believes that he would simply be unable to cope with the 
responsibilities. The problem is that he has created certain expectations by indicating a 
willingness to consider the offer, when in fact he had no serious inclination to take it. In this 
case, saying that he would thmk about it would not have been an indication of hs willingness, 
Hunter (1987: 1 18-120) discusses hrther uses of the word ‘think’, concerning which I am in broad 
agreement. However, I am not convinced by the central claim of that article, that in some cases, where 
the word ‘think’ is used to scold someone’s substandard performance, as when we say ‘you weren’t 
thinking’, we areprebendingthat an auxilliary activity of thinking should have been engaged in to bring 
about the best results, when in fact it wasn’t. Hunter argues that: “As an indirect way of saying this, we 
trade on the conception of thinking as an auxiIIiary activity enabling us to perform certain tasks 
competently ... we pretend that the beneficial activity did not occur, as a way of saying that the effect it 
might have had did not occur.. .but all we are actually saying is the latter.” (1 26- 127). It seems to me 
that such pretence is no part at all of making the latter claim, and I think that Scheer (1991) is correct 
to say that the auxilliary activities not performed, for which the person is scolded, are those of pausing, 
checking, comparing, etc; so in saying ‘you weren’t thinking’, we are simply referring to the fact that 
these auxilliary activities were not performed. We are not pretending that there is a fbrther auxilliary 
activity, an imaginary one, underlying the person’s overt actvities that would have brought about the 
appropriate standard of work. 
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as he led others to believe; it would rather have been a way of avoidmg the embarrassing 
situation of having to admit to his boss that he was not ready for the promotion. l h s  use of 
the concept thdung presupposes that the individual is capable of being involved in certain 
on-going personal relationships, and it also presupposes that he has an awareness of the 
demands of that aspect of hs relationshp with hs boss, which he had created by saying that 
he would thmk about the offer. It is an act whch is itself partly constitutive of ihs  
relationshp, dictating the manner in which it really ought to evolve. It has added a new 
hmension to the relationshp, and with it a new set of demands which, in this case, the 
individual openly acknowledged but privately tried to avoid. 
There is yet a further use of the concept thinlung which can also be said to commit the 
individual to a certain standard of behaviour, and to a certain constancy in hs judgements, 
when it is used to express an opinion, or to make a judgement. An individual can take a moral 
stance by saying that he thinks that brutality to animals is a crime, or that he thmks that 
children should be disciplined from an early age. Interestingly, this use of the concept 
thdung is more or less interchangeable with certain uses of the concept believing, in that an 
individual who W s  that brutality to animals is a crime is an individual who believes that 
brutality to animals is a crime, and an individual who thmks that children should be 
dsciplined from an early age is an individual who believes that children should be disciplined 
from an early age. But perhaps a more important point to note here is that in using the 
concept &dung in these ways the individual is expressing a persisting moral amtude, raising 
expectations in others as to how he would be llkely to act in certain situations, or as to what 
he is llkely to thnk about some other issues. The concept thinking can also be used to express 
an opinion or to make a judgement when the individual is not entirely sure of his grounds, 
and that he is quite prepared to retract hs statement if he finds any good reason to do so. 
Although t h s  use of the concept th-g can again be said to create expectations in others as 
to how the individual is llkely to act, the expectations must be weakened by the fact that in 
using the concept tlunlung in t h s  way the individual is indicating that he is not prepared to 
meet the demands that he has created, come what may. The statement, ‘I thmk he is coming 
today, but I am not sure’, indicates that the individual is not prepared to defend h s  claim to 
the last, and that it should not be unexpected if he were to retract it. 
Even if the individual does feel certain that he i s  correct, in whch case he would not have 
said, ‘I W... ’, but simply, ‘He is coming today’, he can later qualifi this statement by using 
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the concept m g  to justi@ h s  preparing tea for a visitor, when the chances of his coming 
seem to be lessening: ‘Well, at least I think he is coming today!’ This use of the concept 
&dung is in a sense justificatory, presupposing that the individual is fidly aware of the 
expectations whch he has created in others when he made his original statement. If he were 
not aware of the expectations that hs statement created, he would not have felt it necessary to 
justie his malung this statement by using the concept thinking when it started to look as if the 
expectations would be hstrated. Thls same use can be illustrated in the case where we try to 
make sense of an individual’s misguided actions, as when we say, ‘She h n k s  her keys are in 
the drawer, but I know they are not’. If she were asked why she was rummaging in the drawer 
when her keys were actually on the table in the next room, she might reply, ’well, I thought 
they were in there’. The important point to note here is that an individual who uses the 
concept thrnlung in h s  justificatory sense must not continue to search in the drawer after she 
has been told that her keys are elsewhere, and after she justifies her mistake by saying that she 
had thought her keys were in the drawer. It would be strange for her to continue searching in 
the drawer after justifling her actions in i h s  way, but if she were to continue searching in the 
drawer nonetheless, we might be entitled to conclude that she still strongly believed that her 
keys were in there, and that she suspected that others were tqmg to mislead her in telling her 
that the keys were on the table in the next room. 
4.Interpretationism 
4. I The Interpretationist k Account Qf Thought 
It might seem at first glance that the account of thought I have been developing is not too 
different fiom the account of thought developed by the physicalist, and that the approach to 
the autonomous nature of mentalistic explanation that I want to recommend, as a 
consequence, will not be much different either. The need to regard human interaction as the 
basis for an account of thought can be seen to be integral to the physicalist’s position, just as 
much as mine, as stemming fiom the need to create a suitable context in which the notion of 
rationality can be applied to human beings. On the assumption that human beings are 
basically physical beings, and that the mode of understanding the physical is basic with 
respect to the mode of understanding the mental, the notion of rationality cannot be 
immediately applied in explanations of an individual’s behaviour. The difficulty whch faces 
the physicalist is that whereas rationality is a constitutive feature of the mode of explanation 
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that enables us to understand an individual as acting in light of what he thmks, it is not a 
constitutive feature of the basic mode of explanation that enables us to understand an 
individual ’s behaviour as having been caused by an internal neurophysiolopcal state or event. 
Or in other words, the difficulty which faces the physicalist is to explain how it can be 
possible to attribute thoughts to physical beings in explaining their behaviour. The attribution 
of thoughts to individuals depends on whether their behaviour can be described in terms 
drawn from the system of concepts that is governed by the constitutive ideal of rationality, 
and the physicalist wants to face up to th s  difficulty by arguing that the attribution of 
thoughts to individuals depends on the possibility of redescribing or interpreting their 
behaviour in terms of a system of concepts, whch can only be assumed to be in place once a 
prior context of human interaction has been presupposed. 
Davidson (1984a), for instance, argues that the context of human interaction must be 
presupposed as a necessary precondition for the attribution of thoughts to individuals because 
it is only w i h  thls context that it seems to be possible to redescribe their behaviour in the 
appropriate terms. His argument can be rehearsed in two main steps. The first step in 
Davidson’s argument is to defend the claim that the notion of rationality can only be in place 
in explanations of an individual’s behaviour where we can say that the individual has a gasp 
of the distmction between objective truth and falsehood. The central idea is that having a 
thought requires there to be a background of beliefs whch identifL the thought by locating it 
in a logical and epistemic space. Having the thought that the candle has blown out in the next 
room requires having the beliefs that there is a candle in the next room, that the candle in the 
next room was lit, that a candle is an enduring physical object whch does not go out of 
existence when it is no longer being perceived, that it has a flame whch can be extinguished 
in a draught, and so on and so forth. The important point to realise is that Davidson considers 
having a belief to require appreciating the contrast between true belief and false, such that an 
individual who can be said to have the background of beliefs, which are necessary for his 
thoughts to have their content, is an individual who can be said to have an awareness of the 
distinction between objective truth and falsehood. 
The second step in Davidson’s argument is meant to show that an individual can only be said 
to have an awareness of the contrast between objective truth and falsehood if he can be said 
to be an interpreter of the speech of another. The idea is that belief necessarily emerges 
w i b  the context of interpersonal communication, or within the context of the interpretation 
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of speech, because that context alone can provide the tools for makmg the required 
distinction between how thmgs are in the world independently of how the inhvidual takes 
thmgs to be. In Davidson’s view, an interpreter understands the speech of another by 
assigning hs own sentences to the speaker as an interpretation of his utterances, and to the 
extent that communication succeeds, the interpreter has provided an interpretation of the 
speaker’s utterances by providing the truth conditions of his sentences. If the interpreter 
knows that Kurt utters the words ‘es regnet’ whenever it is raining, he can use hs own 
sentence ‘it is raining’, to provide an interpretation of Kurt’s utterance by providing the truth 
conditions of hs sentence. 
Interpretation is therefore a matter of providing a disquotational translation of the speaker’s 
utterance into the interpreter’s own language, effectively giving the meaning of his sentence 
by giving its truth conditions in the form of a T-sentence: “‘es regnet’ is true if and only if it 
is raining”. It is crucial to realise that the interpreter can only be successfbl in his task if he 
charitably assumes that Kurt holds sentences to be true whenever they are true, for it is on the 
basis of this assumption that the interpreter can be said to know that, in uttering the words ‘es 
regnet ’. Kurt is uttering the sentence whch can be said to express the belief that it is raining; 
and since what a speaker means by his utterances is held to be partly determined by what he 
believes. the interpreter can therefore be said to be in the position to redescribe Kurt’s 
uttering ‘es regnet ’ as an intentional act of saying ‘it is raining ’ (1 984b: 125- 13 1). 
What supports the claim that thought necessarily presupposes an interpersonal system of 
communication is the point that interpersonal communication alone seems to be capable of 
creating the logical space w i h  which the notion of rationality emerges. But there are certain 
&fficulties with the type of human interaction whrch Davidson considers to be appropriate in 
this regard, whxh are brought out quite clearly in hs account of understanding others as a 
matter of interpreting their speech. Certamly, it is correct to point to the context of human 
interaction as a necessary precondition for thought; but it is problematic to hold that 
understanding what an individual W s  or means boils down to being able to provide an 
interpretation of hs utterances by giving the truth conditions of hs sentences. To begn with, 
it is rather strained to say that understanding what an individual means when he utters the 
words, ‘it is raining ’, when in it is stormy outside and there are heavy raindrops splashing into 
the puddles, is an act of disquotational translation or interpretation. One might question the 
point of hs uttering these words in so obvious a fashon, but h s  need not amount to the idea 
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that understanding what others mean is in every case a matter of providing the truth 
conditions of their sentences. For as Glock points out, understandmg what other individuals 
mean involves a wider variety of reactions and responses than this account seems to 
acknowledge: 
Understanding utterances in one’s own language is not a matter of disquotation. For being able to offer 
such disquotations is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for understanding an utterance.. .A 
child may understand an utterance without having mastered the apparatus of disquotation, i.e., without 
being able to say ‘By “Shut the door” she means shut the door’. Equally, a person who can utter such 
sentences cannot on those grounds alone be said to understand the utterance. Instead, understanding is 
manifested in shutting the door, or perhaps by refising to do so on the ground that it is too hot, etc. 
What is required is the ability to react appropriately to the utterance, to grasp its implications, and to 
explain its meaning if challenged. (1993: 203). 
It seems to me that a suitable expansion of this objection would allude to the contexts of 
drrect and indirect human relationships as providing the setting in whch the appropriateness 
of the response is determined. Suppose that the individual who utters the words, ‘it is 
raining’, is a farmer who has been praying for the rainy season to start early after the 
devastating heat of the summer. In uttering these words the farmer is expressing his relief that 
his crops are not going to be completely ruined by the drought; understanding what he means 
in uttering these words and what he is thmlung about when he smiles with relief is not about 
knowing the truth conditions of his sentence, but about knowing what the early start to the 
wet season means for his capacity to supply wheat and grain to the surrounding villages. 
Suppose that the individual who utters the words, ‘it is raining’, is the leader of a 
mountaineering team who have just started their climb. In uttering these words the leader is 
expressing hs concern for the climb that they have just embarked on and for the safety of his 
team members; understanding what he means in uttering these words and what he is h & n g  
about when he pauses with a worried expression is again not about knowing the truth 
conditions of hs sentence, but about knowing what the impending rain fall means for the 
progress of the climb, Simply by considering the differences in what is involved in 
understanding the utterance ‘it is raining’ in these two cases, it makes it difficult to retain the 
idea that understanding others is a matter of disquotational translation. More than this, it 
indicates that it is extremely problematic to diminish the importance of the wider variety of 
non-interpretative responses to the individual, and the contexts in which these responses are 
made, for such responses are also constitutive of our understanding the individual, and the 
wider context itself determines what counts as an appropriaie response when he utters the 
words ‘it is raining ’. 
4.2. The Underlying Account Of Human Relationships 
Underlying this account of thought there appears to be a problematic account of human 
relationshps, whch might be usefully discussed at point. There is an implicit 
assumption, which is dnven by the physicalist ’s metaphysics, that every human relationship is 
at root a relationshp between two physical beings. By t h s  account, individuals understand 
each other in a personal sense if they can successfully redescribe the other’s behaviour in 
terms of a system of concepts which are not immediately applicable to that behaviour from 
the outset, but which can nonetheless be applied to it on a secondary level as an achevement 
of interpretation. An example of the type of human interaction presupposed by this position 
is provided by Davidson in the following passage: 
A theory of interpretation, like a theory of action, allows us to redescribe certain events in a revealing 
way ... a theory of action can answer the question of what an agent is doing when he has raised his arm 
by redescribing the act as one of trying to catch his friend’s attention (1984a: 161). 
An explicit example of th ls type of human interaction is given by Jackson and Pettit: 
Suppose I want to predict how someone’s body will move on some specified occasion or under some 
specified conditions: where do I start? ... The obvious answer is: certain observed facts about what is 
sometimes called raw behaviour, the physical movements our bodies make described as such, rather 
than, for instance, the movements described in terms of the language of intentionally characterized 
action. For it is the raw behaviour which we more immediately perceive through the way that it 
impinges on our sense-organs. ( 1993 : 26 1-2). 
To highlight the connection between the physicalist’s causal account of the mental with hs 
interpretationist account of human relationships, here is Child: 
Interpretationists allow that there are connections between a person’s having the beliefs and desires she 
does and the internal causal organization she does. (What attitudes a subject has is a matter of how she 
can be interpreted, which is answerable to what she says and does; and at some level, we think, her 
sayng and doing what she does results from her being causally organized in the way she is.) (1994: 9). 
The interpretationist seems to assume that every human relationship is underwritten by a 
specific type of impersonal relationship, one whch is entered into for the purpose of 
predicting and explaining an individual’s behaviour in terms of a system of concepts which 
are not immediately applicable within the context of the relationshp as it stands.6 Suppose, 
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Cockburn ( 1990: 80- 106) suggests that a significant range of materialist views can be formulated in 
terms of the assumption that an interest in prediction and control is, in some sense, what is basic in our 
relations with each other. For if the basic way in which other people figure in our thinking is such as to 
facilitate prediction and control of their behaviour, then our interest in others can only be accurately 
6 
81 
for instance, that we wanted to explain why an individual climbed up into the tree in the 
garden. The standard interpretationist account might run something lrke this. The individual 
climbed up into the tree because he believed the cat ran up it and he wanted to get it down 
again. But since we are presented with raw behavioural data whose most basic description is 
in physicalistic terms, our explanation which alludes to the individual’s beliefs and wants 
must have involved redescribing that behaviour in higher level mentalistic terms. In other 
words, it is only as the result of interpreting that we are in the position to give such a 
redescription of the individual’s behaviour and its causes. The task we originally began with, 
to causally explain the individual’s behaviour when he is moving up into the tree, remains the 
same throughout &Is whole complex process. What differs is only the manner in which we 
are able to pick out the individual’s behaviour and its causes as the result of interpreting it. 
Rather than being restricted to tallung in terms of neurophysiological states and events, and 
physicalistically characterised bodily movements, we can now talk in terms of the 
individual’s beliefs and wants concerning the cat, and his actions as they were caused by the 
latter. 
Thus. the submerged strand in the interpretationist account seems to be that all human 
relationships retain the basic features of non-everyday relationships, in that they are entered 
into for the purpose of predicting and causally explaining an individual’s behaviour, whilst 
the internal states and events which are picked out for ths purpose are described in terms of 
concepts which can only come into view w i h n  the context of everyday relationships. Which 
is to say that every human relationship is conceived to be a non-everyday relationship which 
has evolved into an everyday relationship through a complicated process of interpretation or 
redescription. 
The central problem with th~s is that if we assume that every relationship between individuals 
begins on this type of impersonal level, there seems to be no obvious way in which the 
demands of personal relationshps could ever have become an issue for these individuals, 
whose basic way of relating seems to be always in terms of the demands of impersonal 
expressed in terms of features of the non-human world of the physicalistic ontology. And much the 
same point is made by Hacker (1996: 425): “The idea that our ordinary psychological vocabulary is 
part of a rudimentary causal theory of human behaviour induces the idea that its primary function must 
be the prediction and control of human behaviour.” This would explain a great deal. It would 
encourage the idea that mentalistic explanations are capable of meeting our explanatory requirements 
only in so far as mental events, states and processes are in fact identical with neurophysiological events, 
states and processes, since it is only in these terms that such mentalistic-physicalistic predictions of 
behaviour can be made. 
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relationshps. To suppose that the basic form of human relationships is impersonal in the 
manner implied by interpretationism is to suppose that the basic motivation for entering into 
human relationshps is to prehct what others will do next and how they are likely to react in 
such and such circumstances. But the ability to make such predictions presupposes an 
understanding of human motives and intentions, purpose and reasons, weaknesses and 
failings of character, the way attitudes vary from person to person, and so on, which requires 
that we can already relate to others on an everyday level. Interpretationism seems to reverse 
the priorities here to bad effect. For if every human relationship starts off on a non-everyday 
level, we are left without an explanation of how the process of interpretation could purport to 
bring such notions into view. And unless these notions were already in view, it seems to me 
that there would be no obvious explanation of why individuals ever engaged in precisely 
these acts of interpretation in the first place. 
The immediate consequence of accepting the interpretationist approach to human 
relationships is that it prevents us from appreciating the deep extent of the autonomous nature 
of mentalistic explanation. This is due to the fact that it prevents us from seeing that the 
various concepts used in expressing and directing our interests and concerns in our 
relationshps with each other fulfil the specific roles demanded of them without implicating 
the explanatory resources of the physical sciences. In the interpretationist 's account, 
mentalistic explanations cannot be credited with this deeper degree of autonomy because 
mental concepts are used within the contexts of what are, at root, non-everyday relationshps. 
Within the context of such hybrid relationshps, mental concepts are c e r t d y  constrained by 
the principles of rationality; but part of their use is to predict and causally explain an 
individual 's behaviour. which they do by apparently redescribing neurophysiological states 
and events in terms of mental properties. Such uses of mental concepts therefore straddle 
both the mental and the physical explanatory domains, and hence incorporate features of 
these apparently incommensurable domains by having both rationalistic and physicalistic 
implications built into them. 
To my mind, tlus fails to acknowledge the deep extent of the autonomy of the mental 
domain, since it fails to acknowledge the possibility that mental concepts can fulfil the tasks 
required of them without having to straddle both the mental and the physical explanatory 
domains. It seems to me that we can only acknowledge the autonomy of the mental in the 
deeper sense through coming to appreciate the role of mental concepts within the context of 
83 
everyday human relationshps, which they can fulfil without implicating the explanatory 
resources of the physical sciences to complete their work. Here is how: mental concepts are 
used withm the contexts of our relationships in expressing and shaping the everyday interests 
and concerns we have about each other, but since they are not put to work in the course of 
moving from physicalistically conceived non-everyday relationships to mentalistically 
conceived everyday relationshps by way of interpretation, they can serve our interests and 
concerns without back-up fi-om the explanatory resources of the physical sciences. 
Certainly, there are aspects of human interaction that fall under the domain of the physical 
sciences, such as movements of limbs, contractions of the muscles and the like. But in so far 
as our interests are tied to our involvement in everyday relationships with other people, which 
constitute our most immediate and basic starting point in relating to others, the latter aspects 
are irrelevant. The explanatory practices constitutive of the physical sciences enjoy their own 
autonomy, as do the explanatory practices integral to our successful involvement in our 
everyday relationships. But what we are interested in within the latter context is not supported 
by drawing on explanatory resources which serve the interests particular to the physical 
sciences. To suppose that our mental concepts must pick out the same subject matter as 
physical concepts pick out is to suppose that our mental concepts are by themselves not 
capable of meeting the demands we make of them. And this in turn is connected to the 
supposition that mental concepts emerge within the contexts of relationships premissed on the 
need to causally explain each other’s bodily movements by reference to reasons we have for 
acting in certain ways. But what interests us when the carpenter reaches for hs sandpaper is 
not that he is correctly describable as being in a mental-physical state that causes his bodily 
movements, but that he has realised that the chair is not yet up to the standard expected. Our 
interest in this case is exhaustible within the context of his involvement in this relationship, 
and not with predicting his bodily movements by reference to internal neurophysiological 
states described in mental terms. 
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Chapter 5: Rationalising Explanations 
1.Introduction 
What I want to do in the balance of h s  chapter is argue that rationalising explanations are 
non-causal explanations of action, and I want to use this point to defend my larger claim that 
mentalistic explanations are autonomous with respect to physicalistic explanations in the 
deeper sense. I will argue, contrary to the physicalist, that rationalising explanations succeed 
in carrying out their work without having to rely on the explanatory resources of the physical 
sciences, as they would if the point of rationalising an individual’s actions were to attribute 
the mental states that rationalise his behaviour by causing it, with the relevant causal 
processes occurring at the micro-physical level. The causal explanatory work of mental states, 
on h s  interpretation of rationalising explanations, necessarily implicates the explanatory 
resources of the physical sciences. But in my view, on the other hand, rationalising 
explanations need not be given h s  causal interpretation, since they are perfectly capable of 
fulfilling our explanatory requirements themselves, without dependmg on support fiom the 
underlying causal processes in the physical domain. Again, this is not to be taken as a denial 
that there are such underlying causal processes, and that these processes are explanatory of 
the individual’s bodily movements; it is rather a denial of the claim that our mentalistic 
explanatory resources cannot meet the requirements we have of them unless they can be said 
to describe the neurophysiological states and processes operative in the physical domain. 
Denying this claim, and explaining how it is unnecessary, is what is required, I believe, to 
appreciate the extent of the claim that the mental is autonomous with respect to the physical. 
2.What rationalising explanations explain 
Rationalising explanations are intrinsic to our understanding of individuals as rational agents. 
They enable us to understand why an indwidual acted as he did, by citing the factors in light 
of whch his actions can be seen to have been reasonable for lum to perform in certain 
circumstances. We rationalise an individual’s behaviour when we explain it as having been 
performed for some particular reason, or in spite of some other reasons that he may have had 
at the time. An individual cannot be said to have acted for a reason if he is unaware of it as 
being the reason for whch he acted, nor can he be said to have acted in spite of other reasons 
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if he did not regard them as being reasons for not acting as he did. Even if hs actions could 
have been explained in terms of certain reasons, unless the individual is prepared to 
acknowledge that he acted as he did for these particular reasons, the reasons cited in such 
rationalising explanations cannot be the reasons for which the individual acted. For unless the 
individual is aware of the reasons for which he acted, it might happen that the reason that is 
cited in the explanation of hs action is one whch the individual could not have rationally 
had, gwen the rest of what he h n k s  and believes. 
Rationalising an individual’s actions can sometimes be a complicated task, since it might 
involve takmg into account a wide variety of factors whch are not immechately obvious from 
the way the individual is behaving. What the individual thrnks or believes is not always 
dwernible from studying hs behaviour alone, and the reason for whch the individual is 
acting is often complicated by the fact that the individual is immersed in a variety of 
relationshps that might well have some important bearing on how hs actions are to be 
understood in any particular case. Rationalising explanations explain why an individual is 
actmg as he does, but OUT ability to understand some individuals might therefore be fi-ustrated 
by the fact that aspects of their personal psychology are deliberately hdden from us, or just 
plain difficult to get at, more so when OUT acquaintance with them is limited to only parhcular 
aspects of their lives. Where the important factors stem from aspects of the indwidual’s life 
in whch we may not be directly involved, it is often difficult to know straight off why the 
individual is acting in a certain way. Failure to appreciate the violence suffered by an 
individual in a particularly torrid marriage might leave it quite unclear to her work colleagues 
why she was so apprehensive about sociahsing after work. But to closer fiends and relatives, 
who are directly involved in the relevant aspects of her life, the reasons for her apprehension 
are immediately obvious. Knowing her as a close fiiend or a relative puts certain individuals 
in a position to understand why she is acting as she is in certain situations, whereas these 
reasons might be completely missed by those individuals who know her only in a worlung 
capacity. At the same time, those who know her in a workmg capacity might be in a better 
position than some of her close fhends and relatives to understand why she was so averse to 
the company’s proposed merger with a large local business. 
The point I am trylng to get at here is simply that their involvement in different types of 
relationshps with h s  individual puts different people in a better or worse position to 
understand different aspects of her personal psychology. Certain individuals are in a better 
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position to understand why she rehses to socialise after her work through being involved in 
family or fkendship relations with her, whereas other inlviduals are in a better position to 
understand her business ideas through being involved in working relationships with her. So 
what I want to suggest is that understanding why thrs indvidual is acting as she does is a 
matter of seeing her action as part of her involvement in these relationships, and the 
rationalising explanations we offer might then be understood as expressing the interests we 
have in this aspect of her actions. 
To be precise, my position is that understanding an indwidual’s reason for acting as he does 
is understandmg hs actions as being rational responses to features of the situations in whch 
he finds h s e l f .  In a large number of cases, though not in all, b s  means that understanding 
an individual’s actions as having been performed for particular reasons is understanlng his 
actions as being partly constitutive of hs involvement in relationships with other people.’ 
This is manifest in the fact that the identity of an individual’s actions are often inseparable 
fiom the identity of the actions of those individuals with whom he is involved in these 
relationshps, and also in the fact that the identity of an individual’s actions are often 
inseparable from the identity of his own previous or future actions, whch in turn are bound 
up with the identity of the previous and hture actions of others. The act of giving and 
receiving gifts might illustrate thrs point. An individual’s act of giving a gift to hs loved one 
is intrinsically tied to hs loved one’s act of receiving the gift. It is understood as the act of 
giving a gift by the individual receiving the gft because they are both already involved in the 
types of relationshps in which the act of giving a gift is sometunes warranted, and in which 
the act of receiving the gift is the appropriate response to make. But through their 
involvement in thzs relationshp, the individual receiving the gift is in the position to 
understand this particular act of gift giving as a simple expression of love, as a plea for 
forgiveness for a wrong doing, or as a peace offering for a recent lover ’s quarrel. 
It would be rather artificial to suppose that the identity of the act of giving a gift could be 
sharply separated fkom the identity of the act of receiving a gift, as if it were a fi-ee standing 
piece of behaviour whose sipficance could only be grasped through a process of 
interpretation. The individual does not have to interpret the behaviour of her loved one in 
I say ‘in a large number of cases’ because, as in the previous chapter, I do not want to say that 1 
solitary individuals cannot act for reasons, and I want to inchrde actions which indivichals perform on 
their own, such as bathing, playing solitaire, listening to music on head-phones, or going for a walk in 
order to be alone. But again, the capacity to be alone, to do things by oneself, is a determination of the 
capacity to be with others, and to be involved in various types o f  relationships. 
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order to understand it as an act of giving a gft, before she can be said to be in a position to 
respond to hs act in the appropriate manner by receiving it. It might be that the individual has 
to work out whether the act is a simple expression of love, or whether it is an act of guilt for a 
particular transgression; but that is only likely to be the case where the past hstory of the 
relationshp suggests reasons for doubting the sincerity of the offering. What might have to 
be worked out is the sigmficance of the gift, but not that the individual’s act is an act of 
giving a gift. That is already taken for granted as partly constitutive of the particular 
relationshp in whch the individuals are involved, which is manifest in the fact that she 
responds to it by graciously receiving it, politely rejecting it, or suspiciously questioning the 
motives behmd it; and dependmg on which response she makes, the immediate course of the 
relationshp will be affected in some way. 
In these cases, the individual can be said to have a reason for acting in a certain way if the 
demands of hs relationships have a propensity to solicit certain types of response fiom him, 
and the individual actually acts on a particular reason if the demands of hs relationship solicit 
that parbcular response fiom h m  whch he would explain by citing one or other of these 
demands. To illustrate h s  point, let me modi@ the example: that the passenger on the train is 
in possession of an invalid ticket is a reason for the conductor to escort the passenger fiom 
the train at the next station. The situation m which the conductor finds hunself presents him 
with a reason for takmg such steps, given hs awareness of the obligation of passengers to be 
in possession of a valid ticket, and hs awareness of hs duty as a conductor to reinforce this 
particular obligation. The conductor’s awareness of these demands can only be acquired 
through being involved in the appropriate type of social relationshps, in which the identity of 
the act of buying a ticket is intrinsically tied to the identity of the act of granting adrmssion. 
With these interrelated acts comes a variety of demands, to whch both individuals must be 
responsive if they are to be said to have the capacity to be involved in these particular 
relationshps. So it can be said that the conductor escorts the passenger fiom the train for the 
reason that he is in possession of an invalid ticket if, in explaining why he acted as he did, the 
conductor would truthfblly cite the fact that the passenger is in possession of an invalid ticket 
as demanding that these measures be taken. 
Explaining an individual’s actions as having been performed for a particular reason is 
therefore a matter of connecting his actions to certain features of the situation in whch he 
finds himself. The connection is forged in terms of the rationalistic and normative relations 
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which are in place for the individual in virtue of his conception of the situation, and the 
causal relations whch are explanatory of his bodily movements are extrinsic to thls being the 
case. In explaining why an individual acted as he &d we are interested in getting at hs 
reasons, and we do th~s by understanding which features of the situation strike him as 
particularly salient. (We are not interested in what caused his body to move in any particular 
way, and even if we did have th~s information it would not tell us what we want to know.) 
The fact that the passenger is in possession of an invalid ticket strikes the conductor as 
particularly salient given hs conception of the situation, and it is in terms of hs conception 
of the situation that his actions are connected to that fact by means of the rationalistic and 
normative relations whch are intrinsic to the rationalising form of explanation. 
Th~s takes me to a crucial point, which raises a problem for the causal account of rationalising 
explanations: if it is correct to say that the reason for the conductor’s action is the fact that the 
passenger is in possession of an invalid ticket, then it cannot also be correct to say that hs 
reason for acting is, as the causal account of rationalising explanations has it, the belief-desire 
combination which causes h m  to act. The causal account of rationalising explanations is 
committed to the idea that an explanation of an individual’s actions in terms of hs reasons is 
a species of causal explanation, for in order to have a causal account of rationalising 
explanations, the reason for acting must be construed as that which rationalises the 
individual’s action by causing it. Or as Davidson puts it, the reason must be a rational cause 
of the action; it is the belief and desire in light of whch the action can be seen to be 
reasonable (1980b: 233). 
What I am suggesting is that the reason for acting is not the belief and desire whch the 
individual has at the time of action, and which work together in some mysterious way to 
cause the behaviour that the reason is supposed to explain; rather is the reason for acting 
gwen by what the individual tt.lmks or believes and what the individual desires on that 
occasion. Here is what I mean. That the bulls are too lean for selling at the market is the 
firmer’s reason for fattening them up. Certarnly, thls fact would not present the farmer with a 
reason for doing any such b g  if he did not have the relevant beliefs and desires. But what 
the reference to the farmer’s beliefs and desires does is explain why this fact is a reason for 
him. They themselves do not constitute hs reason. Thus, I feel that the causal account of 
rationalising explanations involves a basic slippage, to which the physicalist has been 
attracted because it allows h m  to retain a physico-causal account of behaviour, whlst at the 
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same time it appears to let lum retain the notion of rationality as integral to that account, thus 
giving hun the possibility of arguing that the mental is nonetheless autonomous with respect 
to the physical. But what I am claiming, on the other hand, is that rationalising explanations 
do not incorporate the notion of causality as a necessary component. However, this is 
challenged by certain arguments wluch are thought to motivate the claim that the concept of 
acting on a reason must contain within itself two ideas: the idea of rationality and the idea of 
a cause. 
3.Why must rationalising explanations be causal explanations? 
3. I .Accounting For The Force Of' Because ' 
The causal account of rationalising explanations has often been appealed to as the only means 
of explaining the relation that obtains between the reason and the action. It is sometimes 
motivated on the strength of the point that merely avemng to the fact that an individual has a 
reason for acting is not a sufficient conhtion for his actually acting on that reason. 
Davidson 's classic argument for the causal account is this: although rationalising explanations 
justie an individual 's actions in the sense that they cite the beliefs and desires in light of 
which the individual's actions can be seen to be reasonable, they must also be causal 
explanations in the sense that the beliefs and desires which rationalise the individual's actions 
must do so in virtue of being their causes. Giving a reason explains an action in the sense that 
it allows us to fit it into a wider context, but t l us  still leaves us without an account of how the 
reason explains the action, and it fails to touch on the question of whether the reason wluch is 
cited in explanation of the action is in fact the reason why the individual acted. So the 
explanatory efficacy of reasons can only be accounted for on the assumption that reasons are 
causes, otherwise rationalising explanations will fail to account for the force of the 'because' 
which is operative in these cases (and what better way to do this than through the slippage 
outlined above?). The problem can then be put in the following way: it is one thing to cite the 
beliefs and desires whch reveal an individual's actions to be reasonable for him to perform, 
but it is another thmg to show that having these beliefs and desires actually explain the 
individual 's actions. And as Davidson concludes: 
A desire and a belief of the right sort may explain an action, but not necessarily. A man might have 
good reasons for killing his father, and he might do it, and yet the reasons not be his reasons in doing 
it ... so when we offer the fact of the desire and belief in explanation, we imply not only that the agent 
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had the desire and belief, but that they were efficacious in producing the action. Here we must 
say.. .that causality is involved (1 980b: 232). 
As I have already pointed out, this argument is less than convincing. It surely cannot be on 
these grounds alone that “we must say” that causality is involved. What motivates the causal 
account of rationalising explanations, at least as far as this argument is concerned, is that 
there seems to be no other way of explaining the relation between the reason and the action 
when the reason in fact explains the action. Certainly, it is correct to say that the man might 
have a good reason for killing his father and yet not kill him for that reason. But this cannot 
be sufficient grounds for concluding that the reason on which the individual acts must be the 
one whch causes it. If it turned out that the man shot his father accidentally at archery 
practice, when the fact that his father had a vast estate gave the man a good reason for killing 
him anyway, then the man did not act on the latter reason because giving that reason in 
explaining his actions would be incorrect. 
The point is straight-forwardly grammatical: the reason on which the individual acts is the 
reason which gives the correct explanation of his action, and the correct explanation is the 
one which the individual would truthfully give if asked. The individual’s own truthful 
explanation of his actions is the criterion by which we determine the reason for which the 
individual acted as he did. The correct explanation is that the man fired his arrow toward the 
target, and the man’s father happened to walk into its path just as the arrow was fired. So 
although the man killed his father, and although he certainly had a reason for killing him, he 
&d not in fact kill him for that reason. This would give an incorrect explanation of the man’s 
actions, and hence it would fail to give the reason for which the man acted as he did. But to 
insist that the latter reason would give an incorrect explanation of the individual’s actions 
because it did not cause them would be to assume from the outset that the causal account of 
rationalising explanations were true. In order to establish this conclusion, which is by no 
means obvious from these considerations, further argument is required. 
3.2. The Completeness Of Physics 
There is a deeper argument underlying the causal account of rationalising explanations, which 
is more f d y  rooted in the physicalist’s explanatory fi-amework. The causal account of 
rationalising explanations is motivated on the strength of the completeness of the physical 
sciences, which is the principle that there is a complete and deterministic explanation of 
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everythg that exists, and hence of everydung that happens, in terms of the explanatory 
resources of the physical sciences. There is no need to go beyond the physical domain to 
explain some physical occurrence, such as the bodily movements of the individual who is 
acting for some reason or other. The occurrence of the indwidual’s bodily movements are 
completely and exhaustively explained in terms of the occurrence of antecedent physical 
events; so if mental states or events are to stand a chance of being explanatory of an 
individual’s behaviour. then they must somehow merge with these physical states and events, 
either through being reahsed by them, or through being mereologically composed out of 
them. But ths  means that once reasons are construed as ‘belief-desire pairs’, rationalising 
explanations must be supported by underlying physicalistic explanations, since the mental 
states and events cited in these explanations are not in the position to make any difference to 
the individual ’s behaviour unless they are in fact physical states and events. 
This is enough to motivate the causal interpretation itself, but let me point out an immediate 
consequence of h s  argument that will help to reinforce the conclusion. For any event, there 
must be an explanation of its occurrence that cites its physical properties, locating that event 
withm the network of causal relations. Certain events can also be explained in rationalistic 
terms, by citing their mental properties, but there cannot be a rationalistic explanation of an 
event for which there is no physical explanation. For any two events which differ with respect 
to their rationalistic explanations, there must be a difference with respect to their physical 
explanations, which will thereby regrster a difference in the causal relations that these events 
can enter into. It follows fi-om ths  that if two events differ with respect to their rationalistic 
explanation, they must also differ with respect to their physicalistic explanation, which is to 
say that for any rationalistic explanation to be true of an event, there must be some 
physicalistic explanation on which h s  rationalistic explanation depends. From h s ,  the 
desired conclusion seems to follow without too much difficulty: rationalistic explanations 
must be a subspecies of causal explanation. 
In practical terms, what th~s means is that if the explanation of the man’s lulling hs father is 
that he believed his father had a secret pot of money and he wanted to lnherit that pot of 
money sooner rather than later, then there must also be some causal explanation of the man’s 
actions on whch the truth of h s  particular rationalising explanation depends. If the man &d 
not act for this reason, but accidentally lulled hs father anyway, then there must of necessity 
be a different causal explanation of the man’s actions. So at a basic level, what &stinguishes 
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an action whch is performed for one reason, from an action which is performed for another, 
must be the truth of the causal explanation of the occurrence of the indwidual’s behaviour, on 
whch the rationalising explanation depends. 
Despite the fact that tlus argument looks to be much more sophisticated, it is doubtful 
whether it is any more successful than the previous argument. It is, however, much more 
difficult to criticise; but a usefbl starting point might be to question whether the causal 
account of rationalising explanations, as it is motivated on the strength of this argument, is 
internally coherent. If it is correct to say that the notions of rationality and causality must be 
built into the concept of actmg on a reason, then it seems that it must also be correct to say 
that the autonomous nature of mental properties does not prevent them from being causally 
relevant. But from w i t h  the non-reductivist ’s metaphysical framework, it can be argued that 
autonomous mental properties are in danger of being causally irrelevant. 
n s  gwes rise to the problem of mental property epiphenomenalism, which is the problem 
that the instantiation of mental properties in events is irrelevant to the causal relations that 
these events can enter into. W c h  causal relations events can enter into is determined 
exclusively by their physical properties, leaving no causal work for their mental properties to 
carry out. ~s is to say that had an event failed to instantiate any of its mental properties, 
once its physical properties had been fixed, no difference would have been made to the 
causal relations that that event could have entered into. It could have entered into the Same 
causal relations, regardless of whether it had instantiated any of its mental properties or not. 
On a closer inspection, this problem can be seen to divide into two: first, once an event’s 
physical properties have been fixed, there is no causal work that its mental properties can do; 
second, once an event’s physical properties have been fixed, there is no causal work that its 
mental properties need do. 
4.The problem of mental property epiphenomenalism 
4. I a. The Causal Irrelevance Of Non-Nomological Properties 
Honderich (1982: 60-62) raises a problem of the first type. Suppose that the event of putting 
pears on a Scale causes the pointer to register two pounds, and suppose that the events are 
described in exactly these terms. It is not necessary that every property of these events will be 
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picked out by just this description, and some of the properties which are not picked out by 
t h s  description may be the properties whch are in fact relevant to the causal relation that 
holds between these events. As Honderich points out, it is only in virtue of certain of their 
properties rather than others that events can be said to be the causes they are. The events 
cannot be said to be in lawllke connection in virtue of the first event being the event of 
putting somethmg green and French on the scale, and in virtue of the second event being the 
event of the pointer’s registering two pounds. As far as determining the causal relation 
between these events is concerned, the latter properties are irrelevant. But although the events 
are not brought under a law in virtue of being described in exactly these terms, it does not 
mean that the event of putting pears on the scale did not cause the pointer to move. What it 
means is simply that the failure of certain properties to figure in lawful generalisations entails 
that it cannot be in virtue of these properties that the events enter into the causal relations they 
do. 
This creates the following difficulty for the causal theory of rationalising explanations: given 
that events whch instantiate mental properties also instantiate physical properties, and that 
the causal relations which hold between events do so in virtue of the fact that they instantiate 
law governed properties, how can it be the case that the mental properties of these events are 
relevant to the causal relations that they enter into? Suppose that we explain an individual’s 
behaviour of wallung to the water fountain by saying that he wanted a drmk, and that he 
believed that he would be able to quench his thrst at the fountain. What this explanation 
seems to imply is that the event whch causes the individual’s behaviour instantiates the 
mental properhes cited in the rationalisation of hs action. But since the event cannot be said 
to cause the individual’s behaviour in virtue of instantiating any of its mental properties, it 
follows that the mental propertres cited in ths explanation are irrelevant to the fact that the 
individual walked to the water fountain. So there now seems to be no non-arbitraq 
explanation of the fact that the event whch caused the individual’s behaviour is the event 
which instantiates the mental properties cited in the rationalisation of hs action. Or in other 
words, there now seems to be no non-arbitraty explanation of how the individual’s reason for 
wallung to the fountain caused hs wallung to the fountain; yet it was supposed to be the merit 
of the causal account that it alone could provide an account of the relation between reasons 
and actions. 
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4.1 b. Causal Explanatory Exclusion 
Kim (1993~: 351-355) raises a problem of the second type. He argues that the causal account 
of rationalising explanations, as it is set out within the framework of non-reductive 
physicalism, flounders over the causal explanatory exclusion problem. This is basically the 
problem that the causal role of an event’s mental properties is in danger of pre-emption by 
the causal role of its physical properties. Or in other words, once an event’s physical 
properties have been fixed, there is no causal work that its mental properhes need do. 
Suppose that mental property M is causally efficacious with respect to mental property M*, 
and that on a given occasion, the instantiation of M causes the instantiation of M*. But given 
that mental property M* is realised by physical property P*, there are now two different 
answers to the question why mental property M* is instantiated: on the one hand, the answer 
could be that M* is instantiated because it was caused by the instantiation of M; on the other 
hand, the answer could be that M* is instantiated because it is realised by the physical 
property P*, whch happens to be instantiated on that occasion. So if the instantiation of 
mental property M, is to have caused the instantiation of mental property M*, it could only 
have done so if it had caused physical property P* to be instantiated, since the instantiation of 
P* is already nomologically sufficient for M* to be instantiated. But t h ~ s  presupposes the 
possibility of downward causation, fiom hgher-level mental properties to their lower-level 
physical realisation bases. 
Now suppose that on a given occasion the instantiation of M causes the instantiation of PI, as 
we can grant if we allow the possibility of downward causation. But given that mental 
property M is realised by physical property P, and that the instantiation of P therefore 
explains why M is instantiated, it follows that the instantiation of P itself is sufficient for the 
instantiation of P*. The question which arises now is why should we not take P as the cause 
of P*, and disregard M as an epiphenomenon? If the instantiation of P* has a complete and 
sufficient physical cause in the form of the instantiation of physical property P, as the 
principle of the causal closure of the physical domain demands, there is no reason for taking 
M to be the cause of M*, since M is realised by P, M* is realised by P*, and P completely 
explains P*. All the causal work is carried out at the level of physical properties, leaving no 
causal work for mental properties to do. But Kim insists that the causal efficacy of mental 
properhes might strll be secured, if the principle of ‘causal inheritance’ is adopted. By this 
principle, if mental property M is instantiated on a given occasion by being realised by 
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physical property P, then the causal powers of M are identical to the causal powers of P; all 
causal relations are therefore implemented at the microphysical level, such that the causal 
powers we attribute to mental properties are lnherited fiom the causal powers of physical 
properties. 
Again, in practical terms, what this amounts to is that the mental properties cited in the 
explanation of the individual wallung to the fountain have no causal work left to do once the 
physical properties of the behaviour-causing events have been fixed. There is no causal work 
left for mental properties to do, unless they are permitted a downward causal role with 
respect to the physical properhes of the individual’s behaviour. But since there is already a 
complete explanation of the individual’s behaviour in terms of the instantiation of the 
physical properties of the behaviour-causing event, granting autonomous causal powers to 
mental properties is not warranted, since it simply results in the causal over-determination of 
the individual’s behaviour. Thrs has an unhappy consequence for the causal theory of 
rationalising explanations: if mental properties fail to have their own causal powers, there is 
little reason to consider mental properhes to characterise an autonomous domain; and if 
mental properties cannot be credited with the autonomy that the non-reductivist demands, this 
will put pressure on the idea that the rationalising mode of explanation can be said to be a 
species of causal explanation, whch is nonetheless autonomous with respect to physicalistic 
explanations. 
This is unacceptable for the causal account of rationalising explanations, in so far as one of 
its central aims is to find a way of reconciling the autonomy of the mental with the fact that 
the physical sciences provide a complete explanation of the individual’s behaviour in terms 
drawn exclusively from its own field. Once the completeness of the physical sciences is 
assumed, there is no room left for rationalising explanations to get a gnp as an autonomous 
form of causal explanation. All the causal work is carried out at the lower-level of physical 
properhes, whch means that mental properhes can only be said to be causally efficacious if 
we allow their efficacy to be inherited or derived fiom that of physical properties. But this 
leaves the higher-level mental properties with no autonomous causal role to play. The causal 
account of rationalising explanations appeared to show how both modes of explanation could 
co-exist when they take as their subject matter the causation of an individual’s behaviour; but 
the two objections just considered cast doubt on the possibility of keeping them both in place 
together, and indeed, on the very need to retain the rationalising mode of explanation once 
the completeness of the physicalistic mode is acknowledged. 
4 . 2 ~ .  The Causal Eflcacy of Higher-Level Patterns 
That mental properties are relegated to the status of epiphenomena within the fi-amework of 
non-reductive physicalism seems to reveal a deep incoherence in that position. Part of the 
merit of non-reductive physicalism is that it seemed to secure the autonomy of mental 
properties, despite the fact that they are grounded in the physical structure of the world. But 
before setting non-reductive physicalism aside on the above objections, it is reasonable to 
consider whether they can be answered. The problem facing the non-reductive physicalist is 
that the causal powers of higher-level properties in general seem to be completely derived or 
mherited from the causal powers of the underlying physical properties, whose arrangements 
can be said to realise the hgher-level properties on a particular occasion. For if higher-level 
properties are realised by particular arrangements of lower-level physical properties, then it 
does seem to follow that the causal powers of hgher-level properties are n o h g  over and 
above the causal powers of lower-level physical properties. But it might be replied that the 
charge of mental property epiphenomenalism cannot be sustained, if it can be demonstrated 
that mental properties can in fact exert some form of causal influence over physical 
properties. 
a s  is the line taken by Van Gulick (1993: 250-252). He argues that the charge of mental 
property epiphenomenalism is not as serious a threat as it initially seems. His reply to the 
charge of epiphenomenalism is this: it does not immediately follow fi-om the fact that mental 
states and events are realised by composites of physical states and events, that mental states 
and events cannot exert some form of causal influence over the physical states and events of 
whch they are composites. It does not follow because the causal powers of hgher-level states 
and events are not solely determined by the causal powers of their constituent parts, but by 
the causal powers of their constituent parts @gether with their particular organization. The 
patterns that are picked out by the predicates of the special sciences in general are stable and 
recurrent features of the world, whch are preserved as such regardless of the changes and 
alterations talung place among the lower level constituents of these patterns. Van Gulick’s 
central point is that the existence of these patterns in the world determines that the particular 
constituents of their instances are organised and recruited as they are. Th~s has the effect that 
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hgher-level patterns are responsible for selectively activating only some of the causal powers 
attributable to their constituents parts. That is, the physical constituents of these patterns may 
have many causal powers, but only some subset of these causal powers will be activated in a 
given situation. Through being organised into h s  particular higher-level pattern, certain 
subsets will be caused to be activated and others will not, and the higher-level pattern, 
therefore, can be said to exert its own causal influence over its physical constituents by 
selectively activating certain of these subsets rather than others. 
If &us argument works, it suggests reasons for thinking that the higher-level patterns picked 
out by the prdcates of the special sciences are capable of exerting some of their own causal 
powers, whch are not entirely derived from the causal powers of their constituent parts. Van 
Gulick argues that the activity of a reagent can be affected by the presence of a catalysing 
enzyme that forms a composite with the reagent, and this apparently weakens the force of the 
epiphenomenalist’s charge. However, even if it is correct to say that when biochemical states 
and events combine to form composites they acquire their own autonomous causal powers, 
we do not yet have reason to suppose that this can throw light on the present issue. It does not 
show that if the composite is a mental event (the intelligibility of whxh has already been put 
in doubt, given the problem with fusions) it can exert an autonomous causal influence over 
the activity of its constituent parts. It is one &ung to argue that biochemical composites can 
have a causal effect on their constituent parts, but h s  does not help us understand what it 
means to say that mental states and events can exert some causal influence over the physical 
states and events whch purportedly form their constituents parts. The trouble is that whereas 
we readily understand the principle behind the idea that lugher-level biochemical composites 
have lower level biochemical states and events as their constituent parts, we do not so readily 
understand the principle behind the idea that mental states and events have constituent parts in 
the Same sense. But this is exactly what we do no need to understand if the analogy between 
mental states and events and tzlgher level biochemical composites is to help us understand 
how autonomous mental properties can exert underived causal powers over physical 
properties. 
4.26. Non-Reducible Supervenient Causation 
A different reply is suggested by Enq (1995: 178-180). He argues that there is a species of 
supervenient properties whose causal efficacy cannot be fully accounted for by the causal role 
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of their microphysical base. The properties in question are locally supervenient properties that 
are associated with certain globally supervenient properties. It is because certain locally 
supervenient properties can be said to “carry7’ certain globally supervenient properties that 
their causal efficacy cannot be exhaustible by the causal role of their microphysical base. 
Thus, we seem to have found a role that mental proeprties need to fblfil. Here is how the 
argument works. For each representation of a state of affairs, there is a structure which 
embodies that representation, and which locally supervenes on some neurophysiological 
properties of the brain. Since thrs same structure could have been instantiated in a baby who 
does not yet have any beliefs, Enq holds that it cannot be identical with the property of being 
a representation of a state of affairs. The relation between the macro structure of the brain, 
and the property of being a representation, is rather one of carrying. The property of being a 
representation of a state of affairs includes in its supervenient base properties outside the 
confines of the individual’s body. So according to Enq, the neurophysiological state of the 
brain only has the property of representing this state of affairs in virtue of the fact that it is a 
realisation of the structure that would be ideally caused by this state of &airs. 
What h s  means is that although the neurophysiological state of the brain is itself sufficient to 
determine that a given macro structure is instantiated, it is not sufficient to determine that this 
structure constitutes a representation of the state of affairs in question. That t h s  structure 
constitutes a representation of the state of affairs cannot be derived from the fact that it 
locally supervenes on some neurophysiological state of the brain. The neurophysiological 
state of the brain can only be said to constitute a representation in virtue of the fact that it is a 
realisation of some macro structure that would have been caused by the relevant state of 
affairs under certain specifiable ideal conditions. Now by Enq‘s reasoning, a piece of 
behaviour is intentional behaviour only if it has been caused by a representational state. The 
intentional behaviour of running away from a tiger, for instance, is constituted as such only if 
it has been caused by the representation of a tiger. The neurophysiological state of the brain 
will be sufficient to cause the individual’s bodily movements when he is running away from 
the tiger, but that the piece of behaviour is, as EnC puts it, “an intentional running away”, is 
not fully determined by the fact that it was caused by tfus neurophysiological state of the 
brain. That the piece of behaviour has the property of being intentional is dependent on 
whether it has been caused by the neurophysiological state that realises the relevant 
representation, but the neurophysiological state realises the relevant representation only in 
virtue of its relations to factors outside the individual ’s body. 
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En$ argues that when a globally supervenient property (being a representation of a tiger) is 
carried by a locally supervenient property (being a given macro state of the brain), a novel 
causal structure is created, whch is different from the causal structure obtaining at the micro- 
physical level. Because the properties of being a representation of a state of affairs, and being 
a piece of intentional behaviour, are globally supervenient properties that are carried by 
certain locally supervenient properties, a significantly different level of causal relations 
obtains between these events. Ths  hgher level of causal relations is superimposed on the 
causal relations already existing at the micro level, in virtue of the fact that the properties 
which locally supervene on the micro properties carry certain globally supervenient 
properties, whose causal efficacy cannot be fully accounted for by the causal role of the 
lower level micro properties. By Enc‘s lights, the causal relations at this level are 
nonreducible to the causal relations at the micro level, and this seems to secure his claim that 
mental properties play a causal role over and above the causal role played by microphysical 
properties. 
However, ths  seems to imply that a single event can be involved in a large number of causal 
relations at the one time, corresponding, more or less, to the number of descriptions that can 
be made of it. It seems to imply that the neural event stands in a causal relation to the 
contraction and expansion of the individual’s muscles, and that the Same event, described in 
terms of certain of its macro properties, stands in a causal relation to the individual’s bodily 
movements. Tlus might not seem problematic. But I thnk the problem rather lies with the 
next claim, that the same event again, when described in terms of its representational 
properties, stands in an independent causal relation to the individual’s intentional behaviour. 
It is not clear to me that EnC has identified an autonomous level of causal relations that is 
independent of, and non-parasitic on, the causal relations at the micro level. Even if we agree, 
for the sake of the argument, that there are a number of different and independent causal 
stories to be told about the Same neurophysiologcal events, as EnC insists, this does not seem 
sufficient to warrant hs claim that, corresponding to a nonreducible mental description of 
these events, there is an independent causal relation that is nonreducible to certain lower 
level causal relations. 
The independence of the hgher level causal relation from the lower level causal relation is 
thought to have been secured by the claim that the causation of the individual’s behaviour by 
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certain neural events is not sufficient to make it the case that the behaviour is intentional. This 
claim is certady correct; but in so far mental states and events are identical to the physical 
state or event, this observation only seems to secure the need to recognise an autonomous 
level of description. It does not seem to secure the fact that there is an independent level of 
causal relations between these events, corresponding to their independent higher level 
descriptions. For although we might not be able to derive the complete set of an event’s 
higher level properties from a description of that event in terms of its causal relation to some 
other event, it does not follow that we have to assume that these underivable hgher level 
properties have been independently caused by the hgher level properties of the first event. 
For t h s  reason I am doubtfbl that this argument is any more successful than the previous 
argument in securing an autonomous level of mental causation, and again the prime reason 
for this failure seems to be that the token mental event is assumed to be identical with some 
lower level token physical events. 
5.Securing the autonomy of mental causation by rejecting the principles of physicalism 
The arguments considered against the causal account of rationalising explanations seem to 
imply the denial of the fact that what an indwidual t h d s  can sometimes be causally 
explanatory of what he does. I do not want h s  denial to follow from the non-causal account 
of rationalising explanations that I have been developing, so I need to find a way of making 
sense of mental causation that is consistent with my position. Tlus should not be too difficult, 
since mental causation only seems to be put in doubt if it is understood in terms of the 
principle of the nomological character of causality and the completeness of physical theories. 
In terms of these principles, causation is an extensional relation between two events, which 
holds independently of the various explanatory frameworks in terms of which the events can 
be described; but the principles require that whenever h s  relation does in fact hold, there 
must be a closed and comprehensive framework whose laws govern the events under certain 
of their descriptions. a s  is what has been seen to cast doubt on the autonomy of mental 
causation. But there should be no obvious reason to deny that the autonomy of mental 
causation can be secured if it can be understood independently of these principles; nor should 
there be any obvious reason to deny that the autonomy of mental causation can be made 
consistent with the non-causal account of rationalising explanations. 
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Baker (1993: 92-4) suggests a way of understanding mental causation independently of the 
principles of physicalism, whch involves reversing the priority of causation and explanation, 
and then grounding the notion of causation in an array of counterfactual facts constitutive of 
our explanatory practices. In terms of this reversal, the notion of causation comes to be 
viewed as an explanatory concept which figures in our explanations of everyday happenings, 
and causes come to be viewed as that which is cited in these explanations. More specifically, 
causal explanations are explanations which are given in answer to ’why?’ questions, such as 
’why is the traffic so snarled today?’, and causes are cited in answers to these questions, such 
as ‘road works at the interchange’. Baker’s recommendation is that the notion of causation 
should therefore be analysed in the following way: (i) if c had not occurred, then other thmgs 
being equal, e would not have occurred; (ii) given that c occurred, then other h n g s  being 
equal, e was inevitable. Applied to explanations of actions, Baker wants to say that Jill’s 
thdung that she left her keys in the bookstore causes her to return to retneve them in virtue 
of the following explanatory facts: if Jill hadn’t thought that her keys were in the store, then 
other things being equal, she wouldn’t have returned, and given that she did think that her 
keys were in the store, then other things being equal, her returning to the store was inevitable. 
This reversal allows us to say that what is relevant to settling whether a causal relation holds 
is simply whether certain counterfactual claims are true, rather than whether the events have 
descriptions under whch they instantiate a strict law. There is no need for causally related 
events to be governed by stnct laws because there is no need for causal explanations to cite 
anything like the complete causes of the type required by the physicalist’s principles. 
Somethmg like this idea is worth developing, since it completely avoids the troubles with 
mental property epiphenomenalism which threaten to undermine the non-reductivist ’s 
account of mental causation. Whether Jill’s thdung caused her to act as she did would not 
depend on whether non-nomological properties can be said to be causally relevant, but rather 
on the truth of the counterfactual claim that had she not thought what she did, she would not 
have acted as she did. However, it seems to me that there is a problem with Baker’s position, 
whch prevents me fiom talung full advantage of it. There seems to be no distinction drawn 
between answers to ’why?’ questions whch are genuinely causal explanations, and answers 
to ’why?’ questions whch are not causal explanations, such as ’you gave me a fright, that is 
why I jumped’, and ‘there was somebody standing in the shadows, that is why I didn’t go any 
M e r  ’.
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If Baker’s methodological recommendation to reverse the priorities of causation and 
explanation is to be exploited as a way of securing the autonomy of mental causation, and its 
consistency with the non-causal account of rationalising explanations that I have developed, 
there will have to be a way of distinguishing between explanations that cite mental causes and 
explanations that do not. It simply cannot be acceptable for my purposes to assimilate all 
explanations of an individual’s actions in terms of what he th inks to causal explanations, 
since h s  move overlooks the different implications for certain of our relationships, that 
come into view through explanations that cite mental causes, and explanations that cite 
reasons. Anscombe (1968) might be able to help me out here. She agrees that mental causes 
are cited in answers to ’why?’ questions, but the important point to note is that she puts a 
restriction on the type of question that can be said to be seeking a mental cause in its answer. 
It is noteworthy that the restriction she places on what can count as a mental cause is to be 
understood in terms of our interests in explaining a particular aspect of an individual’s 
actions. A mental cause is simply what would be cited in describing what went through the 
individual’s mind that led up to and issued in his action, most commonly, but not necessarily, 
when the individual is in a state of excitement or agitation: “The martial music excites me, 
that is why I walk up and down”. “What made you sign the document at last?- The thought: 
‘It’s my duty’ kept hammering away in my mind until I said to myself, ‘I can do no other’, 
and so signed.” (1968: 76). 
In contrast to this, what characterises explanations of an individual’s actions that cite reasons 
is that they illuminate aspects of the individual’s situation as he conceives it. What is of 
interest is not what happened to be going through the individual’s mind that led up to his 
action, but whether the individual’s response to hs situation was warranted or appropriate. So 
if the request for an explanation is expressing an interest in the latter considerations, then 
what is given in response is the indwidual ’s reasons for acting as he did; but if the request for 
an explanation is expressing an interest in what was going through the individual’s mind that 
led up to his action, then what is given in response are the mental causes of the indnridual’s 
action. a s  is a useful way of showing how the non-causal account of rationalising 
explanations can be consistent with the possibility of explaining an individual’s actions in 
terms of mental causes. I thmk it is important to note that both types of explanation are 
autonomous, in the sense that their intelligibility stems from their role within the contexts of 
human relationshps. l h s  is more evident with regard to a request for an explanation in terms 
of an individual’s reasons, but it can also be said of a request for an explanation in terms of 
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mental causes. Understanding what caused the individual to sign the document enables us to 
understand that he was acting under pressure, that he did not calmly come to the decision to 
sign it, and that our attitude toward the individual ought to be less severe than it might have 
otherwise been. 
The mode of explanation that cites mental causes is autonomous with respect to the mode of 
explanation that cites physical causes, and its autonomy is to be understood in the same way 
as the autonomy of the rationalising mode of explanation.2 Mental states can be granted 
causal efficacy without having to be realised in physical states, since their causal efficacy is to 
be understood in terms of the way in which they figure in our explanations of the indwidual’s 
actions. Explanations of the individual’s actions whch reveal them to have been performed 
under certain circumstances, such as those mentioned above, can be legitimately described as 
causal explanations. Mental causes can be said to make a difference to the individual’s 
behaviour, or simply to his current thoughts, without implicating the explanatory resources of 
the physical sciences, and the differences that mental causes make are manifest in the 
mentalistic explanation given. That an individual ’s thoughts are construed as mental causes is 
registered by the way in whch they figure in our explanations, as excusing the individual’s 
sudden decision to act as he did, as acknowledging hs diminished responsibility, as 
explaining how he suddenly came to be thrnking about a girl he once met in Vienna when he 
started off tfunlung about how quickly the flowers had wilted in the garden, as describing 
what was going on in his mind that led up to and issued in his action, and so on, and so forth. 
The important point here is that our concept of mental causation does not implicate the 
explanatory resources of the physical sciences, since the explanatory work required of this 
concept is successfully carried out whlst remaining within the network of explanations 
appropriate to the mental domain itself. It is only on the assumption that mentalistic and 
physicalistic causal explanations explain the very same thing, namely, the individual’s bodily 
movements, that we need to assume that mental states and events are identical with physical 
states and events; and it is only if we make this assumption that we are forced to argue that 
the explanatory work required of the concept of mental causation cannot be carried out 
without drawing on the explanatory resources of the physical sciences. But if it is correct to 
~ ~ 
As Wolgast (1998: 30-3 1 )  correctly points out, there is a difference between understanding the causal 
processes responsible for bringing about bodily movements, and understanding mental causes, since the 
latter requires our p ersomlunderstanding and experience of human nature, whereas the former does 
not, and the mental causes characterise the individual’s actions, whereas the physical processes do not. 
2 
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say that the concept of mental causation meets our explanatory requirements within the 
network of human relationshps, and if it is correct to say that our interest in talkmg about 
mental causes differs from our interest in tallung about the physical causation of an 
individual’s bodily movements, then we can say that mental causation is in this sense 
autonomous with respect to physical causation. 
6.Conclusion 
Understanding others as rational agents is a matter of understanding their actions as being 
responses to the reasons presented to them in different situations. Although the actions that 
individuals perform are not in every case actions which are partly constitutive of their 
involvement in some human relationship, it seems to me that their responsiveness to reasons 
cannot be completely separated from their responsiveness to the demands of human 
relationships. Understanding others as physical beings, on the other hand, is a matter of 
understanding their behaviour as subject to determination from neurobiological states and 
events. But whlst it is certamly correct to state that there are natural causal relations of some 
sort between the mental and the physical domains, it does not seem obvious that both modes 
of understanding must take as their common subject matter internal behaviour-causing states 
and events. This only becomes obvious when both modes of understanding are forcibly 
merged together in a manner appropriate to capturing the sense in which the physicalist’s 
explanatory resources are all encompassing. But it does not follow from the fact that there are 
such natural relations between the mental and the physical domains that the physicalist’s 
explanatory resources must be able to tie down the mental domain in the manner required. 
The problem is that once the priority of the physical is assumed, and once the explanatory 
resources of the physical sciences have been extended beyond their own proper domain, there 
no longer seems to be any room left for an autonomous mental domain. The only solution is 
to think of the mental as somehow identical with, or realised by, the physical, so that mental 
states and events can be granted the causal powers they seem to have been denied, thereby 
allowing them to make some causal difference in the physical world. For unless mental states 
and events are conceived in h s  manner, the concern is that they cannot be explanatory of an 
individual’s behaviour. So it seems that the only way to secure the effectiveness of our 
mentalistic explanations, once the metaphysics of physicalism have been assumed, is in fact 
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to compromise their full autonomy by insisting that they can meet the demands made of them 
only if they are underwritten by the explanatory resources of the physical sciences. 
But rather than grantmg causal powers to the mental domain, it seems to me that once the 
completeness of the physical sciences has been accepted, and once mental events are 
identified with physical events, there seems to be no warrant to grant autonomous causal 
powers to the mental. The causal powers granted to the mental turn out to be completely 
derived fiom the causal powers of the physical, leaving mental properties with no causal 
work to do. The upshot of h s  is that not only has the mental domain been denied its 
autonomy, but that the mentalistic explanations we employ on an everyday basis seem to 
have been deprived of their effectiveness. It seemed at first that mentalistic explanations had 
to be merged with physicalistic explanations in order to ensure that mentalistic explanations 
could meet the demands made of them; but what has actually happened, or so I have been 
arguing, is that the merging of our explanatory resources in this manner has resulted in 
mentalistic explanations having no genuine explanatory role to play at all. 
I have been arguing that the explanatory resources appropriate to understanding others as 
rational agents do not have to draw on the explanatory resources of the physical sciences in 
order to successfully meet the everyday requirements we have of them, since what they 
explain is the individual’s responsiveness to the demands of the situations in which he finds 
himself, and they can do this without relying on support fiom the explanatory resources of 
the physical sciences. Certainly, the individual’s capacity to act for reasons causally 
presupposes that there are underlying physical processes bringing about changes in his bodily 
movements; but the mentalistic explanations we make of the individual are not geared toward 
rationalising his behaviour by citing the mental states and events that causally explain it. It 
seems to me that mentalistic explanations do not require a built-in causal component in the 
way that only becomes necessary once mental states and events are identified with physical 
states and events. Instead, mentalistic explanations are rather geared toward rationalising an 
individual’s behaviour by allowing us, in a large number of cases, to see his actions as partly 
constitutive of his involvement in certain of his relationshps. But again, not all actions will 
be of this type, since we perform actions when we are on our own whch are not obviously 
tied to our involvement with other people, as when we go for a walk to relax or keep fit, or 
when we sing a song or whistle a tune just for the sake of it; and we can readily agree that 
ce- individuals, those seelung absolute solitude for the purpose of mdtation, or those 
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unable to cope with the pressures of modern society, may have completely withdrawn from 
their involvement in relationshps with other people altogether. So in certain cases, 
understanding others might not be a matter of seeing their actions as partly constitutive of 
their involvement in some relationship; but this does not affect the point that what is at issue 
is our personal understanding, that we draw on our experience of human nature, and that the 
mentalistic explanations thus appealed to can work successfully without implicating the 
explanatory resources of the physical sciences. 
The pivotal point in the causal account I have been concerned with seems to be the 
assumption that mentalistic and physicalistic explanations take a common subject matter, that 
the subject matter picked out by mentalistic explanations is the very Same as the subject 
matter that is picked out by physicalistic explanations, with the only difference being the 
manner in whch this happens. This assumption is motivated by the acceptance of the 
metaphysical framework of physicalism, whch forces us to find a means of grounding the 
mental in the physical structure of the world. The fear is that unless mental properties can be 
shown to be realised by physical properhes, unless mental states and events can be shown to 
be identical with physical states and events, and so on, the mental domain will represent a 
break down in the completeness of the physical sciences. Everything which exists is physical, 
and as such everything which occurs can be given a complete and deterministic explanation 
by means of the explanatory resources of the physical sciences. But unless the mental is 
somehow integrated into this deterministic network, it would have to be admttted that the 
explanatory resources of the physical sciences could not explain everythmg which exists. It is 
the need to make good the principles of physicalism that motivates the conception of the 
mental as identical with the physical, and it is this conception that prevents us from 
appreciating the deeper extent of the autonomy of the mental. That extent can only be 
appreciated by acknowledging that the explanatory resources of the mental domain can work 
successfully and completely without implicating the explanatory resources of the physical 
domain. 
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Chapter 6: Thoughts Externalised 
LIntroduc tion 
Externalism is the view that what an indwidual thlnks is subject to determination fiom factors 
that lie outside the physical boundanes of the indwidual’s own body. W c h  factors are 
considered to be relevant seems to depend very much on wluch factors figure prominently in 
one’s account of the indwidual ’s relationshp to hs environment and to the other people with 
whom he lives hs life. An account of the individual’s relation to his environment in terms of 
the brute causal relations that obtain between h m  and the objects and events whch he 
experiences will tend to hold that it is the nature of the physical environment that determines 
the content of hs thoughts. An account of the individual’s relation to hls environment in 
terms of hs parhcipation in a linguistic community will tend to hold that it is the meaning of 
the terms in the linguistic community that determines the content of his thoughts. Which 
factors are relevant to the determination of an indwidual’s thoughts is important. It not only 
has a bearing on the account that one can gve of the indwidual’s understandmg of hs own 
thoughts, it also has a bearing on the account that one is able to give of the explanations 
employed in understandmg other individuals as rational agents. 
That thoughts are individuated externalistically can be used to put pressure on the assumption 
that mental states and events are identical with internal physical states and events of the 
individual ’s body. The externalistic individuation of thought complicates matters by pointing 
out that what an indwidual thinks can be said to be dependent on factors external to hs body, 
whch arguably makes it hfficult for the physicalist to defend the identity claim. Yet it is 
important for the consistency of hs position that he can do so, since the identity claim seems 
to be required withm hs metaphysical framework to make sense of the fact that what an 
individual thurks and believes is causally relevant to what he does. l h s  presupposes that the 
individual’s mental states and events are identical with the internal behaviour-causing states 
or events whch fall withm the field of the physical sciences. The aim of thls chapter is 
therefore to work out an account of the dependence of thought on the indwidual’s 
surroundings that will put pressure on the identity claim, and hence provide support for the 
argument of the previous chapter. I will begin by considering whether the versions of 
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externalism set out by Putnam and Burge respectively are suitable models for the position 
that I have been tryrng to develop, and I will then consider some of the options open to the 
physicalist to reconcile the externalistic indwiduation of thoughts with the identity claim. I 
will conclude with some observations on the problem of reconciling the externalistic 
individuation of thoughts with self-knowledge. 
2.The externalistic individuation of thoughts 
2. I a. Putnam k Twin Earth 
Putnam (1975~) asks us to suppose that there is a planet called twin earth where the seas, 
rivers and lakes are filled with a substance which superficially resembles water, but whose 
chemical structure is XYZ, rather than H20. The word ’water ’ is used on earth to refer to the 
substance whose chemical structure is H20, whereas on twin earth it is used to refer to the 
substance whose chemical structure is XYZ. Suppose that Oscar is an inhabitant of earth, who 
has a molecule for molecule identical twin on twin earth, and who says h g s  like ‘I thlnk 
there is some water two miles along the track ’, and ‘I would ldce a glass of water ’. Suppose 
also that Oscar expresses h s  thoughts and desires using the same words that his twin on twin 
earth uses to express hs thoughts and desires. Putnam argues that an individual can only have 
the thought that there is a glass of water in front of hm, if in actual fact he has the capacity to 
refer to water, which is that substance with the chemical structure H20. Th~s seems 
unobjectionable; but the consequence of accepting th~s point is that we are forced to deny that 
Oscar and hs twin can be having the same thoughts when they are staring at the glass of 
water in front of them, despite the fact that they are indiscernible in all internal physical and 
p sy chologcal respects. 
Putnam’s point is that having thoughts about water presupposes having the capacity to refer 
to water, but that having the capacity to refer to water presupposes that one is standing in 
some direct or indirect causal relation to that substance which has the chemical structure 
H20. The actual chemical structure of the substance referred to is argued to be relevant to 
fixing the meaning of the word ’water’, so it appears to follow that Oscar and hs twin are 
having different thoughts as a result of the physical differences in their respective 
environments. The statement, ‘Oscar thinks that there is a glass of water in fi-ont of hm’, is 
therefore not just a statement about what is going on inside Oscar’s head, but is in part a 
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statement about the nature of the environment that he mhabits. In order to deal with the 
differences in content, whch arise as a consequence of the hfferences in the physical 
environment, Putnam draws a distinction between psychologml states in a wide sense, and 
psychologcal states in a narrow sense (1975~: 220). 
Oscar’s thought that there is a glass of water in fi-ont of lum is a psychological state in the 
wide sense. Oscar can only be said to have such a thought if has the capacity to refer to that 
substance whose chemical structure is H20, and h s  presupposes that Oscar is standing in 
some direct or indirect causal relation to that substance in his environment. Oscar’s twin 
cannot be said to have the same thought, since he cannot be said to have the capacity to refer 
to that substance whose chemical structure is H20. It might be said that Oscar and hs twin 
are in the same psychologcal state in the narrow sense in that they are molecule for molecule 
identical, and furthermore, Oscar and his twin would probably behave in much the same way 
whenever they had the thoughts expressed by the words ‘there is a glass of water in fi-ont of 
me ’, or ‘there is some water two miles along the track ’. But Oscar and hs twin cannot be said 
to be in the same psychological state in the wide sense. Oscar’s twin did not acquire hs 
concepts in an environment in whch the word ’water’ refers to H20, so he does not have the 
capacity to refer to that substance whch Oscar refers to in expressing his thoughts and beliefs 
about water. The upshot of Putnam’s ban earth thought experiment is that whch thoughts an 
individual can be said to have seems to be dependent on the nature of his physical 
environment, and on the nature of the causal-hstorical relationshp that he bears to hs 
environment. 
2. I b. Burge b Counte factual Linguistic Communities 
Burge (1 979) asks us to suppose that a patient, Bert, visits hs doctor with the complaint that 
hs h t i s  has spread to his thigh. The doctor assures Bert that arthrrtis is a disease which 
can only affect the joints, so whatever is causing the discomfort, it cannot be h t i s .  Burge 
argues that individuals use such terms deferentially to the experts in their linguistic 
community, and because of h s  Bert is prepared to take the doctor’s word for it. Burge then 
asks us to suppose that there is a counterf‘actual situation in whch Bert’s internal physical 
properties remain fixed, but in whch there is a difference in the use of the term ‘arthritis’. In 
the counterfactual situation, the term is used by the experts to refer to a d~sease which is not 
restricted to the joints. In both the actual, and in the counterfactual linguistic community, Bert 
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has the thought expressed by the words, ‘my arthritis has spread to my thlgh’. But despite the 
hct that Bert’s internal physical properties are held constant, the thought which Bert 
expresses in the actual linguistic community will be drfferent from the thought wluch Bert 
expresses in the counterfactual linguistic community. 
Burge suggests that although we would be prepared to attribute a false belief about arthrrtis to 
Bert in the actual linguistic community, we would simply not attribute a belief about what we 
call ‘arthr~tis’ to Bert in the counterfactual community. Burge insists that it is an important 
part in his argument that we commonly attribute thoughts to individuals despite their lacking 
a complete mastery of some notion in the content of their thoughts, which we can do only 
because we know that the individual uses hs concepts deferentially to the experts in his 
linguistic community. Burge’s conclusion is that a difference in an individual’s linguistic 
community will be enough to constitute a drfference in the content of lus thoughts, even if 
there is no difference in the individual’s internal physical and psychological properties. f i s  
clearly requires that we accept the claim that what an individual means by hrs words is what 
the words mean in hs linguistic community, otherwise there will be no reason for sayng that 
Bert’s thoughts differed solely in virtue of the difference in the linguistic community to 
whch he belonged. So the upshot of Burge’s thought experiment is that which thoughts an 
individual can be said to have seems to be dependent on the nature of hts linguistic 
community, and on the nature of the causal-lustorical relation that he bears to lus community. 
2.2.Strengthening The Arguments By Weakening Them 
It would be nice if I could let matters rest with Putnam and Burge, but I am inclined to 
suspect that the arguments they advance in support of the externalistic individuation of 
thoughts are questionable. Or at any rate, they are not suitable models for the position that I 
have been trying to develop. The central problem with these arguments is that their attempt to 
motivate externalism seems to compromise the individual ’s awareness of certain aspects of 
€us own thoughts. There is something not quite right about attributing thoughts to indwiduals 
who do not fully understand the implications of having them, unless it is clear fiom the start 
that the thoughts have been appropriately qualified to take this into account. f i s  is 
particularly evident with regard to Putnam’s version of externalism, wluch is very much 
weakened by his failure to appreciate the significance of the agreement there would most 
hkely have been between Oscar and lus twin, if they had been asked what they were thmlung 
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about. Putnam’s position rests on the assumption that the meaning of the word ’water’ 
depends on the nature ofthe physical environment in whch it was learned. If thrs is correct, it 
will have a bearing on the content of the thoughts attributed to inhabitants of different 
physical environments. Oscar and hrs twin will necessarily express &fferent thoughts, even 
though they appear not to. But as Glock and Preston (1995: 5 19) point out, Putnam ’s 
arguments distort the conceptual connection between meaning on the one hand, and 
explanations of meaning on the other. Just as the meaning of a word cannot be severed from 
an explanation of its meaning, what an individual means when he is using a word cannot be 
severed from the explanation that he gives of its meaning. So if Oscar and hs twin were to 
agree in the explanations they gave of their thoughts, it should follow that both Oscar and his 
twin were thinlung the same thoughts when they claimed to be hrsty. The hfference in the 
chemical structure of water on their different planets would make no difference to what they 
were thdung, unless they indicated their awareness of this difference in the explanations they 
gave. 
Similarly, the problem with Burge’s position is that it over-estimates the extent to whch the 
inhvidual ’s participation in hs linguistic community is relevant to what he means. Or rather, 
Burge seems to have failed to allow sufficient scope for the indwidual to &verge from the 
linguistic community in particular situations, such as Bert’s visit to the doctor. In these cases, 
we are more inclined to gve credence to what the individual tells us he is tlmhng, rather 
than what the experts in his linguistic community dictate that he is thmlung. Bert is said to be 
dunlung about arthritis only because we attribute to him h s  concept despite hs incomplete 
understandmg of it, but in so doing we would be inclined to qual@ thrs attribution by saying 
that Bert does not know that arthntis can only affect the joints. What we are inclined to say 
about Bert falls short of what we are inclined to say about the experts who have a more 
complete understanding; so in t lus respect, it looks as if considering Bert in the counterfactual 
situation cannot really force us to attribute different thoughts to him, despite the fact that the 
meaning of the word ‘arthntis’ is somewhat different. Unless Bert were to offer different 
explanations of what he was thrnking in the different situations, we would not be inclined to 
attribute different thoughts to h, regardless of the different meanings of the terms in hs 
linguistic community. 
What needs to be worked out here is a way of malung the point that what an indwidual th inks 
can be dependent on factors external to his body, without creating the kind of tension found 
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in Putnam and Burge. It seems to me that the most plausible way to make this point is to 
recognise the extent to which an individual’s possession of hs conceptual skills is dependent 
on hs involvement with other people, whlst at the same time refusing to credrt the indwidual 
with conceptions of hs situation whch are too sophsticated to cohere with hs actual 
competence in exercising hs slulls. This will secure the dependence of thought on factors 
outside the individual’s body, but it will do it in such a way as to ensure that what the 
individual thmks is not dependent on factors of whch he might be ignorant. So although 
Burge is correct to insist that the individual can only be said to have his conceptual skills 
through participating in a particular linguistic community, our attributions of thoughts to 
certain individuals must be qualified in order to avoid seeming to credit them with an 
awareness of factors of whch they are in fact ignorant. 
Here is my own example. Suppose that an individual picks up hs car from the garage after 
having it serviced. His invoice details that lus sump has a hair-line fracture in it, although it 
has not been attended to as part of the service agreement. It would be rather misleadmg to 
attribute the thought that the sump is fractured to the individual, without qualifLing it in the 
appropriate manner, if he then set out from the garage on a lengthy journey without talung 
extra oil along with ’twn. Not quali@ing thls attribution would seem to credit the indwidual 
with an awareness of the implications that the fractured sump has for the lubrication of hs 
engine, whilst hs subsequent behaviour would seem to indicate that he did not fully 
understand what it means to have a fractured sump. The point is that what an individual can 
be said to thmk must be constrained by hs level of conceptual competence as it is displayed 
in the various ways in whch he would respond to the demands of the situation in whch he 
finds h s e l f ,  for in attributing thoughts to individuals we are expressing an interest in the 
extent to whch they are responsive to these demands. Here we are interested in the extent to 
whch the fractured sump figures in the inlvidual’s &dung as presenting h m  with a reason 
for talung the appropriate precautionary measures to prevent hs engine seizing up. An 
individual who claims to have the thought that his sump is fractured is expected to display an 
awareness of the implications that it has for the performance of the engine; but if the 
individual fails to take any of the precautionary measures that would normally be expected in 
such a case, what he can be said to thmk would have to be qualified accordingly. 
It now looks as if the argument can be strengthened in such a way as to keep the externalist’s 
central intuition in place, without compromising the individual’s own understandmg of hs 
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thoughts. Th~s might be achieved through appealing to what McDowell (1986) refers to as 
object-dependent thoughts. Object-dependent thoughts are thoughts which are expressed 
through the use of demonstratives, whch set up a logical connection between these thoughts 
and the objects they are about. The thought expressed by the words ‘that cat is about to jump 
onto the table’, is an object-dependent thought; it is logically connected to the cat itself, in 
such a way that the individual would not have been able to have precisely that thought if the 
cat had not been there. Presumably, the individual’s internal physical properties could be held 
constant whilst he is considered in a counterfactual situation in whch there is no cat present. 
In the counterfactual situation, the individual cannot be said to have this Same thought, since 
the thought is logically tied to the cat itself; so it follows that whether or not the individual 
has this thought about the cat is determined independently of determining whether he has the 
same internal physical properties in these cfifferent situations. It does not make any cfifference 
whether he has the same internal physical properties or not; what makes the difference is the 
presence of the cat. 
Th~s eems to be a strilung illustration of the way in whch thoughts are dependent on factors 
external to the individual, to the extent that their alleged dependence on the individual’s 
internal physical properties is compromised, but whch does not force us to attribute thoughts 
to individuals that outstrip their actual level of conceptual competence. It is crucial to realise 
that object-dependent thoughts are intrinsically related to the objects they are about, in that 
the object itself is said to figure as a constituent in the individual’s thoughts; yet at the Same 
time, object-dependent thoughts are nonetheless individuated according to the individual ’s 
conception of these objects, rather than by the perhaps unknown properties of the objects 
themselves. What the individual hnks  when he has the thought that that cat is about to jump 
onto the table is individuated according to the individual’s own conception of the cat, since 
the cat itself can only be said to figure in the individual’s thoughts in the first place, if it can 
do so in such a way as to respect the individual’s level of conceptual competence. This Same 
point can be extended to cover non-demonstrative cases: the fractured sump can be said to 
figure in the individual’s thoughts as presenting him with a reason for talung extra oil on h s  
j ourney. Again, if h s  is the case, the individual must understand the implications of having a 
fiactured sump for the lubrication of the engine. For although the fractured sump itself can be 
said to figure in the indwidual’s thoughts as presenting him with a reason for acting to avoid 
engine seizure, it cannot do so in such a way as to outstrip his actual level of conceptual 
competence. But if it is correct to say that objects can figure constitutively in an individual ’s 
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tiunlung, in these cases presenting h m  with a reason for acting in a certain way,’ then the 
externalistic individuation of thoughts can be said to undermine the important physicalist 
assumption that an individual’s mental states and events are identical with physical states and 
events of his brain. 
2.3.An Objection To Object-Dependency 
Noonan (1993) disagrees that object-dependent thoughts pose such a problem for the identity 
claim. By Noonan’s lights, the dependency whch appears to threaten the identity claim is 
only superficial; it is not to be taken as sigmfjring the non-internality of the mental in the 
stronger sense that I am looking for. Instead, object dependent thoughts should more properly 
be construed as complexes, consisting of internal psychological states plus contingently 
existing external factors, and as such the dependency in these thoughts should not be taken to 
suggest the non-internality of psychological states and events. The crux of Noonan’s 
objection is that so-called object dependent thoughts are redundant in the explanation of an 
individual’s actions, and h s  makes it reasonable to suppose that they are not, properly 
speaking, psycho1ogm.l states. Here is why. Suppose, first, that an individual kicks the cat, 
and that the individual ’s action is explained by citing the object dependent thought, ‘he h k s  
that that cat is about to attack him’. Now suppose a counterfactual case in which everything 
remains unchanged apart fiom the fact that the individual is hallucinating the cat, and that he 
lashes out into thin air. The individual cannot be credited with having the object dependent 
thought in the hallucinatory case, for the simple reason that the non-existence of the cat is 
sufficient to defeat this ascription, yet the individual’s behaviour is identical in both cases. 
But since the individual’s behaviour is identical in both cases, and since the object dependent 
thought cannot be attributed to the individual in the hallucinatory case, it seems to follow that 
the individual’s behaviour can be adequately explained in each case without having to cite 
any object dependent thoughts at all. The content of the individual’s psychologcal states in 
the hallucinatory case represents a proper subset of the content of hs psychologd states in 
the veridical case, and it looks as if that subset is suficient to explain the individual’s 
behaviour in both. On these grounds, Noonan suggests that object dependent thoughts are in 
~~ 
’ In saymg that objects figure constitutively in our thinking as presenting us with reasons for acting, I 
do not intend to imply that this is the only way in which objects can figure in our thinking. Unless we 
are ignorant of the sump’s function, the fractured sump at the same time figures in our thinking as the 
cause of engine seizure, and the cat which figures in our thinking as a reason for removing the bottle of 
milk fiom the table at the same time figures in our thinking as the cause of the smashed bottle of milk 
the day before. 
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fact redundant in any adequate psychological explanation of an indwidual’s behaviour, and 
that object dependent thoughts should rather be construed as complexes: 
if a subset of (so-called) psychological states is demonstrated to be redundant in the psychological 
explanation of action, this is surely reason to regard them as not, properly speakmg, psychological 
states at all (like knowledge, which is best regarded not as a psychological state, but as a complex 
consisting of a psychological state (belief) plus certain external factors- not because its status as 
knowledge is causally irrelevant in action explanation, but because it does not have to be cited, as such, 
in the psychological explanation of action at all). (1993: 291-2). 
The problem with tlus objection is that it trades on the idea that the explanation of the 
individual ’s actions will be the same in both cases, whch I doubt. In the hallucinatory case, 
we would cite the individual’s thought that that cat is about to attack him; but the explanation 
would be misleading and incomplete, unless we expanded on it by saying that he was 
hallucinating. Or in other words, we would not have given an adequate explanation of the 
individual’s behaviour if we simply said that he thinks that that cat is about to attack him; we 
would rather say that he is having a hallucination of a cat that is about to attack him. But no 
such incompleteness affects the explanation in the veridical case, since citing this thought 
without qualification is sufficient to explain why the inhvidual is acting as he is. To the 
individual, there is perhaps no difference in each case, but the difference in the external 
circumstances is registered in the different explanations we would give of his behaviour. 
Noonan’s objection is based on the assumption that the content of the individual’s 
psychological states in the hallucinatory case represents a subset of the content of hls states in 
the veridical case. But if this is to show that the ‘extra’ content in the veridical case is 
redundant in our explanation of the individual’s behaviour, it would have to be the case that 
the explanations were identical. It seems to me that this is not so, given that the non-existence 
of the cat in the hallucinatory case would be a relevant factor in our explanation of the 
individual’s lashing into thm air. It may be that his bodily movements can be explained in the 
Same way in both cases, and it may be that the individual would explain why he was acting as 
he was in the same way in both cases, but that does not mean that we would explain why he 
was acting as he was in the Same way in both cases. As such, it seems to me that Noonan’s 
argument is inconclusive. It seems to me that there are reasonable grounds for saying that the 
externahstic indniduation of thoughts is incompatible with the identity claim, more so if we 
can make use of the idea of object dependency. For this idea implies that the individual’s 
thmlung is a unitary act wluch incorporates the object constitutively, whch is to say that his 
tlunlung about the cat cannot be identical with events in hs brain. But before concluding that 
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the externalistic inlviduation of thoughts is not compatible with the identity claim, it is 
worth noticing that there are a number of arguments designed to establish their compatibility, 
to which I now turn. 
3.Reconciling externalism with the identity claim 
3. I. The Dual Component Theory 
One way of reconchg externalism with the identity claim is to exploit Putnam’s lstinction 
between psychological states in a wide sense and psychological states in a narrow sense. The 
externalistic inlviduation of thoughts forces us to recognise that there is a method of 
individuation whch leads to the attribution of thoughts to individuals on the basis of the 
relations in whch they stand to their environment. The availability of th~s method of 
individuation seems to compromise the principle that mental states and events are identical 
with physical states and events in an individual ’s brain, and the principle that indiscernibility 
with respect to physical properties guarantees indiscernibility with respect to mental 
properties. The externalistic individuation of thoughts ought to force us to abandon these 
principles, since there is no longer a guarantee that any two individuals who are alike in all 
physical respects will be alike in all mental respects. But if there is an alternative method of 
individuation available, whch respects the physicalist ’s principles, and whch can co-exist 
with the externalistic method of inlviduation, it looks as if externalism will be reconcilable 
with the identity claim after all. 
Fodor (1992) argues that the twin earth thought experiments simply serve to hghlight the 
applicability of two different methods of inlviduation to indwiduals, by hghhghting the fact 
that our attributions of thoughts to individuals are likely to come into conflict according as 
we focus on one method of individuation rather than the other.2 Fodor’s suggestion seems to 
be that the different methods of individuation generate conflicting attributions of thoughts, 
but that the mere possibility of such a conflict poses no threat to physidsm. It simply 
underlines the fact that if we adopt a method of individuation which attributes thoughts on the 
In fact, Fodor (1992: 666) thinks that it is unlikely that we can have a method of individuation which 
bases its attributions of thoughts on an individual’s relations to his environment. Although he does not 
deny that there are such relations, he is keen to emphasise that we cannot make a science out of them. 
He thinks that we are only ever likely to have a method of individuation which bases its attributions on 
the individual’s internal physical properties, in such a way as to respect the supervenience thesis, Since 
it is only these properties which will turn out to be generalisable in a science of psychology. 
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basis of the individual’s relations to hs environment, there will be the risk that the thoughts 
attributed in this manner might not be the thoughts that would have been attributed to him on 
the basis of hs internal physical properties. Fodor’s idea is that since it is only thoughts 
attributed on the basis of the latter properties whch figure in our psychological theories, or in 
our rationalising explanations, it is only psychological states in a narrow sense which are 
relevant to the explanation of an individual’s behaviour in terms of what he h n k s  and 
believes; it is only psychological states in a narrow sense which tell us what the individual 
had in mind, and it is what the individual had in mind that caused his behaviour (1992: 659). 
I f  Fodor is right, the availability of an externalistic method of individuation need not 
compromise the physicalist’s identity claim. We are only forced to see that the psychologist 
is obliged to adopt that method of individuation which picks out psychological states 
accordmg to hs interests in causally explaining an individual’s behaviour, and that he must 
therefore adopt that method of individuation which permits the attribution of thoughts on the 
basis of the individual’s internal physical or neurological properties. Thrs means that Oscar 
and h s  twin must be considered to be in the same psychological state in so far as our interest 
in attributing thoughts to them is to explain their identical behaviour of reaching for the glass 
of water in front of them. The psychologist must therefore restnct his investigative domain in 
such a way that only psychological states in the narrow sense will be allowed to figure in hs 
generalisations, and h s  restriction is effected by adopting the method of individuation which 
attributes psychological states on the basis of the individual’s internal physical properties. 
This restriction will then successfully avert the threat which the thought experiment appeared 
to generate, for there is now no reason to insist that the psychological states which figure in 
rationalising explanations cannot be identical with those physical or neurological states that 
causally explain the individual ’s behaviour. 
Colin McGinn (1 982) also defends this response to the problems posed by the externalistic 
inhviduation of thoughts, by pointing out that psychological states have two separable 
components, which correspond more or less to Putnam’s wide and narrow states. 
Psychological states have a cognitive component, which is relevant to the rationalising 
explanations we give of an individual’s behaviour, and a referential component, which is 
relevant only in so far as we are interested in these states as representations of some features 
of the individual ’s environment. McGinn ’s suggestion is that the cognitive components of our 
psychological states are characterised by the properties whch are constitutive of their causal 
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role, whereas the referential components are characterised by those properhes which are 
constitutive of their tmth-con&tional relations to features in the inlvidual’s environment 
whch they represent. With respect to the twin earth thought experiment, McGinn’s 
suggestion is that the reason we get conflicting standards of individuation, according as we 
concentrate on the cogmtive or referential component of psychological states, is ths: content 
is a hybrid of conceptually disparate elements, both of which inform our concept of thought 
and belief, but dependmg on what our interests are, we tend to let one component of content 
eclipse the other. Conflict is only natural therefore, given that our psycho1ogca.l states have 
h s  dual nature; and it is only with respect to their cogmtive component, which is causally 
explanatory of an indwidual ’s behaviour, that psychological states need be regarded as falling 
under the physicalist ’s principles ( 1982: 2 14-2 16). 
The dual component theory of thought might appear to explain the conflict whch the twin 
earth thought experiments bring to light, and it might appear to offer a reason for denying 
that externalism poses a serious threat to the identity claim; so, it might also appear that the 
dual component theory of thought rescues the possibility of identifjrlng mental and physical 
states and events, and hence of giving a causal account of rationalising explanations. But it 
seems to me that the dual component theory only looks to be successfbl because it feeds on a 
particular weakness in the original argument that Putnam put forward. The twin earth thought 
experiment seemed to demand a way of insulating an aspect of Oscar and hs twin’s thoughts 
from the environmental factors which were said to be relevant to the indwiduation of their 
content. It is only in terms of such an insulated aspect of their thoughts that we would have 
been able to rationalise their identical behaviour in the Same way, despite the fact that the 
externalistic method of indwiduation forced us to adrmt that Oscar and his twin were hnking 
dfferent thoughts. The dual component view appears to secure this insulated aspect by 
postulating a separable cognitive component, which not only explains why the twins acted in 
the same way gven its immunity to the environmental factors which the externalistic method 
of individuation emphasises, but which is at the same time suitable for identification with an 
internal physical or neurologcal state of their brain. But despite its apparent attractions for 
the physicalist’s identity claim, it is questionable whether the dual component theory of 
thought actually makes much sense. 
The first thing to note is that there does not seem to be anythng positive that can be said 
about the separable cognitive component of these dual component states, other than the fact 
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that they play a causal explanatory role with respect to the individual’s behaviour. The 
internal cognitive component is supposed to be that component which is cited in rationalising 
explanations of the individual’s behaviour, but given that it is also supposed to be non- 
semantically characterised, it is difficult to see how it can be a cognitive component at all. 
Presumably, if anydung is to count as a cogmtive component of a psychological state, it must 
be possible to specifL what that component is supposed to be cogmtive of; but in the dual 
component theory, the component whch purports to fill this cognitive role is said to be 
devoid of those properties which are constitutive of its referential relations to the indwidual ’s 
environment. So what seems to underlie thts attempted reconciliation of externalism with 
physicalism is the assumption that we can separate an individual’s cognitions, whch figure in 
rationalising explanations of h s  behaviour, from the fact that they are cognitions of the 
individual’s environment, in whch he is so behaving? 
Fodor and McGinn are both clearly right to insist that it is what the individual has in mind 
that explains hs behaviour, but there is no good reason to suppose that what a person has in 
mind must be an insulated component of a psychological state, other than the fact that it 
provides the physicalist with an internal component that can be identified with a physical 
state of the brain. There seems to be a slippage here, whch the physicalist’s terminology 
might have encouraged, between what an individual has in mind, in the sense of what he is 
thmlung about, and what he has in mind, in the sense of the physical state of hs brain which 
is causally explanatory of hs bodily movements. l k s  slippage is crucial to the reconciliation 
of the externalistic individuation of thoughts with their causal explanatory role. But it can 
easily be seen to be suspect, if we refuse to agree with the particular way in which Putnam 
sets out hs externalistic intuitions in the first place. There is no need to insulate a cognitive 
component of thoughts in order to explain why the twin’s behaviour was identical. There is a 
sense in whch their thoughts are already insulated from the differences in their 
environments, if the different chemical structures simply do not figure in the explanations 
they would give of what they are thdung. a s  is precisely where Putnam’s argument seems 
to go wrong. If it is correct to say that what an individual thinks is exhaustible w i h  the 
explanations he might give whenever he is asked, then it is incorrect to say that what an 
individual hnks  can be partly fixed by the unknown chemical structure of the physical 
environment he mhabits. The chemical structure of the substances in hs environment makes 
McDowell(l986: 160), captures this point quite nicely: “It is impossible not to be concerned about 
the boundary around the internal component of the two-component picture, and the darkness within it, 
if one is concerned at all about the relation between subjectivity and the objective world.” 
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no dfference to what the individual u s ,  unless it figures somewhere in his conception of 
the situation; and since it is how the individual conceives the situation that determines how he 
will act, there is no reason to make the problematic bifurcatory move that Fodor and McGinn 
make in response to externalism. 
3.2. Events And Their Descriptions 
The central lfficulty that the physicalist faces is that of reconcihg the object dependency in 
certain types of thoughts with the identity claim. That objects can be said to figure 
constitutively in an individual’s thdung presents the problem of explaining why the mental 
event of thdung that the sump is fiactured can be partly constituted by the fractured sump 
itself, whereas the physical events occurring in the individual’s brain at the same time cannot 
be said to be so constituted. The implication of a h t t i n g  that objects can figure 
constitutively in an individual’s thdung seems to be that the identity thesis has to be rejected, 
since there can be no plausible means of explaining how the physical events in the brain, with 
whch ths mental event is to be identified, can have the fiactured sump as a constitutent part. 
No doubt &IS problem could have been dealt with by the dual component theory of thought, 
but I have already found reason to reject that approach. There is, however, an alternative way 
of dealing with tlus problem, which is simply to deny that the implication of a h t t i n g  that 
objects can figure constitutively in an individual’s thoughts is that the identity claim has to be 
rejected. a s  move attempts to reconcile the fact that certain thoughts are individuated in 
terms of external objects, with the fact that they are nonetheless identical with physical events 
whch are not so identified, by talung advantage of the distinction between events and their 
descriptions. 
Davidson (1 994: 58-9) attempts to effect thrs reconcili&on by comparing mental events and 
states to the state of being sunburned. Sunburn is a state whch is individuated by its causal 
relations to the sun, an object whch is external to the sunburned patch of skm itself. But h s  
does not mean that sunburn cannot be identical with a physical state of the slun, just because 
it is identified as the type of burn it is in terms of its causal relations to an object outside the 
boundanes of that patch of skin itself. In the same way, mental events are indwiduated in 
terms of their causal relations to the objects and events that they are about, but this does not 
mean that mental events cannot be identical with physical events in the body. Th~s apparently 
shows that there is no obstacle to holdmg that mental events can be identical with physical 
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events in the body and that mental events are individuated in terms of an inlvidual’s causal- 
hstorical relations to hs environment; for although physical states and events in the brain do 
not themselves presuppose the existence of external objects, the physicalist could easily agree 
that some of their descriptions might. The point could be put by saying that even if some 
mental events are logically related to the external objects they are about, it does not follow 
that these mental events cannot be identical with certain physical events in the individual’s 
brain. For although the physical events in the individual’s brain cannot be said to be logically 
related to such external objects, the physicalist could easily reply that the logcal relation in 
question need only be admitted to hold between certain descriptions of these events and 
objects, as opposed to between the events and the objects themselves. So there is simply no 
entailment fi-om the claim that mental events are individuated in terms of external objects to 
the claim that mental events cannot be identical with physical events in the brain. 
The problem I have with the sunburn analogy is that, whdst it is correct to say that the burned 
patch of skm is identified as a patch of sun-burned skm in virtue of its causal historical 
relations to the sun, it is not so clear that we can apply the same reasoning to the brain events 
with whch mental events are supposed to be identified. The analogy looks as if it is meant to 
explain how non-relational brain events can be identical with mental events which are 
individuated in terms of relational factors, but it seems to me that it explains no such thing. 
Because the analogy starts out with a burned patch of skm, whch is then identified as the 
type of burn it is in virtue of its cause, we need to start out with a thought, and then identifL it 
as the type of thought it is in virtue of its cause. So if the analogy is to be applied in h s  
instance at all, we would have to be able to work with the following distmction: it would have 
to be possible to start out with a non-relationally identified thought event, and then identifL it 
as the type of thought it is in terms of its causal relations to objects or events in the 
indwidual’s environment. But even if h s  &stinction makes sense, it is not what Davidson 
wanted hs analogy to explain. It does not explain how non-relationally individuated brain 
events can be described as relationally individuated mental events, since the analogy only 
seems to let us start out with non-relationally individuated mental events. In order to apply in 
h s  instance at all, there would have to be further grounds for assuming that non-relationally 
individuated mental events are identical with non-relationally individuated brain events. This, 
however, is simply to presuppose as intelligible what the analogy was supposed to help us 
understand in the first place. 
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Macdonald (1990: 400-402) develops a similar line of defence, again emphasising the 
dstinction between events and their descriptions. In making h s  d~stinction, she draws a 
further distinction between constitutive properties of events and characterising properties of 
events. Qute simply, constitutive properties of events are their essential properties, which 
cannot be altered without altering the events themselves; characterising properties, on the 
other hand, are non-essential properties, which are instantiated in events by virtue of certain 
of their descriptions. The relevance of ths  distinction to preserving the identity claim is now 
hr ly  straightforward: intentional mental properties supervene on an individual ’s internal 
physical properties and hs causal relations to his environment, but there is no obstacle to 
saying that the events which instance these mental properties are nonetheless events in the 
individual’s brain. Th~s reconciliatory move can be made without too much trouble if we 
agree that the latter properties of the individual’s brain events are characterising rather than 
constitutive properties, whch is to say that since they are instanced in these events only by 
virtue of certain of their redescriptions, the externalistic indwiduation of thoughts is perfectly 
compatible with the identity claim. 
Unfortunately there does not seem to be a neutral standpoint fiom which to distinguish 
between those properties which qualie as constitutive and those which qualie as 
characterising. Any decision on whether one type of property rather than another is 
constitutive of the token event will obviously be determined by the requirements of the 
hnework in whch the event’s propernes are to be typed, whch makes the decision to type 
physical properties as constitutive rather than characterising a foregone conclusion. But 
perhaps the physicalist is entitled to this bias, since the question is whether the object 
dependence in thoughts can be reconciled with the identity thesis. Suppose, then, that we 
grant h s  much for the sake of the argument. We still need to understand how the token 
event’s characterising properties are related to its constitutive properties, otherwise this 
dstinction will be of no real use, and this raises the problems already encountered with 
regard to Macdonald’s notion of property coinstantiation. It has yet to be made clear how 
mental properties, which supposedly characterise an event, can be coinstantiated by physical 
properties, whch are supposedly constitutive of the event. It has yet to be made clear how, 
for example, the individual’s thmlung about the fkactured sump can be coinstantiated by 
particular neural events whch happen to be occurring in hs brain at the same time. It does 
not help matters to insist that these neural events instantiate the relevant mental properties 
because they have been caused by light emissions coming fiom the fiactured sump, since 
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there would then have to be some sort of an explanation as to how these causal linkages could 
be characterised in intentional terms, which takes us directly back to the problem of 
explaining how mental and physical properties can be coinstantiated. But until these 
cbfficdties have been resolved, and it is by no means obvious what would resolve it, the 
hstinction between constitutive and characterising properties does not explain how to 
reconcile the object dependence in our thoughts with the identity thesis. 
4. Thinking and knowing what one is thinking 
I have been appealing to the externalistic individuation of thoughts in order to put pressure on 
the identity claim. But there could be a problem with taking this line, for it is sometimes 
argued that the externalistic individuation of thoughts poses a problem for the individual’s 
privileged knowledge of what he is hnlung. The reasoning behnd this objection is simple: if 
what an individual thlnks is dependent on factors which lie beyond the confines of his body, 
he will not be in the position to know what he is &dung until he undertakes an empirical 
investigation of h s  environment. This seems to have the consequence that a second person 
will be in just as good a position to tell what an individual is hnlung about as the individual 
himself. Worse than this, a second person might well be in a better position to tell what the 
individual is thdung about than the individual himself. Oscar and Bert immediately lose 
authority on their own h h g ,  once it is granted that their thoughts are individuated by 
factors which are equally accessible to others. To my mind, h s  is unacceptable. I have 
already suggested that part of what we are doing in attributing thoughts to an individual is 
expressing an interest in hs awareness of the demands of the situation in whch he finds 
h s e l f .  So it must be important to acknowledge the individual’s own perspective on hs 
situation, even where it seems to diverge in striking ways from what the experts in his 
linguistic community would be inclined to grant. I have been arguing that this forces us to 
weaken the externalist’s position somewhat, but Burge insists that his stronger position can 
easily accommodate the indwidual ’s authority on his own thoughts. 
Burge (1 994) defends hs stronger position by arguing that whilst the enabling condhons for 
having a particular thought must be presupposed in the t h i h g  of that thought, the 
individual can be said to know what he is thdung without having to know that these enabling 
conditions actually obtain. The individual can be said to know what he is thinking in so far as 
he has the capacity to hnk the first order thought self ascriptively. An enabling condition for 
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having the thought that there is some water two miles along the track is that the inhvidual is 
standing in some complex causal relation to water; an enabling conltion for having the 
thought that hs arthtltis has spread to his h g h  is that the individual is situated in a linguistic 
community in whch the term 'arthritis' refers to a &seas that is not restricted to the joints. 
So the l o g d  presupposition of having the thought about water is that the individual is 
standing in some complex causal relation to the substance with chemical structure H20, and 
the logical presupposition of having the thought about arthritis is that he is situated in the 
appropriate linguistic community. Burge argues that although these enabling conditions must 
obtain if the individual is to have these thoughts, it does not follow that the individual cannot 
know what he is thinlung unless he knows that the enabling conditions do in fact obtain. 
What is required is simply that the individual h n k s  these first order thoughts whdst 
exercising his second order self ascriptive slulls: 
To think of something as water, for example, one must be in some causal relation to water- or at least 
in some causal relation to other particular substances that enable one to theorize accurately about 
water. In the normal case, one sees and touches water. Such relations illustrate the sort of conditions 
that make possible thinlung of something as water. To know that such conditions obtain, one must rely 
on empirical methods ... But to thnk that water is a liquid, one need not know the complex conditions 
that must obtain if one is to think that thought. Such conditions must only be presupposed. (1994: 69- 
70). 
One knows one’s thought to be what it is simply by thinking it while exercising second-order self- 
ascriptive powers. One has no ‘criterion’, or test, or procedure for identdjmg the thought, and one 
need not exercise comparisons between it and other thoughts in order to know it as the thought one is 
thinlung. Getting the ‘right ’ one is simply a matter of thinlung the thought in the relevant reflexive way. 
(1994: 72). 
It seems to me that h s  defence can only have limited success, given that Burge’s original 
argument for externalism can be seen to depend on the assumption that we are bound to give 
an individual’s words the meanings they have in hs linguistic community. Th~s  assumption 
seems to rule out the possibility of the individual diverging in what he means on a particular 
occasion from what the words standardly mean in hs linguistic community, and at the same 
time it seems to commit us to the assumption that we are sometimes bound to attribute 
thoughts to an individual whch he does not k n k  he has. It could happen that the individual 
claims to be having a thought about water, when in fact the enabling conditions for having 
this first order empirical thought do not obtain. Thls could happen because although the 
individual is exercising h is  second order self ascriptive skills, the content of the first order 
thought over whch these skalls are exercised is determined by conditions whch are unknown 
to hun. The individual thinks he is having a first order thought about water; but this is 
defeated by the fact that the enabling conditions for having that thought fail to obtain. So 
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although the individual thrnks that he is having a first order thought about water, his 
ignorance of the enabling conditions blinds hun to the fact that he is having a first order 
thought about some other substance. As such, it does not make any difference that the second 
order thought takes the first order thought as its content, if the content of the first order 
thought can be determined by factors of which the individual is ignorant. Or, as Georgalis 
puts the complaint: 
Eone is not aware of content in the first case, or if the causal relation determining content in the first 
case, does not explain the subject’s awareness of content, why should content within content make a 
difference relative to awareness of first content? It  must he included in a way that is irrelevant to the 
subject ’s awareness of his contenis. ( 1 990: 1 06). 
And the same complaint is made by Brueckner: 
7hinhng ... that I am thinlung that such and such does not necessarily amount to knowing that I am 
thmkmg that such and such, even if it is true that 1 am thinlung that such and such. So the question 
remains open as to whether my introspective thought that I am thnking that some water is 
dripping ... amounts to knowledge that I am thnking that some water is dripping, given my lack of 
knowledge of the crucial content-determining circumstances.. .my knowing that I am thinlung that some 
water is dripping requires that I know that I am not thinlung that some twater is dripping. How can I 
know that if I lack knowledge of external content-determining circumstances? ( I  990: 449-450). 
Fortunately, h s  same type of objection does not really affect the weaker position that I have 
been t y n g  to develop. The very fact that our attributions of thoughts to certain individuals 
have to be qualified according to their conceptual competence is indicative of the fact that 
first person authority is taken for granted. It is a logical presupposition of having the thought 
that there is some water two miles along the track that the individual has the conceptual skills 
whch are exercised in the expression of that thought. But it is important to realise that what 
the individual can be said to t h d  on any parhcular occasion must be consistent with the level 
of hs conceptual competence. a s  ought to be enough to rule out the difficulties affecting 
Burge’s position: what an individual can be said to think on a particular occasion is not 
logically separable from hs ability to explain what he is tlunlung on that occasion, so it 
follows that the criteria for attributing a thought to an individual are at the same time criteria 
for excludmg the possibility that he might not know what he is thdung. If what the 
individual can be said to h n k  is exhaustible withrn the explanations that he would give if he 
were asked, then in general there can be no aspects of hs thoughts of which he might be 
ignorant. There might be aspects of the individual’s thoughts whch he finds difficult to 
express, but that has probably got more to do with hs not having a clearly formulated idea in 
the first place, or with his distressed state of mind, than with his not having access to the 
external factors whch purportedly determine what he is thmlung. 
Having said that, I do think that there are some cases in which it is not so obvious that the 
individual has privileged access to his thoughts. Self-deception comes immediately to mind. 
But as a concrete example, consider ~s case. Suppose that an individual is on safari. He 
suddenly notices a snake sliding into a bush just ahead of hm, and he thinks to himself, ‘that 
make is venomous’. A dzflerent snake slides back out a second later. The individual fails to 
notice h s  difference, and he is still thinlung to himself, ‘that snake is venomous’. The 
thought at the later moment is logically tied to the different snake, by the use of the 
demonstrative in the expression of the thought, although no such difference is registered by 
the individual. Someone walking behind the bush can see two identical snakes sliding back 
and forward, and he later asks the individual which snake he was thmking about. Since the 
individual did not distinguish between the two snakes, it seems to follow that although he was 
thinlung about the different snakes at different moments, the individual is not able to say 
which snake he was thinking about at any parbcular moment. 
No doubt more cases llke this one can be imagined, but I do not thlnk they pose any serious 
threat to the more central cases in which no such doubts arise. Given that we are sometimes 
susceptible to illusions or self-deceptions, and that we do not always have the clearest 
perception of things, it is only to be expected that such cases exist. But what is distinctive of 
these cases is that an explanation of why the individual’s authority is in question is called for, 
whereas in normal everyday situations we do not require an explanation of why the 
individual’s claim to know what he is t h h g  is taken for granted. The very fact that we 
want an explanation as to why the individual fails to have authority on his thinlung in certain 
situations is indicative of the fact that they are atypical and non-ordinary, and that in 
assessing their impact on the issue of self knowledge we have to treat them on their own 
merits as special cases. 
5. Con clusion 
I have been trying to motivate a version of externalism that is weak enough to preserve the 
indwidual’s authority on h s  own thmlung, but whch is strong enough to put pressure on the 
idea that mental states and events are identical with physical states and events. Even if the 
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argument that I have put forward does not conclusively refbte the physicalist’s position, it 
does suggest reasons for doubting that the identity claim can be preserved unproblematically. 
Certainly, in the case of object-dependent thoughts, the argument that I have been developing 
seems to be much stronger. If factors in the individual’s situation can be said to figure 
constitutively in his thnking, as presenting him with a reason for acting in a certain way, then 
it is very difficult to retain the idea that mental events are identical with internal behaviour- 
causing physical events in the individual’s body. Further, if what an individual thinks can be 
said to be logcally dependent on the presence of the object itself. then what he is thinking 
can be said to differ according to the layout of his situation, rather than according to the 
internal physical properties instantiated by his neural events. So if it is correct to say that 
objects themselves can figure constitutively in our thnkmg, then it makes it rather unclear 
that the identity claim provides us with the correct expression of the relation between the 
mental and the physical. and hence also that the causal account of rationalising explanations 
provides us with the correct account of how reasons explain actions, which is exactly the 
conclusions I have been looking for. 
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Chapter 7: Thinking and the Brain 
1.Introduction 
The approach to thmkmg that I have been developing focuses on the indwidual’s involvement 
in human relationshps. I have argued that it is only if the individual can be said to have an 
awareness of the demands of human relationships that he can be said to have the capacity to 
think. But it might seem that the result of placing the emphasis on the individual’s 
involvement in human relationshps as the crucial factor is that the neurobiological 
functioning of the brain is in danger of being completely ruled out of consideration. For if 
what it means to say that an individual has the capacity to thmk is intrinsically connected to 
what it means to say that he has the capacity to be involved in human relationshps, then it is 
not obvious what the brain has got to do with thmlung. I have indeed said very little about the 
brain and its relevance to my position, whch might not be surprising, given that I have been 
concerned to develop a non-physicalistic approach to m g .  But it might seem that this is 
not justified, since I have in effect hsregarded the hard scientific facts of the matter in order 
to push the thesis that mentalistic explanations are autonomous with respect to physicalistic 
explanations in the deep sense. Admittedly, the hard scientific facts of the matter have been 
ignored, and perhaps justifiably so. For it is not very clear what the discovery of such facts, 
whatever they are, could tell us about what we mean when we say that an individual has the 
capacity to thmk; nor, for that matter, is it very clear that the discovery of these facts would 
force us to say that mentalistic explanations must implicate physicalistic explanations in 
carrying out their work. 
Certainly, it would be ill-advised of me to ignore the brain completely, even if the point of 
considering the brain in its relation to thinlung is only to offer reasons for the mistrust I feel, 
regardmg the confidence with which some phlosophers assert that tlunlung goes on in the 
brain, or that the brain is complex enough to be our &dung thing.’ It is important to note 
Searle (1991: 50) writes: “It’s an obvious fact that the brain has a level of real psychological 
information processes. To repeat, people actually think, and thinking goes on in their brains.” And in a 
similar vein, Flanagan (1 992: 60), writes: “The brain is a supremely well connected system of 
processors capable of more distinct states, by several orders of magnitude, than any system ever 
known. This, I hope, provides some reassurance that the brain is complex enough to be our res 
cogztans- our thinking thing.” Both of these claims fall foul of what Kenny (1985)’ refers to as the 
‘homunculus fallacy’, which is the mistake of applying mental concepts to parts of human beings; in this 
case, the mistake is to apply the concept thinking to the brain, when its grammar permits only an 
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that, although it is not immedately obvious what importance I can attach to the brain, the 
approach to t b k m g  that 1 have been developing does not commit me to denying that it has 
any role to play at all. There is no denying that the functioning of the brain, and the rest of the 
nervous system for that matter, must figure in physicalistic explanations of human behaviour. 
That much seems obvious. What does not seem obvious is that h s  should force us to 
postulate a relation between the mental and the physical that would be consistent with the 
metaphysical unifjang principles rnherent in the non-reductivist ’s metaphysical framework. 
Resisting h s  particular move, however, does not force me to deny that the functioning of the 
brain is relevant. Without the stable functioning of the brain, the individual’s behavioural 
possibilities and bodily capacities in general would be in danger of being severely restricted 
and impaired, preventing h m  fi-om carrying on with hs life in a normal manner. So t h ~ s  
clearly suggests that the functioning of the brain must be presupposed at some point in my 
position, even though I am not prepared to elevate it to the prime status it is sometimes 
accorded. I will begin in the next section with a consideration of two different ways of 
articulating the relation that holds between hnlung and the brain, one direct and unmediated, 
the other indirect and mediated, and I will argue that neither position is in fact satisfactory. 
2.Thinking: biological or computational? 
2.1 a. Biological Naturalism And The Brain In A Vat Fantasy 
Searle (1983) develops an account of knking whch accords the brain the type of importance 
I am concerned to resist. He puts forward the view that thlnlung is a natural biologcal 
phenomenon, in the very same sense as digestion, mitosis and photosynthesis are natural 
biological phenomena, whch occurs or goes on in the individual’s brain. According to h s  
position, whch is unsurprisingly named biological naturalism, h b g  is both caused by, 
and realised in, the neurobiological processes going on in the brain. The relation between 
thdung and the brain is thus direct and mediated: h h n g  is n o b g  over and above 
neurobiologcal processes going on in the brain. Searle attempts to motivate this conception 
of the relation between thdung and the brain by appeal to the brain in a vat fantasy, whch is 
meant to show that an individual could have had the capacity to hnk, even though he did not 
application to the whole human being. Whilst this is certainly correct, I would emphasise that the 
problem lies with the application of mental concepts to that which fails to be a person in any sense of 
the word, to that which fails to have the capacity to relate to other people, to that which fails to have 
interests, to that which lacks moral status, and so on. 
130 
actually stand in any type of relationslups to other people, or indeed to his environment. The 
underlymg assumption, whch I find unacceptable, is that the individual’s relationshps with 
other people, and h ~ s  relations to other thmgs, could be dispensed with, without this makmg 
any difference at al l  to h ~ s  thdung. Once the individual’s thnlung is concentrated in the 
brain in this manner: it becomes irrelevant that he is actually involved in relationslups with 
other people, that he is actually living through situations in which he is presented with reasons 
for acting in certain ways, and feeling certain things. 
Yet Searle (1983: 143) points out that having mental capacities depends on having an array 
of practical slulls and abilities, pre-intentional stances and attitudes, behavioural habits and 
dlspositions. To my mind, th~s is to suggest that thinking is inseparable from the life that the 
individual lives in the world with other people, and that other people and other things are 
therefore indispensable in a way that would undermine the intelligibility of the brain in a vat 
fantasy. But Searle evades th~s conclusion by claiming that all this necessary background is 
similarly realised in the individual’s brain and his nervous system. The immediate difficulty 
with th~s idea, however, is that whilst the individual’s W i n g  is recogused as being 
inseparable from the life he lives, the life he lives is so strongly concentrated into the brain 
that it too turns out to be exclusively dependent on his neurobiological functioning. But this 
is to suppose that there is notlung more to the fact that the indwidual has a life to live than the 
fact that human life has a neurobiological dimension. By this account, if it were possible to 
completely reproduce the individual’s neurobiology in a laboratory, and to sustain an 
identical level of electrochemical stimulation, this would be sufficient to reproduce the life 
that the individual lives. But it seems to me that regardless of how complete the replication 
turned out to be, even if it were molecule-for-molecule exact, the fact that the individual has a 
life to live could not be reproduced in th~s manner. 
One of the difficulties with the brain in a vat fantasy is that the individual who has the 
capacity to think is an individual who has a conceptually constituted orientation in the world, 
whch is shaped and constrained through his involvement in various types of relationships 
with other people. The fact that the individual has th~s orientation in the world cannot be 
The metaphor of ‘concentration’ is suggested by Cockburn (1989, who refers to the mind-brain 
identity theory as concentrating the human being into the brain. The point, I presume, is that the 
concept ‘mind’ is inextricably bound up with the concept ‘person’, and that talk of the mind is therefore 
talk of attributes, capacities, qualities, and so on, which are attributable only to living persons. 
‘Concentrating’ the human being in the brain, severing the internal connections with the mind and the 
human form, is the logical consequence of identifymg the mind with the brain. 
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reproduced by electrochemically stimulating a neurobiological replica of the indwidual ’s 
brain in a laboratory. The basic problem here is not that it would be technically impossible to 
reproduce a neurobiologcally identical brain in a laboratory situation; even if that could be 
achieved, it would not be sufficient to reproduce the fact the indwidual has a life to live in the 
world with other people. The basic problem is rather that the individual’s orientation in the 
world is conceptually constituted, whereas the electrochemical stimulation of the 
neurobiologcally identical brain would be a purely causal matter. The gap between the 
neurobiogical dimension of the individual’s life, and the life that the individual lives, is a 
logical gap. We would not, for instance, describe a brain in a vat as having desires or fears, as 
Mling in love or planning to get married. Such descriptions make no literal sense when 
applied to the brain. So to suppose that the individual’s thmking can remain inseparable from 
the life the individual lives, whilst at the same time be nothing over and above the 
neurobiological processes going on in hs brain, is therefore to ignore the logical gap that 
separates these dimensions of human life, and to merge them together in an unacceptable 
manner. 
2.1 b.ScientrJic Evidence In Searle ‘s Defence? 
It might be replied in Searle’s defence that there are some indisputable scientific facts which 
can be cited as evidence for the claim that thinlung goes on in the brain, or that hnlung is 
nothmg over and above neurobiologcal processes. The force of this defence, however, must 
be immediately weakened by the difficulties we have in malung sense of the idea in the first 
place. It seems to me that unless we can make sense of what thrs claim means, it cannot 
strengthen its plausibility to offer evidence in favour of it; the difficulty with such a move is 
that before the hard scientific facts of the matter can be cited in support of the claim that 
thdung is realised in the brain, it has to be clear that we understand not only where to look 
for thrs evidence, but also that we understand what would qualify as evidence for such a 
claim. It seems to me that this presupposes that we understand what it means to say that 
thmkmg is realised in the brain, whch I have already found reason to question. As an 
example, here is some such evidence cited by Flanagan: 
Positron emission tomography (PET) and very recently turbo-charged magnetic resonance imagining 
provide amazing opportunity to watch thought in action, to map experiences onto brain 
processes ... There is robust evidence showing vivid differences in brain activity in persons engaged in 
phenomenologicaily distinct mental activities.. .Activity of lots of processors in different locations is 
required if certain kinds of thoughts are to occur. ( 1  992: 39-40). 
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Work with PET scans and other brain imaging techniques indicate that there are certain gross 
typological correlations between feeling and thought types and types of brain process. (1992: 47). 
Although there is nothing implausible about the claim that there are vivid differences in brain 
activity in persons engaged in phenomenologically dstinct tasks, and although it might well 
be the case that activity of lots of processors in different locations is required if thoughts are 
to occur, these facts cannot be used in support of the claim that thrnlung is realised in the 
brain, or that mental processes just are brain processes. The problem is not that the evidence 
underdetermines the theory; the problem is more basic than h s .  It is simply that without an 
understanding of what it could mean to say that W i n g  is realised in the brain, it is not very 
clear what kmd of work the evidence is supposed to do, nor is it very clear what would count 
as evidence for such a claim in the first place. It seems to me that we simply do not 
understand what Flanagan means when he says, for instance, that brain imaging techniques 
provide us with an opportunity to watch thought in action, unless we already understand what 
it means to say that thmlung is realised in the brain. How could the occurrence of brain 
activity, when an individual is thinking, provide support for the claim that his th-g is in 
fact nothmg over and above this brain activity? Answering h s  question presupposes that we 
already understand the type of role that the activity of processors in the brain are required to 
fblfil, if they are to be understood as that whch constitutes the indwidual ’s thmlung. But this 
is precisely what we do not understand. Perhaps we only seem to understand what this means 
because we are prone to be misled by what Olafson calls the amphbious nature of these 
inquiries: 
what can and cannot be said in the idiom of neuroscience strictly construed seems perfectly natural to 
both the scientist and his audience and attracts no special attention. It is of great significance, however, 
that these scientific inquiries have what might be called an “amphibious” character by virtue of which 
they function both inside and outside the conceptual limits of their object domain as that of a physical 
science. This means that the undemanding that &rms their inquiries has sources other than the 
observation and analysis of what can be show to take place in the brain. Most important, that 
understanding informs the way in which the objects of neuroscience are conceived in the context of 
such inquiries. (1995: 249-50). 
Olafson’s point might be put by saying that it only seem that we can make sense of these 
claims, because it is difficult for the neuroscientist to completely sever the type of 
understanding appropriate to his domain of investigation, when he comes to study subjects in 
the impersonal mode, fiom the type of understanding appropriate to lus involvement in 
personal relationshps. The neuroscientist hrmself is an individual who is capable of being 
involved with others, includmg hs present subjects, on a personal level. It is therefore 
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unsurprising that his understanding of certain aspects of the physical dunension of human life 
is partially informed by hrs understanding of the mental. This is particularly obvious when the 
mode of understanding the physical is brought into operation in a context in which the 
individual is required to carry out everyday mental activities, such as thlnlung about the 
cross-word puzzle he left unfinished on the bus, or about how awfiil the coffee tasted before 
the experiment began. So when it comes to the neuroscientist’s understanding of specific 
aspects of the domain circumscribed by his inquiry into the physical dimension of human 
life, hs understanding of these aspects is already influenced by h s  prior understanding of the 
everyday mental activities which his subjects are being asked to perform. 
Let me pick up on another point raised by Flanagan, concerning the possibility of typological 
correlations between feeling and thought types and types of brain processes. The central 
hficulty with t h ~ s  uggestion is that thlnlung can take a variety of different forms depending 
on a whole host of interrelated factors, namely, an individual’s experience and level of 
expertise, hs practical abilities, his conceptual slulls, and so on, and so forth. The forms that 
an individual’s thinlung can take on different occasions are various, and they fail to be type- 
related to the various forms exhibited by neurobiological events and processes in his brain on 
these occasions. The type of unity exhibited by the various forms that thinking may take is a 
unity deriving from the uses we make of the concept thdung itself, whch we learn to apply 
in different cases through the course of learning to be involved in relationships with others. 
But t h ~ s  type of unity is simply not matched withm the domain of neurobiology, whose 
principles of classification are not able to get a gnp, with a view to imposing unity, on the 
various forms that thnking may take. Th~s eems to be part of what Wittgenstein is bylng to 
get at, in the following remarks: 
I s  thinlung a specific organic process of the mind, so to speak- as it were chewing and digesting in the 
mind? (1981: fi 607) 
No supposition seems to me more natural than that there is no process in the brain correlated 
with ... thinking; so that it would be impossible to read off thought-processes f?om brain-processes. I 
mean this: if I talk or write there is, I assume, a system of impulses going out fi-om my brain and 
correlated with my spoken or written thoughts. But why should the system continue hrther in the 
direction of the center? Why should this order not proceed, so to speak, out of chaos? (1981 : fi 608). 
Wittgenstein’s final question here may be read as expressing a rather strong point, namely, 
that the individual ’s thdung may be causally dependent on n o h g  more than a chaotic mass 
of neurobiological processes. The suggestion may be the strong point that there is no order at 
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all at the neurobiological level, rather than the weaker point that although there is order at thrs 
level, it is chaotic when considered fi-om the perspective of the order constituted by mental 
concepts. I am inclined to interpret the remark in terms of the weaker point. The point, then, 
is that the order ehbited by the hfferent forms that thmlung may take is an order which is 
loosely imposed through the concept t h h g  itself, whereas the order exhrbited by hfferent 
types of neurobiologcal processes is an order which can only be in place through the 
concepts particular to that domain, and whch is chaotic and random when viewed fiom the 
perspective of the latter. For instance, the patterns of brain processes whch occur when an 
individual is thinlung that the coffee tasted awfbl, or that the cross-word puzzle was quite 
Cfifficult, are random and arbitrary when viewed in relation to the individual’s thrnlung, and 
there is no reason to suppose that type identical patterns will be exhrbited in the brains of two 
inhviduals who are thmkmg the Same thing. Tlus is what makes it rather implausible to 
assume that the order exlbited in the various forms that thmtung may take can continue right 
through to the neurobiological processes themselves. But unless there is some way to make 
sense of thls supposition, it leaves it quite unclear what it means to say that there are gross 
typological correlations between thought types and types of brain processes, or that the 
individual’s thmtung is nothmg over and above the neurobiological processes going on in his 
2.2. Computational Processes As The Mediating Link? 
Perhaps a more plausible approach is to insert some type of mehating link between thmkmg 
and the brain, in such a way as to avoid the problems whch arise out of the assumption that 
thmlung is hectly realised in brain activity. This idea is explained by Fodor (1987), in his 
computational theory of thnlung, according to whch the functional relationshp between 
computer hardware and the computational programs it runs serves as a worlung model for the 
relationshp that obtains between the brain and the mental processes it subserves. The central 
idea seems to be that just as the computer hardware implements computational programs at 
an abstract hctional level, so the brain can be said to implement computational processes at 
a similarly abstract functional level. To say that the computer hardware implements 
computational programs is to say that, gven its abstract functional structure, it can be said to 
be performing computational operations on a string of syntactically structured symbols. The 
computational theory of thmtung is therefore committed to the claim that, given the brain’s 
135 
hctional organisation, it can be said to be canyrng out computational operations on 
syntactically structured symbols at a level that is inaccessible to consciousness. 
The simplest way to approach the computational theory of thdung is to consider an example 
of the type of problem it is invoked to explain: suppose you thnk that Maria is pretty, and 
that it would be pleasant to spend some time with her; but you have heard that her father is 
particularly protective of her, so you decide that it would be wise to convince her father that 
your intentions are entirely honourable. The computational theory of hnkmg depends on 
assumptions of the following type: your being in the mental state of thmkmg that Maria is 
pretty causally brings about your being in the mental state of thinking that it would be 
pleasant to spend some time with her, and thts mental state in turn causally brings about your 
being in the mental state of t h t h g  that it would be wise to speak to Maria's father. What 
impresses Fodor is the fact that although the various mental states are causally connected, the 
generalisations of common-sense psychology nonetheless pick out these causally connected 
mental states by reference to the propositions they express. The causal relations that obtain 
between the mental state of thmlung that Maria is pretty, and the mental state of thmlung that 
it would be wise to speak to her father, somehow contrive to respect the inferential content 
relations that also obtain between the very same mental states, when they are picked out by 
the generalisations of common-sense psychology by reference to the propositions they 
express. The central problem is therefore to see how the generalisations of common-sense 
psychology, that specify causal relations between mental states, can pick out these mental 
states in such a manner that there are also non-arbitrary content relations between them. 
Fodor seems to see h s  as some kmd of engineering problem, one that calls for the 
construction of a theory: 
How could the mind be so constructed that such generalisations are true of it? What sort of mechanism 
could have states that are both semantically and causally co~ected ,  and such that the causal 
connections respect the semantic ones? (1 987: 14). 
Fodor 's solution to t h~s  problem is hts computational theory of thinlung: it is in virtue of the 
fact that there are underlymg computational mechanisms that the mental state of t h k i n g  that 
Maria is pretty causally brings about the mental state of thmlung that it would be pleasant to 
spend some time with her, in such a way as to preserve inferential content relations. If the 
underlying computational mechanisms are to explain how this can be the case, then they must 
be such that they bring causal and semantic relations together into the Same sequence of 
mental states. Th~s task appears to be exactly suited to computational mechanisms, in that 
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they are designed to transform one symbol into another by operating on their syntactic 
properties, and the transformation is effected in such a way that certain semantic relations 
between the propositions expressed by the symbols are preserved. There are two central 
points here. First, the syntax of a symbol can be thought of as an abstract feature of its shape, 
and the shape of the symbol can be thought of as a potential determinant of the causal role of 
the symbol. That is, syntax is a determinant of a symbol’s causal role. Second, certain 
semantic relations can be “mimicked” by their syntactic relations. That is, the semantic 
relations whch hold between two symbols, when the proposition expressed by one is 
semantically related to the proposition expressed by the other, are parallel to the syntactic 
relations in virtue of whch one of the symbols is derivable from the other. So if the 
underlying computational mechanisms are to be effective here, their operating at ths  level 
must explain how the mental state of thinlung that Maria is pretty causally brings about the 
semantically related mental state of thdung that it would be pleasant to spend some time 
with her. 
One of the main difficulties I have with the computational theory of thinking is its 
assumption that, gven the appropriate functional organisation of the brain, it can be said to 
implement computational operations defined over the syntactic properties of mental 
representations. The problem is that the computational processes are held to be implemented 
at a level that is inaccessible to consciousness, and the mental representations, whch are 
postulated to provide a mechanism for getting from one mental state to another in a rational 
sequence, are tokened in the brain independently of the thrnker’s awareness of them. The 
computational theory of thmlung thus holds that mental symbols are tokened in the brain at a 
level that is inaccessible to consciousness; but the problem here is that nothing can count as a 
symbol or a representation that is not at least available to be used in a rule governed way. 
This casts doubt on the idea that having a thought can be analysed in terms of having a mental 
symbol tokened in one’s brain in a certain way, for the simple reason that such tokens cannot 
be said to be symbols, and nor, therefore, can they be said to express propositions. But if thrs 
is the case, it makes no sense to say that computational processes can be called upon to 
generate semantically coherent mental processes out of such mental representations. 
There are two main reasons for h s :  first, if mental symbols tokened in the brain cannot be 
said to express propositions in the first place, then computational operations on these 
symbols W not generate inferential content relations between them; second, even if it is 
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granted that computational operations on these symbols generate sequences of causal 
relations that succeed in mimicking rational relations between propositions, which now ought 
to seem problematic anyway, this falls short of the claim that inferential content relations can 
actually be mechanically implemented. 
A related problem is that the computational theory of thmlung assumes that the postulation of 
underlpg computational mechanisms provides a causal explanation of thinlung in the sense 
that they constitute the mediating links between the neurobiological properties instantiated by 
the brain, and the common-sense psychological properties instantiated by our mental 
processes. Computational mechanisms are said to provide a causal explanation of hnking in 
that they generate rational sequences of mental states by manipulating mental representations 
according to their syntactic properhes. But if the mechanisms operate at a level that is 
inaccessible to consciousness, there seems to be no more reason to say that they are rule 
governed than there is to say that the mental symbols they manipulate express propositions. 
In general, the ability to follow rules presupposes the ability to respond to the normative 
constraints that rules impose on one's behaviour. So if one can be said to be manipulating 
symbols according to their syntactic properties, one must be aware of what counts as a correct 
manipulation of the symbols and what counts as an incorrect manipulation of the symbols. 
But in the case of computational mechanisms implemented in the brain at a level that is 
inaccessible to consciousness, there is no way of giving content to h s  dwtinction. The most 
that can be said is that, given the functional organisation of the brain, some of its processes 
can be described as If' they were rule governed. But th ls falls short of the claim that 
computational mechanisms actually operate in a rule governed way on the syntactic 
properhes of mental symbols, and in turn it falls short of supporting the idea that 
computational processes constitute the mediating llnk between hnking and the brain. 
3.The attitude of scientistic optimism 
3. ].Seeing-Aspects Of Organisation 
Part of what underlies the idea that the brain must be given such a central role in our account 
of thinlung is the feeling that mental concepts refer to states and events whose causal efficacy 
with regard to human behaviour must be explained in terms of neurobiological processes in 
the brain. Goldfarb ( 1992: 1 12) refers to this as the attitude of scientistic optimism, the smug 
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and unexamined assurance that what wants explanation is obvious, and that the application of 
scientific tools to the problems at hand is the only approach to take. Within the context of this 
approach, the direction in whch an answer is to be pursued to the question of the relevance 
of the brain to thmkmg has already been settled in advance: t h i h g  is to be understood in 
terms of the operation of the brain; whether the latter is conceived biologically, 
computationally, or in some other manner, is simply a matter of detail, to be worked out once 
the basic orientation is in place. The difficulty which faces the approach to thinking that I 
have been recommending, more so when it is held up for comparison against the various 
scientific approaches to thinlung, is that it is immediately spurned as unrigorous, 
unenlightened and unworthy of serious consideration. But the negative attitude that is widely 
expressed toward such non-physicalistic approaches is only to be expected: it is simply not 
on the agenda of the scientific approach to work out an understandmg of the mental which 
would resist integration, through a battery of unifying principles, into the physicalistic 
framework in whch its own investigations are carried out. 
The battery of metaphysical unifying principles are appealed to as a means of expressing the 
relation that is thought to hold between the mental and the physical, when the available data 
are organised from the perspective of the athtude of scientistic optimism. But the connection 
that is subsequently postulated is simply one way of organising the data; it is indicative of the 
confidence that it must be possible for everything to be explained scientifically.3 It might be 
said that this is a lund of seeing-as, which comes about through the unquestioned and 
unlimited application of the conceptual apparatus that gives expression to the amtude of 
scientistic optimism. To interpret neurobiological processes as constituting dunlung is, I 
suspect, an achevement of the scientistic attitude, whch is given expression through the 
unbridled application of the conceptual apparatus particular to the neurobiological dimension 
of human life. To see the connection between the mind and the brain as one of realisation or 
constitution is to have one’s perceptions shaped in thls way, and the approach to thinking that 
I have been recommending then comes to be regarded as naive and rather simplistic. 
Once the attitude of scientistic optimism has been cultivated, through over-exposure to the 
tough-mindedness of those who stubbornly refuse to entertain the possibility that scientific 
tools are not immediately applicable in every instance, it becomes increasingly natural to 
insist that the available data can only be organised in one way, and it becomes increasingly 
Wittgenstein remarks: “Where does this idea come from? It is like a pair of glasses on our nose 
through which we see whatever we look at. It never occurs to us to take them off” (1967: tj 103). 
3 
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unnatural to return to the non-scientistic perception with whch, it seems, only the 
unenlightened can pretend to be comfortable. If the neuroscientist were to restrict his 
investigations to hs own clearly circumscribed field, and if he were to succeed in completely 
severing hs understanding of that field from the understandmg appropriate to the field of 
everyday human relationships, it would be less likely that he would see the activity of lots of 
neural processors as constitutive of hnlung. It only becomes possible for him to view the 
neurobiological processes in the brain as constitutive of hnlung if he widens the field of his 
inquuy, in order to postulate the type of unifjmg l d s  demanded by the scientistic attitude. 
So it seems to me that it is precisely this attitude that accounts for the tendency to over-inflate 
the importance of the brain when it comes to explaining the individual’s capacity to hnk, 
since it is precisely t h s  attitude that gives rise to the overwhelming need to explain how the 
mental can be integrated into the physical dimension of human life. 
3.2. The Consequence For Mental Autonomy 
If thls is correct, then the claim that mentalistic explanations must draw on the support of 
physicalistic explanations in canying out their work can be said to be an explicit expression 
of the amtude of scientistic optimism. To suppose that mentalistic explanations cannot work 
autonomously is to suppose that the mental must be related to the physical in the manner 
suggested by the stand point of scientistic optimism. It is to suppose that mental states and 
events must be related to physical states and events by way of realisation or constitution, and 
that mental states and events can be legitimately cited in explanations of human action only 
because they derive their eEcacy from the causal efficacy of these underlying physical states 
and events. Part of the process of coming to see that mentalistic explanations are autonomous 
in the deeper sense is the process of loosening the hold that the attitude of scientistic 
optimism has over our perception in these matters. To be in the position to see that 
mentalistic explanations can carry out their work without implicating the explanatory 
resources of the physical sciences is to be in the position to see that it is not necessary that 
thmlung be related to the neurobiological functioning of the brain in the manner dictated by 
thls attitude. 
The reason why this is not necessary can be brought out by focusing on a way of expressing 
the dualism mherent in our concept of what it means to be a human being. a s  dualism can 
be understood as indicative of the fact that whlst human beings are part of the natural world, 
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in the straight-forward sense that human life has a basic biological constitution, human beings 
nonetheless learn to live in such a way that they come to have a life of their own, whch 
serves to orientate them conceptually in the dfferent situations in which they find themselves. 
Having a life to live in this sense is dstinctive of what it means to be a human being, 
separating human beings fiom the rest of the living creatures who mhabit the natural world. 
The important point to note is that in living out their lives, human beings are sensitive to the 
bfferent ways in whch different people and different thmgs present themselves to them, and 
in many cases, to the hfferent ways in whch they present themselves to other people. It is 
withm t h s  dimension of human life that we have to look to find the dwersely over-lapping 
and loosely inter-loclung contexts and situations that give sense to our various uses of mental 
concepts. As Dilman puts it: 
E we want to be clear about what it means to speak of the mind of a living thing, we need to turn our 
attention to those aspects of our life in which the reality of others for us finds expression, a life in which 
necessarily we ourselves are persons. ( 1996: 189). 
In having a life to live, human beings are distinct from other living creatures in that they have 
their own personal psychology. But rather than look for ways of identimng aspects of that 
personal psychology with aspects of their neurobiological constitution, it seems to me that we 
have to recognise the implication of the fact that the externalisation of the mental is an 
inelimenable feature of the way of living distinctive of human beings. We have to recogruse 
that thdung is embedded in the lives that human beings live in such a way that precludes its 
identification with what is going on in the brain. What we ought to say is that the focal point 
of ow investigation is the human being, and that in having a life to live, the human being is 
no longer exclusively subject to the dnves and forces of hs biologcal nature, on a level with 
other non-linguistic but sentient creatures, but is rather open‘ to the world that is shaped and 
structured through the activities of other linguistic creatures who have a conceptually 
constituted orientation llke h s e l f .  And t h ~ s  means that the connection between the mind and 
the brain is a connection that cannot be properly stated in terms integral to the non- 
reductivist’s metaphysical framework, because the attempt to identify the mental with the 
physical is, I suggest, to misrepresent the distinction between mentalistic and physicalistic 
modes of explanation. 
The imagery of ‘openness to the world’ as a way of expressing that which is distinctive of human 4 
beings is developed in McDowell(1996), and also in Olafson (1995). 
14 1 
Thrs drstinction is one which is more properly expressed in terms of the fact that human 
beings have their own life to live in the world, and hence have their own personal 
psychology; whch is to say that human beings, whlst being partly subject to the drrves of 
their natural biologcal constitution, are at the Same time partly subject to the different ways 
in whch different people and drfferent things present themselves to them in different 
sitwtions. But the problem with the attempt to identify the mind with the brain is that it fails 
to acknowledge that the individual’s own personal psychology is inseparable from his 
openness to the world. Th~s is because it is part of having an openness to the world that 
factors in that world can figure constitutively in hs thinlung, and as the argument of the 
previous chapter suggested, this does not sit comfortably with the internalisation of the 
mental in the literally spatial sense required by that identification. So a more appropriate tact, 
in stating the connection between the mental and the physical, is to resist being drawn into the 
idea that we have to find a way of embedding the mental in the physical, and to consider 
instead how the brain serves its neurobiological function in sustarnrng human life, and hence 
how it serves its function as a causal enabling condition for the different ways in which 
human beings behave and respond as they live out their lives with each other on a day to day 
basis. 
Thus, mentalistic explanations carry out their work withm the lives that human beings live, 
whereas physicalistic explanations cany out their work withm the neurobiological dimensions 
of human life. So the deep extent of mental autonomy can be said to consist not only in the 
k t  that there is a logcal gap between these dimensions of human life, and hence between 
the interests served by each of these modes of explanation, but also in the fact that the type of 
everyday relationshps constitutive of the lives that human beings live are hdamental and 
basic. W c h  is to say that although mentalistic explanations presuppose that physicalistic 
explanations are already in place as part of the causal background, they do not cany out the 
work required of them through deriving their explanatory efficacy from physicalistic 
explanations in canryrng out the work required of them. As I argued in the fourth chapter, if 
we assume that our everyday relationships necessarily begin fi-om a non-everyday level, and 
subsequently work toward an everyday level through a process of interpretation, then our 
interest in others is necessarily an interest in causally explaining their behaviour by reference 
to the reasons they have for acting in certain ways. Th~s is the crux of the matter. It is a 
consequence of accepting h s  assumption that the physicalist is forced to regard mentalistic 
and physicahstic explanations as convergmg on the common subject-matter of internal 
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behaviour-causing states and events. But although mentalistic explanations are certamly 
recogmsed as drawing on a system of irreducible concepts, the problem is that once the 
physicalist’s metaphysical principles are firmly in place, dictating the extent to which the 
autonomous nature of mentalistic explanations can be respected, mentalistic explanations 
necessarily lose their deep autonomy. 
4.Conclusion 
Although I have been trying to exercise some amount of caution when it comes to 
understanding the role of the brain in explaining thmking, it has not been my intention to 
suggest that the brain is completely irrelevant. It has only been my intention to resist being 
caught up in the spirit of scientistic optimism, according to which the functioning of the brain 
must be given its prime status, as that with which W i n g  is to be identified. It seems to me 
that t h s  is to over-inflate the role of the brain with regard to W i n g ,  the only justification 
for which is the questionable methodologcal assumption that everythug must be explained 
in physicalistic terms. The smooth and continued functioning of the brain is certainly relevant 
to an individual’s having the capacity to thmk, in the sense that damage to certain parts of the 
brain often results in the sudden inability to exercise various cognitive and behavioural 
capacities with the same degree of spontaneity and integration as previously. But this is not to 
say that an individual suffering damage to certain parts of Ius brain would necessarily lose the 
capacity to thmk, since that would be to suppose that the smooth and continued hctioning 
of the brain was all that mattered. Adrmttedly, it would be difficult to know what to say in 
such cases. since each individual would have to be considered on his own merits. Although 
there is an important respect in whch having the capacity to thrnk causally presupposes the 
continued functioning of the brain. h s  in itself does not warrant that conclusion that thlnlung 
goes on in the brain, or that the brain is our t W g  thmg; nor, for that matter, does it 
warrant the conclusion that mentalistic explanations must implicate physicalistic explanations 
in canyLng out the work required of them. 
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Chapter 8: Animal Thinking 
1.Introduc tion 
It is an obvious merit of an account of W n g ,  or of an account of the mental in general, if it 
can be said to make sense of our tendency to treat some non-human animals as having the 
capacity to hnk, or as having a mind. What I have said so far, however, seems to leave me 
without an explanation of the fact that we do treat certain non-human animals as having the 
capacity to W. It seems as if I ought to be committed to denying that it makes sense to say 
that non-human animals can thmk, on the grounds that non-human animals cannot be said to 
have the capacity to be involved in human relationshps. Th~s presents me with a problem: in 
arguing that there is an intrinsic connection between what it means to have the capacity to 
think and what it means to have the capacity to be involved in human relationshps, it might 
seem as if I have unwittingly denied that we can find a legitimate sense in which to attribute 
thoughts to non-human animals who, by d e f ~ t i o n  alone, cannot be said to be involved in 
human relationshps, despite the fact that we commonly explain why such animals are 
behaving in certam ways in mentalistic terms, by attnbuting to them the thoughts, intentions 
or desires whch appear to rationalise their behaviour. So what I want to do in h s  chapter, to 
round off my argument, is argue that the intrinsic connection that I have been insisting on 
(between the capacity for thought and the capacity to be involved in human relationshps) can 
be sustained, whlst doing justice to our irresistible inclination to treat certam animals 
(without being able to give a fixed list of whch ones) as thmkmg animals. 
2.Animal thinking: a further fragment of our already fragmented concept 
2.1 .McDowell k Distinction: Living In A world And Living In An Environment 
It might be useful to begm by considering an interesting distinction, whch I alluded to in the 
previous chapter, between ‘living in a world’ and ‘living in an environment ’. Thls kstinction 
is put to use by McDowell (1996: 114-9), in explaining how to make sense of an animal’s 
sensitivity to certain features of its environment, without having to attribute to that animal the 
type of orientation in the world whch it could only have through the possession of a 
language. Presumably, we can say that an ammal that lacks a conceptually constituted 
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orientation in the world is an animal that lacks the Ml-fledged subjectivity which goes hand 
in hand with the capacity for thought. McDowell’s idea is that we can only get to grips with 
an animal ’s mode of existence, includmg the form that its sensitivity to its environment takes, 
through getting to gnps with the merely biologcal dnves that shape its life. On this 
conception, an animal’s life turns out to be no more than a succession of problems and 
opportunities, constituted as such by the biological forces that exert their control over its 
behaviour. Human beings, on the other hand, live in the world. Through being brought up 
into a particular way of living, whch only becomes accessible through the acquisition of a 
language, human beings come to have the type of orientation in the world which non-human 
animals could never have. But ths does not mean that animals are to be treated as senseless 
automata, for we need not credit animals with a conceptually constituted orientation in the 
world in crehting them with an alertness to their own environment. 
McDowell’s idea is that what sets human beings apart from animals is that human beings can 
come to live in a world through acquiring the capacity to conceptualise their situation, and 
tlus is a feat that animals can never achieve in so far as the patterns of their lives are not 
hguistically structured. I thmk that thrs is a useful way of bringmg out a fhdamental 
hfference between the lives of human beings and the lives of animals. For the capacity to 
conceptualise a situation, and to adopt a rational response to the demands that it presents, 
seems to be constitutive of the lives of human beings in a way that it is not constitutive of the 
lives of animals. But by refusing to c r d t  animals with ths capacity, we also seem to be 
refusing to credit animals with the capacity to thmk. a s  brings us cfirectly into conflict with 
our inclination to attribute thoughts and beliefs to animals in malung sense of their behaviour, 
and it is not very clear how ths conflict is to be resolved, particularly if we want to retain the 
dtstinction between living in a world and living in an environment. 
2.2a.Malcolrn Is Distinction: Thinhng And Having Thoughts 
One way in whch ths conflict might be resolved is to appeal to the distinction between what 
it means to thmk, and what it means to have a thought. a s  dstinction seems to be at the 
centre of Malcolm’s (1977) efforts to make sense of the fact that we legtimately use the 
concept thmkmg with respect to animals, without implying that they can have thoughts before 
their minds. It is meant to capture the difference there is between merely thrnlung that such 
and such is the case, without consciously formulating the proposition that such and such is the 
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case, and actually having the thought before one’s mind that such and such is the case, wluch 
does involve consciously formulating that proposition. Malcolm believes that by appealing to 
h s  distinction, wluch we commonly make in everyday life anyway, we can appreciate what 
is involved in attributing thoughts to animals, despite the fact that they lack the capacity to 
conceptualise their situation. Malcolm asks us to: 
Suppose our dog is chasing the neighbour’s cat. The latter runs fbll tilt toward an oak tree, but 
suddenly swerves at the last moment and disappears up a nearby maple tree. The dog doesn’t see this 
manoeuvre, and on arriving at the oak tree he rears up on his hind legs, paws the trunk as if tryrng to 
scale it, and barks excitedly into the branches above. We who observe the whole episode from a 
window say, “He thinks that the cat went up that oak tree.” We say, “thinks” because he is barking up 
the wrong tree. (1977: 49-50). 
Malcolm’s idea is that we can be justified in attributing this thought to the dog, despite the 
fact that it lacks the capacity to formulate or entertain the proposition that the cat went up the 
oak tree, because there is a way of using the concept knking whch does not entail that the 
subject had a particular thought or that a particular thought occurred to the subject. This 
seems to be fair enough. We often do describe a dog’s behaviour by saying that it thnks that 
such and such, or that it believes that such and such, but we wouldn’t want to imply that the 
thought that such and such had occurred to the dog or that dus thought went through its mind. 
Malcolm goes on to argue that we use the concept U n g  in the Same way with regard to 
people: 
suppose a friend of mine and I are engrossed in an exciting conversation. We are about to drive off in 
his car. While holding up his end of the conversation he fbmbles in his pocket for the car keys. I, 
knowing that they are in the glove compartment, say to myself, “He thnks the keys are in his pocket.” I 
do not imply that he said to himsell: or thought to himself, “The keys are in my pocket.” (1977: 49). 
Malcolm seems to be arguing that since the man need not have the thought that lus keys are in 
lus pocket, just because it is correct to say that he thmks the keys are in hs pocket, it follows 
that the dog need not have the thought that the cat was in the tree, just because it is correct to 
say that the dog W s  the cat is in the tree. But thts is where the argument is in danger of 
breakmg down. In so far as we use the concept thdung in both cases without meaning to 
imply that a thought had occurred to the man or the dog, there is a similarity in usage; but 
there is also an important dissimilarity in usage, which needs to be elucidated. The man who 
lost his keys is correctly described as thinlung that hs keys are in lus pocket, and this 
description does not entail that he had the thought that lus keys are in lus pocket. So it looks 
as if we can say that the dog thmks the cat is up the tree, because thts description does not 
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entail that the dog had the thought that the cat is up the tree. But tlus ignores the fact that the 
man who thinks that hs keys are in hs pocket has made a mistake, and that the use of the 
word ‘think’ on tlus occasion is tied to the possibility of hs coming to realise that he has 
made a mistake. Perhaps the dog will notice the cat’s tail hanging down fiom the branch of 
the maple tree, and immelately begm to bark up that tree; but even if we were to say that the 
dog made a mistake, as well we might, we would do so without expecting that the dog could 
ever come to realise that it had made t lus mistake. Unlike the fhend who mistakenly thought 
that hs car keys were in hs pocket, the dog lacks the conceptual resources to be in the 
position to realise that it had been wrong. But unless we can attribute the possibility of 
coming to reahse that a mistake has been made, it is not clear that tlus use of the word ‘t3m.k ’ 
is the very same with respect to the man and the dog. This highlights a fiuther point of 
dtfference between the use of the concept thmlung with regard to the man and the dog. A 
logical precondition for saying that the man t l unks  hs keys are in hrs pocket is that he could 
have had that thought before hs mind. Although our description of the man does not entail 
that he did have the thought before hs mind, it seems to entail that he could have had that 
thought before hs mind. But t lus is not the case with the dog who is barkmg up the wrong 
tree, nor is it the case with the cat who is watchmg from the branch of the nearby maple tree. 
So if Malcolm’s distinction is to be exploited as a way of resolving the conflict, which is 
underlined by McDowell’s distinction between living in a world and living in an 
environment, it will have to developed somewhat in order to bring out sigmficance of these 
dtfferences. The development I have in mind will focus on the significance of the point that 
when we use the concept &dung with respect to certain animals, there is a sense in whch we 
are not using it in the same way in whch we use it with regard to people. 
2.2b.Davidson ’s Objection: Thinhng, Believing And Being Surprised 
Before that, however, it might be worthwhle considering an objection to tlus distinction in 
any form, whch is raised by Davidson (1985). Davidson’s objection is that, in saying that the 
dog t4un.k~ the cat ran up the oak tree, we are making an attribution of content whch the 
dog’s observed behaviour is not complex enough to support. The dog can only be said to 
thmk the cat ran up the oak tree if it can be said to have the appropriate background of beliefs 
to fix tlus content, namely, that trees are growing thmgs, that they need soil and water, that 
they have leaves or needles, that they burn, and so on. Without the appropriately structured 
supporting background, whch is inaccessible to non-language users, there would be no 
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justification for describing the dog’s behaviour in tfus way. Davidson’s objection thus leans 
heavily on the idea that the mental is holistic, and that the normative and rationalistic relations 
whch govern thls holistic network are of a type whch can only be grasped by language users. 
The crux is that languageless creatures cannot be said to thdc because they cannot be said to 
have the appropriate background of beliefs, and they cannot be said to have that, because they 
cannot be said to understand what it would mean for its beliefs to be true or false, or justified 
or unjustified. Davidson tries to illustrate tfus logcal requirement by considering the 
phenomenon of surprise. The idea is that unless a creature can be subject to surprises, in the 
sense that it can come to realise that what it previously believed was false, then it cannot be 
said to have any beliefs to begin with, and if it cannot be said to have any beliefs to begm 
with, then it cannot be said to have any thoughts either: 
Suppose I believe there is a coin in my pocket. I empty my pocket and find no coin. I am surprised. 
Clearly enough I could not be surprised (though I could be startled) if I did not have beliefs in the first 
place. And perhaps it is equally clear that having a belief, at least one of the sort I have taken for my 
example, entails the possibility of surprise. I f  I believe I have a coin in my pocket, something might 
happen that would change my mind. But surprise involves a hrther step. It is not enough that I first 
believe there is a coin in my pocket, and after emptymg my pocket I no longer have this belief Surprise 
requires that I be aware of a contrast between what I did believe and what I come to believe. Such 
awareness, however, is a belief about a belief (1985: 479). 
The point is that beliefs are conceived as states whch can be true or false. So unless a 
creature can be said to be aware of what it would mean for hs beliefs to be true or false, that 
creature cannot be said to have any beliefs. a s  immediately excludes animals from what 
must turn out to be a well-defined domain of thmkers: only creatures that are equipped with a 
language can be said to have the capacity to thmk. It follows necessarily from this that it is 
incorrect to say that the dog thmks the cat ran up the tree. It might Zook as if there is notlung 
wrong with saying tfus, gven that it seems to be justified by the dog’s behaviour on tfus 
particular occasion; but when we take into account the fact that the identity of any one 
thought is dependent on its location w i h  the logcal network of content-determining beliefs, 
it becomes difficult to make sense of our attributions of thoughts about the cat and the tree to 
the dog. 
Davidson’s objection c e W y  seems to put pressure on Maclolm’s distinction, and I have to 
agree that the problem concerning the determination of content does seem to pose a prima 
faciechallenge to the claim that the dog can thmk the cat ran up the tree. But it seems to me 
that there is sometlung not quite correct with the idea that we can justifjr this attribution of 
content to the dog only if we presuppose that it has access to the distinction between truth and 
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fklsehood that language users have. Perhaps Malcolm invites h s  objection, however, in 
pointing out that we use the concept thdung in the same way with regard to animals and 
people, but I want to avoid it by suggesting that we use the concept t l d m g  with regard to 
animals in a slightly diflerent way. 
2.3. Our Relationships With Animals: The Distinction Developed 
According to Gaita (1992: 237), there is a tendency to suppose that the right method in 
investigatmg animal hn lung is to distance ourselves from our subject so that our emotions 
and affections are prevented from interfering with our sense of what is ‘objectively the case’. 
a s  tendency manifests itself in the need to find a language for describing animals which is 
only contingently vulnerable to various aspects of human nature, to our passions, our 
fantasies and our failings of character. This seems to hghlight a submerged strand in 
Davidson’s position, where the question of whether animals can be said to think is to be 
settled in an aprzori manner. The central issue for Davidson is whether animals can grasp the 
chstinction between objective truth and falsehood, and whether their behavioural repertoire is 
sufficiently complex to support this distinction. His claim is that only linguistic behaviour 
will suffice, and that languageless creatures therefore lack the capacity to thnk. 
But Gaita points out, with regard to human beings first of all, that what gves mental concepts 
their sense cannot be separated from our emotional and affective natures, and that it is 
precisely h s  side of human life which endows us with those modes of understandmg whch 
are appropriate to ‘seeing the reality’ of another person. He goes on to suggest that there is no 
reason to suppose that thmgs must be radically different in relation to animals, in the sense 
that it is a mistake to suppose that we can determine ‘objectively’ whether or not animals can 
k n k  by adopting a criterion which forces us to disengage from our emotional and affective 
natures. In Gaita’s view, we can only get to gnps with what is objectively the case in these 
issues through the recogmtion that certain forms of emotion and affection are themselves 
modes of understanding, and th~s means that what is objectively there to be understood 
cannot be characterised independently of the fact that our only access to h s  type of reality is 
through precisely these emotions and affections. Or in other words, we cannot get to p p s  
with animal thmlung if we ignore the importance of our emotional and affective orientation 
toward animals in settling the issue, since it is precisely that orientation that gves sense to our 
mental concepts. 
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%s suggests a way of developing Malcolm’s dstinction, and hence resolving the conflict 
with whch t h ~ s  chapter started: on the one hand, we are inclined to attribute thoughts and 
beliefs to cemn animals in explaining their behaviour; but on the other hand, it seems we 
ought to deny that animals can thmk, given that they lack the capacity to be involved in 
human relationshps, and that they lack the conceptual capacities which are required if they 
are to be credted with anythmg llke the orientation in the word that comes hand in hand with 
having the capacity for thought. There need be no irresolvable conflict here if we can come to 
appreciate the connection between the way we relate to animals and the fact that we 
sometimes explain their behaviour in mentalistic terms. For as Gaita notes, our relationshps 
with some animals can involve a great deal of emotional and affective interaction, and can 
verge on matters of moral importance: we love and care for animals, we take care of them 
and train them; they seek our love and affection, they engage our attention, pity and respect; 
they play with us, and sometimes comfort us by being there. And it seems to me that in 
relating to animals in these ways, we are involving them in certain aspects of our lives, and 
we are involving ourselves in certain aspects of their lives, and we therefore become 
sigmficant parts of their environment in makrng them significant parts of our world. 
To the young chld, for example, the family dog might simply be another play mate, and the 
source of joy and amusement; but to the older brother, it might rather be the source of great 
annoyance and irritation. To the blind person, the guide dog is not simply a play mate, nor is 
it simply a pet to be fed and watered on a daily basis; it is rather indispensable to his carrying 
on his life in a near normal manner, almost as an extension of his own body. To the elderly 
man, perhaps house-bound through illness, hs dog might be the only companion he has when 
his nurse or carer goes home at night. Certain animals thus develop their own personalities, 
and some of them become irreplaceable, through the different ways in which they become 
involved in our lives. The chld might not be content with a replacement play mate, although 
hs brother might be happy to have a quieter pet. The blind person would probably need a 
lengthy period of readjustment before he was relaxed and comfortable with hs new guide 
dog, and even then he would probably spend a great deal of time thdung affectionately 
about hs previous dog. The elderly man would feel the loss of hs life companion in a deep 
way, and would lose a part of hs life that was of great importance to him. 
It seems to me that attributing thoughts to animals is part of the way we in whch relate to 
them, when we play with them, feed them and train them, when we seek their comfort and 
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their security.’ Given that animals are capable of relating to each other in certain ways, and 
that some are capable of soliciting responses from UT which are similar to the responses 
whch other people solicit fiom us in similar situations, we cannot help attributing thoughts to 
animals. Some of us find it natural to talk directly to certain animals, those which have a 
human-llke face, to look into their eyes as we look into the eyes of another person, or to tell 
stories and talk about them to other people, using an array of mental concepts, including 
hnking, intending, believing, desiring, and so on. But it seems to me. and this is the 
important point, that the way in whch we use the concept thmlung in relating to animals is 
not quite the Same way in which it is used in relating to other human beings. The way we use 
the concept t h b g  in relating to animals does not carry the same logical baggage that is 
carried by the way we use it in our relationships with other people. 
It seems to me that this is the point that Malcolm should have made when he made the 
dstinction between saying that animals can thnk that such and such is the case. without 
having the thought that such and such is the case before their minds. Given that our 
relationshps with animals do not have the same types of complications and demands as our 
relationshps with other people, there is no need for the use of the concept thinlung in relating 
to animals to carry the same amount of logical baggage. We do not expect Malcolm’s dog to 
be aware of having made a mistake when it noticed the cat’s tail hangrng down from the 
maple tree, nor do we expect it to be aware of having been duped for the third time in 
succession by the same mischevous cat; nor do we expect it to be aware of the fact that the 
oak tree is the oldest tree in sight, or that the maple tree is the one the cat disappeared into the 
time before and the time before that. The different ways in whch the concept dunking is used 
with regard to animals and people is registered in the different ways in which we relate to 
animals and people. Many of the complications and demands which are constitutive of our 
relationships with other people are not constitutive of our relationshps with animals, even 
those animals whch are closest to us. But ths  means that we can legitimately use the concept 
thinlung in relating to animals without logically implymg that they are capable of having 
thoughts before their minds, and hence without having to agree that we are using a mode of 
explanation that goes beyond what the situation and their behaviour merits. 
In making this point I do not mean to deny that it makes sense to talk of wild animals as thinking. 
Although we are not involved in relationships with them, they are not so radically different from trained 
domestic animals in their behaviour and appearance that we would find it unnatural to use mental 
concepts in understanding their behaviour. We study wild animals from a distance as interested 
spectators, when we stand back and watch them at phywith other animals, as they mzmick each 
other’s bodily movements, or as they f ollowrhe lead of the dominant one, as they engage in patterns of 
behaviour and relationships natural to both humans and animals alike, and so on, and so forth. 
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So we might understand our use of the concept thdung with regard to animals if we see it as 
determined by the form of these particular relationshps, and this means that we have to 
acknowledge that we are using it in a slightly drfferent sense with regard to animals fiom the 
senses in whch we use it with regard to other people. So rather than say that we cannot use 
the concept thmlung with regard to animals because they cannot be involved in human 
relationships, we might say that in using the concept thuzking with regard to animals, we are 
using it in a manner appropriate to the forms of their relationshps, both with human beings 
and with other animals. The different uses we make of the concept thrnlung with regard to 
animals and people is therefore registered in the different forms that our relationshps take, 
and this should be seen as hghhghting a further fiagment of the concept thmlung, in addrtion 
to its already fragmented uses with regard to other people. The point of recopsing this 
particular use of the concept thdung is that it allows us to see how mentalistic explanations 
can be legitimately used with regard to certain languageless creatures, even though such 
creatures do not live in a world, in the sense of being responsive to those features of their 
situations that present them with reasons for acting in certain ways, or feeling certain h g s .  
So we can maintain the distinction between living in a world and living in an environment, 
and we can maintain the intnnsic connection between having the capacity to k n k  and having 
the capacity to be involved in human relationshps, and yet we can also continue to explain 
animal behaviour in mentalistic terms, without having to a h t  that we are not quite correct to 
do  SO.^ 
Computers and machmes seem to present a hrther problematic case for my thesis; the obvious 
objection is to say that as technology advances further and further, it will eventually be beyond question 
to say that computers and machines can think. But in an interesting discussion, Dreyfbs (1994) raises a 
number o f  objections to the idea that computers and machines can think, most o f  which stem fiom the 
central claim that thinking presupposes having a background of  common-sense knowledge which 
cannot be encoded into the format required to drive computer and machine programmes. He makes 
much of  the fact that thinking requires having the ability to zero-in on salient features o f  our situation 
and to ignore features which might have been salient given a different set of  circumstances, to make 
relevant generalisations between situations, to learn fiom mistakes, and so on, all of which presuppose 
that we are in actual fact ‘in a situation’, that we have the needs, interests and concerns, in terms of  
which features o f  our situation are salient or relevant, and which cannot be had by disembafied 
computers and machines. This seems correct, but it also seems correct to say that if the computers and 
machines (and this goes for aliens too) were embodied, if they had the skills and abilities that 
disembodied ones lack, if they could interact with the rest of us in a near enough ordinary manner, then 
it would no longer be clear-cut whether they could be said to think or not. For as Hanfling (1991) 
rightly points out, if such machines had an array o f  personal and moral qualities, if they could make 
various types of  demands on us, and hence ifthey were ‘persons’ in this respect, then it would only be 
a prejudice (artzfactism, to be precise) to refise to say that they could think. Indeed, if we regard the 
word ‘think’ as part o f  the way in which we relate to each other, as I have been arguing, then it might 
turn out to be an effort to resist taking it for granted that Hanfling’s machines could think. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
The chef aim of this thesis has been to argue that the autonomous nature of mentalistic 
explanation imposes a strong constraint on what counts as a satisfactory statement of the 
relation between the mental and the physical. It has been argued that there is a deeper extent 
to the autonomous nature of mentalistic explanation than can be appreciated w i h  the 
metaphysical framework of non-reductive physicalism. Withm that framework, the 
autonomous nature of mentalistic explanation turns out to be a matter of the irreducibility of 
mental concepts to physical concepts. But I have claimed that h s  is not sufficient. In 
addition to the requirement that mental concepts are irreducible to physical concepts, there is 
a stronger requirement whch cannot be met within this metaphysical fiamework. The 
stronger requirement is that a satisfactory statement of the relation between the mental and 
the physical must be sensitive to the fact that mentalistic explanations are autonomous in the 
much deeper sense that they can carry out the work required of them without having to derive 
explanatory support from physicalistic explanations in canylng out the work required of 
them. 
I argued in the second chapter that the basic reason why the deeper extent of mental 
autonomy has not been appreciated is that the metaphysical principles integral to the non- 
reductivist 's framework yield a statement of the relation between the mental and the physical 
whch is inconsistent with it. The consequence of adopting these principles is that the mental 
has to be seen to be embedded in the physical structure of the world, and mentalistic 
explanations must therefore converge on the very same subject matter as physicalistic 
explanations, in the sense that both explain the occurrence of the same events, albeit using 
hfferent modes of description. Once the mental is related to the physical in the manner 
demanded by the metaphysical principles of physicalism, the most that can be acknowledged 
is that the modes of description and explanation whch converge on the same events in fact 
diverge in their respective methodologes. But the basicness and completeness of the 
explanatory resources of the physical sciences make it impossible for mentalistic 
explanations to work successfully on their own, since whatever work is carried out by 
mentalistic explanations will have to be supported by the underlying physicalistic 
explanations of these same events. So whereas the metaphysical framework of non-reductive 
physicalism seems suitably structured to recognise the requirement that mentalistic 
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explanations are irreducible to physicalistic explanations, its principles impose an ordering 
onto reality that prevent it fi-om recogwing the fact that mentalistic explanations can carry 
out their work without having to derive explanatory support from physicalistic explanations. 
In the fifth chapter, where I d~scussed the nature of rationalising explanations, I argued that 
matters might actually be worse than this. I argued that the metaphysical framework of non- 
reductive physicalism comes dangerously close to undermining mental autonomy altogether, 
since doubts have arisen over the causal efficacy of mental properties in the physical world. 
The problem is that the non-reductivist can secure mental autonomy only in so far as the 
rationalising mode of explanation is guaranteed to be irreducible to the physicalistic mode of 
explanation, but in order to combine this aspect of mental autonomy with the principles of 
physicalism, he must construe rationalising explanations as a species of causal explanation, 
where the important causal processes are implemented at the physical level. But if it is correct 
to argue that mental properties can be regarded as real and autonomous features of the world 
only in so far as they mherit their causal efficacy fi-om the underlying physical properties 
which constitute their realisation base, then it follows that mental propewes have no 
independent causal role to play in the physical world. And if this is the case, then 
rationalising explanations cannot be construed as a species of causal explanation in the 
desired sense, without riskmg the loss of their autonomy to the physicalistic mode of 
explanation altogether. There seems to be no genuine explanatory work left for the 
rationalising mode of explanation to carry out once the physicalistic mode of explanation has 
carried out its work, and the mental thereby threatens to be nothmg more than an 
epiphenomenal feature of the physical world. 
My position is that if we take the contexts of our everyday relationships as the focal point of 
our investigation into the nature of our explanatory practices, then we can begin to meet the 
requirements imposed on us by the autonomous nature of mentalistic explanations. We can 
do this because we will be able to determine whether mentalistic explanations are successful 
by determining whether they satis& the understanding sought by each individual in his or her 
own relationshp. What counts as a successful mentahstic explanation will be judged relative 
to the contexts of OLU involvement in relationshps with each other, and hence the question of 
the success of mentalistic explanations in carrying out the work required of them will be 
independent of the question of the success of physicalistic explanations in carryrng out the 
work required of them. However, I pointed out that it was not sufficient for my argument to 
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claim that mentalistic and physicalistic explanations have different criteria for success, since 
the mere fact that mentalistic explanations carry out their work accordtng to dtfferent 
standards does not establish that mentalistic explanations are autonomous in the deeper sense. 
It could still be the case that mentalistic explanations have to derive explanatory support from 
physicalistic explanations, even though their success in carrying out their work is assessed 
accordmg to different criteria. 
For this reason, I pointed out that it would be necessary to demonstrate that mentalistic 
explanations can indeed work separately fiom physicalistic explanations, and for that purpose 
I developed a non-causal approach to rationalising explanations. The non-causal approach 
was built on the intrinsic connection I drew between the nature of dunlung and the nature of 
human relationships. The main point was that rationalising explanations explain our actions 
in terms of our responsiveness to the demands of the situations in which we find ourselves, 
which they can do without implicating the explanatory resources of the physical sciences. It is 
only if we must assume that the notion of causality, in the partxular sense required by the 
physicalist, must be built into the notion of what it means to act for a reason, that we are 
forced to say that mentalistic explanations cannot cany out their work independently of 
physicalistic explanations. 
The upshot of all of tlus is that once we reject the metaphysical fiamework of non-reductive 
physicalism, and take our successful explanatory practices as our starting point, we can meet 
both requirements for recognising mental autonomy: first of all, mentalistic explanations are 
irreducible to physicalistic explanations because the success of mentalistic explanations in 
carrying out their work is assessed relative to their ability to satisfjr the understanding we seek 
in our everyday relationshps with each other, whch is distinct from the understandmg sought 
by neurobiologists in studying the hctioning of the brain and the human nervous system; 
second, mentalistic explanations can carry out their work successfully without deriving 
explanatory support from physicalistic explanations in carrying out their work, since 
mentalistic explanations do not explain the same thmg as physicalistic explanations, namely, 
the causation of behaviour by internal physical events and processes. 
The central claim of ~s thesis is that a satisfactory statement of the relation between the 
mental and the physical is one whch is constrained by the autonomous nature of mentalistic 
explanation in the deep sense. Therefore, I suggest that in stating this relation, we should take 
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our cue fiom the considerations whch have put us into position to meet the two requirements 
outlined above. What h s  means is that we should avoid tqmg to find a means of articulating 
the relation between the mental and the physical that would enable us to reconcile the 
embeddedness of the mental in the physical structure of the world with the irreducibility of 
mental concepts to physical concepts. We should rather try to conceive t h ~ s  relation in such a 
manner that is consistent with the distinction between mentalistic and physicalistic 
explanations as they are they are ordinarily employed in our everyday explanatory practices. 
a s  lstinction can be respected if we hnk of it as expressing the dualism implicit in the 
concept of what it means to be a human being: that human beings are subject to physicalistic 
explanation is to say that human beings are creatures whose life has a natural biological 
dtmension; that human beings are subject to mentalistic explanation is to say that human 
beings have a life to live in the world with other people. 
The relation between the mental and the physical might therefore be understood in terms of 
the fact that the bctioning of the brain and the rest of the nervous system serves as a causal 
enabling condition for human beings to live their lives in the world with each other. As such, 
it is not correct to say that the mental is embedded in the physical structure of the world; 
rather is it embedded in the world in which human beings live their lives.’ l b s  world is 
constituted as such through the involvement of human beings in various types of relationships 
with each other. For a human being to have a mind is for hrm to have a life to live in the 
world. For a human being to have a life to live in the world is for h m  to have a conceptually 
constituted orientation in the different situations in which he finds hmself, whch has been 
developed and shaped into a stable and lasting outlook through the long and complicated 
process in whch he learned to relate to others. Thls process of development is not a causal 
process, characteristic of the physical dimension of human life; rather is it a nonnatively 
constrained process of concept acquisition, characteristic of the dimension of human life in 
whch we are involved in various types of relationshps with each other. It is the latter 
dtmension of human life whch provides the contexts in whch the mental can be said to be 
embedded, and the physical dimension of human life can be said to sustain our life in the 
world by malung various features of it causally possible. 
As Wittgenstein ( 1  980b: Q 16) neatly puts it: “In this case I have used the term “embedded”, have said 
that hope, belief, etc., were embedded in human life, in all the situations and reactions which constitute 
human life.” 
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In order to articulate the relation between the mental and the physical more clearly than h s ,  
it would be necessary to engage in an empirical inquiry into the hfferent ways in which the 
brain serves as an enabling conhtion that makes our lives in the world causally possible. But 
however ihs inquq should turn out, I suggest that it ought to be conducted with a sensitivity 
to the constraint presented by the autonomous nature of mentalistic explanation in the deeper 
sense. So rather than focusing on a way of incorporating the mental into the physical structure 
of the world by means of unifjing principles whch purport to justi@ the claim that mental 
states and events just are physical states and events, the focus ought to be restricted to a way 
of explaining how the functioning of the brain and the nervous system plays a causal role in 
sustaining the individual’s everyday activities. To take the former approach is to force a 
structure onto the world whose upshot is to interfere with the way in whch our mentalistic 
explanations are actually used. To take the latter approach is to recopse the soundness of 
the methodologcal point that we ought to take our inqulry no fiuther than is warranted by the 
nature of our everyday explanatory practices. And this, I have been arguing, is to recognise 
the strong constraint imposed by the deep extent of the autonomous nature of mentalistic 
explanation. 
Perhaps such an inquiry would reveal a limitation in my position, however, since I have not 
taken into consideration the fact that the treatment of certain mental disorders involves the 
use of drugs to control the release of specific chemicals in the brain, for instance, whch 
suggests that there are points at whch mentalistic explanations of these sorts are directly 
supported by physicalistic explanations. We can successfully explain why some individuals 
are mentally unstable by reference to their neurobiological condition, and we can temporarily 
exert some control over their mental condition by effectmg the relevant changes in their 
neurobiological condition. We can also explain why an individual is suddenly afi-aid of the 
candlestick on the mantelpiece, why he h n k s  that he has the ability to fly, or to make hmself 
invisible at will, by reference to the chemical changes in his brain effected by the intake of 
hallucinogenic drugs. What tlus suggests is that there is a hfference between the type of 
mentalistic explanations employed in our everyday relationships with each other, and the type 
of mentalistic explanations employed in the treatment of mental dsorders, or in the context 
of abnormal behaviour induced by interfering with the levels of chemicals released in the 
brain. So the constraint presented by the autonomous nature of mentalistic explanation in the 
deep sense will have to be relaxed somewhat in these circumstances; but I am not sure that I 
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could provide a means of clearly ddnguishmg between these cases, and the cases in which I 
have argued that the constraint should be more strictly adhered to.2 
What I have also claimed in ths  thesis is that there is an intrinsic connection between the 
nature of the mental and the nature of our involvement in various types of human 
relationshps, which is to say that the meaning of our mental concepts is inseparable fiom the 
circumstances and situations in whch they are used as part of the way in whch we relate to 
each other. To have a grasp of the meaning of our mental concepts is to know how to relate in 
endless ways to different people; it is to know how to cope with the demands that other 
people present to us throughout the course of our lives. There is no gap between what it 
means to know the meaning of mental concepts and what it means to know how to relate to 
other people. What we mean when we talk about the mental is thus intrinsically connected to 
what we mean when we talk about our involvement in relationships with other people, which 
is to say that our talk about the mental is talk about the way in wlxch we live out OUT lives in 
the company of others. It might even be said, therefore, that our mental concepts are the ways 
in whch we relate to each other, when we are moved by another person’s expression of 
emotion, when we are touched by their declaration of affection, when we state our concerns 
and intentions, or quite simply when we show an interest in certain aspects of each other’s 
lives.3 
Mentalistic explanations are thus geared toward understanding others as responding to the 
demands of the situations in which they find themselves; they are geared toward 
understanding others as living out their lives in the world which has been shaped and 
structured through their involvement in various types of human relationships. Mentalistic 
explanations are subject to the normative and rationalistic constraints generated withm the 
contexts of human relationslxps, and successful mentalistic explanations are those which 
satis@ the understanding sought by the individuals concerned within the context of their own 
particular relationshp. But there is no need to regard mentalistic explanations as a species of 
Perhaps the distinction might be drawn in terms of the distinction between everyday and non- 
everyday relationships. It could be said that the concepts used in discussing the effects of using certain 
types of drugs in the treatment of mental disorders are explanatory concepts whose meanings are fixed 
by their usage in these specific medical contexts. Which is to say that although the uses of these 
concepts in explaining behaviour are directly tied to the individual’s neurobiological condition, this is 
justified within my position by the fact that they carry out their explanatory work within the contexts of 
non-every day relationships. 
Or, as Hertzberg (1983: 106) puts it: “the way human expressions move and affect us ... in a sense, is 
what constitutes our mental concepts.” 
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causal explanation, since that move is motivated by the idea that it is the only way to 
guarantee the fact that what an individual tt.lmks is explanatory of what he does. But this is 
not what we should say. What we should say is this: the fact that what an individual thinks is 
explanatory of what he does is guaranteed by the fact that this is  how we actually explain 
each other’s behaviour. 
This suggests that the concept of thought might be regarded as an explanatory concept, which 
finds application withm the dimension of human life that is constituted by our involvement in 
various types of human relationslups. The fact that what an individual thinks is explanatory of 
what he does is a grammatical fact concerning what we mean when we talk about thdung 
and acting, and what we mean when we talk about thinking and acting is exhaustible within 
the contexts in whch we make use of these concepts in relating to each other. To suppose 
that there has to be certain metaphysical connections between the mental and the physical, in 
order that what an individual thinks can be said to be explanatory of what he does, is to 
overlook the point that we are concerned with a grammatical explanation of these concepts. 
The metaphysical framework of non-reductive physicalism treats this grammatical fact as 
standing in need of further justification, and in implementing that framework our explanatory 
practices suffer the distortion that appears to prevent mentalistic explanations from being 
completely adequate to their own tasks. But if we regard the fact that thidung explains acting 
as grammatical, then we need not attempt to ground it metaphysically. It is rather an 
explanation of what we generally mean when we talk about the uses of the concepts thinlung 
and acting in everyday situations, as when we say, for example, that the trecker is checlng 
his map because he thinks he might have taken a wrong turning somewhere, or that the riot 
police have called for military reinforcements because they dunk the crowds are getting out 
of control. 
The intrinsic connection between the nature of the mental and the nature of human 
relationshps also lughlights an essential moral dimension to our talk about the mental whxh 
might be further developed along the following lines. To be responsive to the demands that 
other people present to us in our relationshps with them is, among other things, a moral 
achievement. Through the proper cultivation of our basic attitudes, through the experiences 
we have at different times in our lives, we learn to see others as makmg various demands on 
us, as constraining our natural inclinations and tendencies, as obligating us to treat them in 
certain ways. We develop an outlook on our lives through the guidance we receive fi-om our 
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parents, and later from our teachers and fhends, whch not only serves to define us as the 
individuals we are, but which at the same time sustains and shapes our relationshps with 
others. We are at the same time actively involved in shaping that definition ourselves, when 
we undertake to improve or correct aspects of our lives we are not satisfied with, and 
sometimes more passively, through the subtle changes to our moods and attitudes which may 
result when we are drawn into revealing different aspects of our lives to different people. The 
ways in whch other people respond to us contributes to our conception of ourselves, and the 
ways in whch we conceive ourselves contributes to the sense of worth and value which we 
subsequently bring to our relationships with other people. The moral aspect of our mental 
concepts is brought out by their uses w i t h  the contexts of our relationships, which we learn 
to use correctly in the course of learning to relate to others: we regard an indwidual in pain as 
someone toward whom pity is an appropriate attitude to have; we regard an individual in 
&stress as someone toward whom comfort is an appropriate attitude to have. 
Part of what is involved in understanding the meaning of our mental concepts is 
understanding the fact that other people make demands on us, which we are responsive to 
through having developed the attitudes toward others which sustain our moral vision in these 
cases. Our moral vision is not a purely cogmtive one, however, whch provides us with an 
understanding of how we ought to respond to others by providing us with a normatively 
constrained interpretation of what happens to be the case. Rather is our moral vision 
inseparable fiom our emotional and affective natures, which provides us with the type of 
orientation toward others that makes such a task of interpretation seem superfluous. Leaving 
room to accommodate exceptions, it can be said that our understanding of what happens to 
be the case is already our understanding of how we ought to respond to others, because the 
concepts drawn on in specifjring the content of our moral judgements are inseparable fiom 
the ways in which we actually relate to each other in the normal course of things. Sometimes 
we do not respond as we know we ought to, and occasionally our judgements are distorted or 
clouded by various factors; but this is not to detract fiom the point that the factual judgement 
that the individual is in pain draws on concepts whose normative implications are already in 
place, presentmg us with a reason to offer him comfort, care, pity and so 
~~ ~ 
According to Luntley ( 199 1 : 179- 18 1 ), the normative implications grasped in circumstances like this 
one are in fact constitutive of our experiences. T€us is an interesting point. It supports the claim that in 
perceiving that an individual is in pain, we are immediately presented with a reason to respond to that 
individual in a particular manner. Our perceptron of the fact that he is in pain is at the same time our 
perception of the fact that a certain course of action is appropriate in these circumstances. 
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Finally, in claiming that there is an intrinsic connection between the nature of the mental and 
the nature of human relationshps, I have used the notion of presence to express the way in 
whch features of the world in whch we live can figure in our hnkmg as giving us reasons 
for acting in certain ways and feeling certain things. What this thesis has not touched on, 
which is c e r t d y  relevant to the plausibility of the latter claim, is the question of whether this 
same notion can be used to develop a non-causal account of what it means to perceive 
somethmg. To suppose that our ordinary concept of perception must somehow express the 
fkct that a causal transaction is talung place between object and perceiver is indeed tempting, 
gven that we would not be able to see or hear somehng if it did not bring about a 
neurophysiological change in our bodies. The central issue to be addressed would be whether 
the causal transaction between the object and the perceiver at the level of neurophysiological 
change has to be imported into our ordinary understanding of what we mean when we say 
that an individual perceives sometfitng. 
One way in whch the causal theory has been motivated, leaning more on epistemological 
than physiological concerns, has been to appeal to the idea that perception is a way of 
informing ourselves about the world of independently existing thmgs.’ The crux of the 
argument is h s :  if we thmk of perception as a way of informing ourselves about the way 
things are in the world independently of the way we take thngs to be, then we are forced to 
admit that the notion of causality must be built into the concept of what it means to perceive 
somethmg. We have to assume the causal dependence of our perceptual experiences on the 
independently existing thmgs we take them to be of, otherwise our experiences could not be 
said to inform us about the way the independently existing world happens to be. And if we do 
assume h s  causal dependence as necessary to explaining the reliability of the information 
conveyed by our perceptual experiences, then it follows that the notion of causality must be 
built into our ordinary conception of what it means to perceive somethmg. 
What is problematic about the causal theory of perception is that it assumes that there is a 
merely extrinsic connection between our perceptual experiences and the objects of whch they 
are experiences. Or in other words, it assumes that the experience of seeing the cat jump onto 
the table, for instance, is extrinsically connected to the fact that the cat is jumping onto the 
table, and that the experience only has the content it has in virtue of the way it has been 
caused in the perceiver. l h s  account of perception does not mesh neatly with the account of 
This particular route to the causal theory of perception is outlined by Strawson (1979). 
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thinking I have developed, since it posits an extrinsic connection between our perceptual 
experiences and the objects we perceive whch would cohere rather neatly with the basic 
ideas expressed in the physicalist’s conception of thought. The internal event would be the 
perceptual experience, and the external factor would be the object perceived. But if we can 
develop an account of perception, which appeals to the notion of presence as a way of 
expressing the intrinsic connection between our perceptual experiences and the objects we 
perceive, then we will be able to thlnk of perceiving as a unitary act in which the 
independently existing object figures as a constituent part! This would block an important 
escape route for the physicalist, since it would block the possibility of separating the 
perceptual experience from the object perceived in the required sense. But more importantly, 
it would suggest a means of extending some of the ideas developed in my approach to 
thnking and acting to cover our perceptual capacities. The larger aim of extending the results 
of h s  thesis to cover our perceptual capacities, which I would consider satisfactory, would 
be to provide a unified account of thought, perception and action, which would not only 
allow us to thnk of human beings as subject to both mentalistic and physicalistic 
explanations, but which would allow us to do ths  whilst respecting the deeper extent of the 
autonomous nature of mentalistic explanations. 
For an example of how perception might be understood in terms of presence, see Olafson (1995: 46- 
86); but see also the disjunctive conception of vision as outlined in Snowdon (1980-l), and McDowell 
( 1  988). And for a more recent debate over the causal and non-causal theory of perception, see Hyman 
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